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John Milton, William Blake and the
History of Individualism
The justification of "the ways of God to man" in Paradise Lost draws upon
a history of classical and Christian theories of justice. According to these theories,
justice is a virtue and has less to do with positive law than it does with individual
wisdom. These theories of justice as a virtue are conceptually dependent upon
the doctrine of the Platonic/Christian soul and a certain form of pre-modern
individualism. In response to the emergent modern individualism of his day
Milton asserted a neo-Platonic conception of truth and order. According to this
metaphysical theory, the individual, because he or she is endowed with a soul, can
attain knowledge of a transcendent and eternal realm of truth through private
contemplation.
Although Romanticism has been seen by some critics, such as Harold
Bloom, to promulgate a modern form of individualism, this thesis will argue that
William Blake's poetry challenges both Milton's traditional doctrine of the
individual soul with its personal relationship to God and the modern concept of
subjectivity.
Historians of ideas are united in locating the emergence of modern
individualism in the seventeenth century with modern individualism being a
hallmark of capitalist and increasingly secular societies. This modern form of
individualism is rejected by both Blake and Milton, but whereas Milton challenges
modern individualism by reasserting an earlier hierarchical individualism, Blake
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2
The subject of this thesis is the historical relationship between two poets
- John Milton and William Blake - and is less a study of influence than an exercise
in the history of ideas. Indeed, this thesis will challenge the standard picture of
poetic influence which has operated in discussions of Blake's relationship to
Milton. The most influential Blake/Milton criticism to date (the work of Joseph
Wittreich) has set itself the task of defining a "line of vision" which supposedly
connects the two poets across history and diverges from its course only to impose
the occasional correction to a unified vision.
This emphasis on continuity and shared vision began in 1935 when the
relationship between Blake and Milton received full-length treatment in Saurat's
Blake andMilton. Saurat begins his study from biographical similarities and bases
his work around one particular similarity between the two poets - their dualism,
a feature which Saurat had identified as central to Milton's work in his study
Milton: Man and Thinker. Relying heavily upon perceived similarities between
Blake and Milton he identifies a "powerful egotism" that both writers were seen
to possess.1 Saurat then undertakes an examination of the life circumstances of
both poets and shows the ways in which biographical similarities produced poetry
of the same tone. For example, he sees all the beliefs and efforts of the two poets
as "owing to pride"2 and then argues that this produces a certain type of poetry in
which "Milton is . . . the veritable hero of Paradise Lost" and "Blake is the hero
of his Prophetic Books."3 Any differences between the two poets are explained,
also biographically, as due to "a lack of self-control" on the part of Blake. There
is no distinction in kind between the two poets, so that the "different
circumstances modif[y] the garb rather than the essentials."4 Neither historical
circumstances nor particular differences of belief are considered as meaningful in
dealing with the relationship between Blake and Milton. IfMilton's texts appear
to privilege reason more than those of Blake, Saurat attributes this to the greater
ability of the earlier poet to control his passions: "Milton's high idea of himself led
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him to keep a firm control over his nature." In assuming that the two poets write
from the same basic impulse Saurat is the first in a long line of critics who will
read Blake as a modified repetition of the earlier poet "with only differences of
degree."5 S. Foster Damon's work on Blake, and more particularly his brief
article on Blake and Milton, also adopts Saurat's dichtomised view of the two
poets, claiming that differences between them are due to a greater emphasis on
passion rather than reason in the later poet.6
The major contemporary Blake/Milton critic, Joseph Wittreich, explicitly
articulates his critical approach within theories of prophecy and eschatology.
According to Wittreich, the true prophet is impersonal, other-worldly and a
participant in the transcendent Word rather than its creator:
Isolated from the visionary line, the prophet is speechless; touching it he
becomes articulate, even to the point of engaging (as Milton does with
Spenser, and Blake with Milton) in corrective criticism. This corrective
function is validated by the fact that, while prophets communicate with one
another, they all derive their vision from Christ; they are all ministers of
the Word.7 '
This concept of "corrective" criticism is then used by Wittreich and other
commentators to discuss Blake's illustrations of Milton. Pamela Dunbar, for
example, argues that "instead of making any radical statements of his texts he
[Blake] confined himself to releasing the insights which he considered to be
hidden beneath them."8 Bette Charlene Werner sees Blake's illustrations as a
"rethinking of Milton's themes, in which the insights that he sees as true are
isolated, while the ideas he regards as confinements or distortions are rejected."9
She thereby characterises the later poet's strategy as a process of sifting through
visionary and non-visionary elements of the earlier poet: "In illustrating Milton's
works, Blake can be seen then to first remove the veiling errors and then to affirm
the essential verities that he finds."10 Such an argument presupposes that Milton's
works contained a latent truth or "essential verities" which became distorted in
their literary manifestation. Such distortions supposedly stemmed from this
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essential truth being brought within a personal, contingent or historical
articulation. Blake then supposedly "frees" the vision from its temporal vagaries
in order to bring Milton's vision into line with its actual intention. If Blake is
seen to offer any counter argument, this is not interpreted as a difference as such,
but rather as a making manifest of what Milton articulated unwittingly,
unconsciously or only partially. According to Stephen Behrendt:
Hence Blake wishes to liberate Milton's vision, not by changing it radically,
but by expressing it in its original, unfettered state, free of its
encumbrances, revealing it in its original glory.11
According to Stephen Behrendt, Blake's illustrations release the eternal meaning
in texts which have fallen into temporality. For Behrendt "corrective criticism" is
a process whereby "illustrations concentrate upon the enduring vision implicit in
Milton's poetry regardless of - and sometimes in Blake's case in spite of - the time
and place in which that poetry was being read and discussed."12 Wittreich,
eventually, sees Blake's work, not even as correction but rather as an expansion
of Milton's project: "Jerusalem is not a correction of Milton's vision but an
extension and amplification of it, an envisioning of the universal redemption that
Paradise Regained and Milton presage."13 It cannot be denied that the idea of
prophecy and the tradition of apocalypse were important to both Blake and
Milton. However, there is a difference between identifying a theory of meaning
as a subject in a series of works and employing that theory to read those works.
An alternative to Wittreich's notion of the "line of vision" is provided by
Harold Bloom's concept of the struggle involved in dealing with precursor poets.
Bloom's theory of poetic influence depends largely upon a certain reading of
Milton's Satan, a figure he sees as the "archetype of the modern poet at his
strongest."14 The presuppositions of Bloom's theory of influence are in fact
founded upon the values the figure of Satan embodies. Bloom describes the
Satanic anxiety as the inability to deal with the fallen condition of poetry - that the
poet will never be absolutely autonomous: "For the poet is condemned to learn
his profoundest yearnings through an awareness of other selves."15
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In contrast to these views of literary influence, this thesis will examine what
I see as the fundamentally opposed philosophical presuppositions of Milton and
Blake. In so doing, one of the implicit challenges will be to question Harold
Bloom's theory of influence in which poets, particularly Romantic poets, play out
an oedipus complex against their father poet (usually Milton). Like the theorists
of a "line of vision" Bloom discounts the historical context of particular poets and
then imposes a twentieth century Freudian conception of self upon the Romantics.
According to Bloom, Romantic self-consciousness is epitomised byMilton's Satan;
the Romantic poets themselves are analogous to the rebelling Satan. In contrast
I will argue that such a definition actually applies least of all to Blake, who
challenges the conception of selfhood in both its traditional and modern forms,
as well as the philosophical presuppositions which ground those forms of
individualism.
This study will therefore draw upon several major works in the history of
ideas which examine the emergence of the concept of subjectivity from the older
forms of Christian individualism. In order to discern the general transition from
Milton's seventeenth century to Blake's modern world, important differences
between various historians of ideas will unavoidably be missed. However, as my
main area of focus will be Milton's and Blake's response to the ideas of their time,
a general picture of this history of ideas will show how Milton and Blake
considered their world without unduly emphasising the debates over the actual
character of that world.
The main conceptual opposition which this thesis explores is the grounding
dichotomy of Platonic philosophy: the distinction between this world ofmatter and
the other world of transcendent forms. This opposition is at the basis of the
difference between pre-moaern transcendent definitions of the self and modern
concepts of the worldly subject. It is also the opposition which grounds a history
of debate over the relationship between the transcendent affairs of the church and
its relation to the temporal state - or between divine law and positive law.
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Furthermore, this opposition has been inextricably intertwined with the definition
of gender in Western philosophy; the bodily or feminine is associated with
material mundanity while masculinity is alignedwith rationality and transcendence.
Blake's most famous statements about Milton, in The Marriage of Heaven and
Hell, occur in a context in which it is declared that without contraries there is no
progression. The history of certain conceptual dichotomies, their hierarchical
ordering, and the concomitant definitions of the self will therefore be the context
against which Blake's response to Milton is set.
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Chapter One:
Individualism, the Soul and Reason.
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The seventeenth century is considered one of the most important periods
for the history of ideas. While the decline of feudalism, scholasticism and religion
was already well under way by the Renaissance, it is in seventeenth-century writers
such as Hobbes, Descartes and Locke that the flourishing of capitalism, bourgeois
humanism, economic thought, science and modern philosophy truly attain their
expression. According to various historians of ideas, the shift from feudalism to
capitalism entails a new way of seeing; relations between persons which were
initially political become economic. That is, from polls - being an expression of
the self in a social context - we shift to system or mechanism - which is a
collection of selves. There is a move from unity to plurality, from a closed
interacting organism to an open mechanism, from a theistically centred theory of
knowledge to an evidential epistemology, from a system of innate value to
exchange value and from a world of various determinate essences to a world of
uniform matter. In examining this movement in the history of thought I will refer
primarily to Martin Heidegger and Louis Dumont although other writers - such
as Alexandre Koyre, Karl Popper, A.O. Lovejoy, Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer and more recently, Hans Blumenberg - have also stressed the
importance of the seventeenth century as the period in which modern ways of
seeing are established.1 By examining Milton, and later Blake, within the context
of modern thought it will become evident that both poets react against the
movement towards modern "open" societies (although in different ways). Milton
reinforces and rejuvenates the pre-modern world-view while Blake sees both the
modern and pre-modern ways of seeing as symptomatic of the same loss of vision.
Martin Heidegger's distinction between the modern "mathematical"
conception of being and the ancient and scholastic world-view depends upon a
certain reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics and Descartes's Meditations.1 What
follows is a summary of Heidegger's conclusions and the significance of
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Heidegger's thought for the conclusions of other historians of ideas. Heidegger's
reading is important for our study insofar as Descartes's work is seen by
Heidegger as providing both the foundation of modern metaphysics as well as the
definitive conception of subjectivity - a concept which has been important for
studies of Romanticism and the Romantic poet's relation to Milton.3 Heidegger's
analysis of the emergence of the concept of the "subject" is situated within, and
seen as dependent upon, the Cartesian conception of the world. In order to
clarify the meaning of the Cartesian project Heidegger first delineates the ancient
conception of the world against which Descartes, Galileo and Newton react.
Although Heidegger cites Aristotle as exemplary of this pre-modern conception,
I will be situating Milton within a Platonic metaphysic; the point to be drawn,
nevertheless, is the same. Heidegger's reading of Aristotle sets out to
demonstrate a particular world-view which is pre-modern in general and this is my
purpose in reading Plato. The differences, then, between Plato and Aristotle (and
they are by no means insignificant) are secondary in this case to what the two
have in common.4 In fact, it is the general background and shared metaphysic,
despite the differences, which are important. In reading Milton with this
background in mind I hope to demonstrate, not that Milton is Platonic nor that
he is Aristotelian, but rather that he is, by and large, pre-modern and that those
aspects of his thought which at first seem particularly modern - his individualism
- are actually argued from the point of view of a pre-modern logic.5
Aristotle's discussion of nature in the Metaphysics delineates various categories
of being. Being is by no means uniform. Each entity has its own character and
its own way of movement. Heavenly bodies, for example, possess spherical
movement in accord with their nature. The entity's movement and way of being
is defined immanently, in accord with its nature. Hence, we cannot use the word
"being" univocally. (When this idea was taken up by the Scholastics it was claimed
that there was only one being that truly is, that needs no other being in order to
be - God - and that all other being exists analogously.) What is important here
is the belief that each entity has its own immanent particularity and quality. When
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we look at Descartes's ontology this picture will shift dramatically, but for the
moment it will be useful to see how Aristotle's idea of nature (which became the
foundation of mediaeval ideas of the great chain of being) can be related in its
logic to the Platonic conception of the soul, the forms and virtue.
According to the Phaedo the soul's relation to truth can only be distorted
by the body; the soul's true way of being is fulfilled only when it acts
independently from the body in a state of total autonomy:
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of
these things trouble her - neither sounds nor sights nor pains nor any
pleasure, - when she takes leave of the body, and has as little to do with
it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being k6
The soul, therefore, has a certain character and pre-determined way of being
which ought not depend on any other being. Knowledge is essentially attained
through contemplation which, though private, yields access to a universal realm
of truth. Activity in the world is primarily social and political (the virtuous citizen
of the republic is other-directed) but the aim and foundation of action is the
transcendent realm of truth which can only be contaminated if confused with the
shadows of this world. The soul is therefore radically individual in its
other-worldly directedness while dictating a distinctly social, collectivist conception
of selfhood in the world. The connection between the two realms (the
other-worldly and this world) is virtue - which can only be known in private
contemplation but which forms the foundation of political, moral and social being.7
The soul in this world must be purified from the body and this can be achieved
through contemplation. The soul may ascend towards transcendence or become
embodied if captured by the desires of the world.8
When Socrates discusses virtue in the Phaedo he insists that virtue cannot
be defined in relation to anything else. Like the soul, which has its own essence
distinguishing it from all other beings, virtue has its own mode of being. Virtue
is not only immanently good with its own particular value; it is also outside or
prior to any conception of economy, as it is that for which nothing else can be
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exchanged. (This rejection of economy in the discussion of virtue will become
important when we discuss Louis Dumont's theory of pre-modern human being
as Homo hierarchicus as opposed to modern Homo oeconomicus.) Socrates is at
pains to point out that virtue must not be valued for any other end, that unless
it is sought for its own sake it is not truly virtue; its being is incompatible with its
existence within any system of exchange. Virtue cannot be defined within a
quantitative conception of value; it has a quality which hierarchises all other
beings. It is not a value amongst others but rather the foundation of value itself.
In his discussion of the contemplation which leads to the knowledge of virtue
Socrates emphasises the importance ofmoral knowledge; for the wisdom of virtue
transcends any economy of value:
Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or
pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is
not the true exchange of virtue ... is there not one true currency for
which all things ought to be exchanged - and that is wisdom? And only in
wisdom's company do courage, temperance, justice - in a word, true virtue
- really exist; nor does it make any difference whether fears or pleasures
or other similar goods or evils are present or not. The virtue which is
severed from wisdom and depends on these exchanges, is a painted show
of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but the
reality consists in a purification from all these things, and in temperance,
and justice, and courage; and wisdom herself is a sort of purification.9
Because virtue is the characteristic activity of the soul, Socrates emphasises
the importance of moral knowledge, for moral knowledge enables the soul to act
in accord with its disposition to virtue. Furthermore, if the soul is inclined
towards virtue and virtue is the basis of all value, then true moral value is internal
to the self and located in the predisposition of the soul. Similarly, Aristotle's
conception of eudaimonia in his Ethics is defined as "an activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue" (1098a-270).10
Despite the fact that Aristotle rejects the Platonic doctrine of forms he still
retains the conception of each entity having its own specific mode of being.
However, for Aristotle transcendence (the good to which we are directed) is social
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(in the form of the polis) rather than metaphysical (the realm of the forms).
Nevertheless, both the Aristotelian teleological conception of being and the
Platonic doctrine of forms and essences have this in common: the behaviour and
true activity of a being (be it the human soul, a natural being or a celestial body)
is intrinsic to its ontological mode. It is neither arbitrary nor extrinsic. The soul
has a characteristic activity and that activity is virtue. Virtue cannot be sought for
any other end; for it is the natural end which the soul seeks.
When Platonism entered Christianity with Augustine it was primarily the
doctrine of the soul which was imported.11 One characteristic of the soul (which
Augustine derives from Plotinus and which was held by all the pagan Platonists)
is that the soul is in its essential nature divine, albeit in a subordinate degree. The
soul itself is neither fallen nor corrupted12 and the character of the life of the soul
in the world determines whether the soul will turn downwards towards the
corporeal or become divine via the philosophic life of contemplation. Augustine
gives an account of the journey of the soul; its destination is determined by its
divine character, while the necessity of its journeying stems from Augustine's
insistence that the soul is a creature and not a part of God.13 Divinity is,
therefore, both the soul's true essence, but also something other. The soul refers
outside itself (to God) to become what it truly is: "For God wisheth to make thee
a God; not by nature as He is son is Whom He hath begotten; but by His Gift
and Adoption" (Sermon 166.4).14 It is Satan's untimely anticipation of his divinity
in Paradise Lost, the forgetting of this difference between divinity by nature and
divinity by adoption which constitutes his fall (as well as the later fall of Eve).
What characterises Augustine specifically on this matter in the history of Christian
thought is his unambiguous emphasis upon the cause of sin arising from the will,
rather than the body:
For the body's decay, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause of the
first sin but the punishment for it, nor is it the flesh, which is subject to
decay, that makes the soul sinful; it is the sinful soul that makes the flesh
subject to decay.15
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It is not by having flesh, which the devil does not have, but by living
according to his own self, that is according to man, that man has become
like the devil. For the devil too chose to live according to his own self
when he did not adhere to the truth, and thus the falsehood that he told
had its source not in God but in himself.16
When we examine Milton's conception of the soul we can see that he too
divides the inner self into two realms and that the worldly element of the self is
not merely the body but that willful aspect of the individual enslaved to the body.
Satan's reiteration of the power ofwill in Paradise Lost is also illuminated by this
distinction between will and reason; for the will enacts the merely bodily desires
and passions if not regulated by reason. Nevertheless, despite the will's tendency
to tie reason to the body, Augustine enables a departure from the Pauline
doctrine that the flesh itself is an impediment to the activity of the soul. Only
when the will has enslaved reason to the body is the body a threat to virtue; as
long as the will acts rationally the body has a rightful place in human being.
Augustine's re-evaluation enables the possibility of the hierarchisation of the
tripartite soul rather than the radical dualism of the early scriptures.17 In
Christian Doctrine Milton envisages the redemption of the entire aspect of
human existence so that even the body will be brought to the condition of the
soul; for body and soul are not two different substances: "the whole man is soul,
and the soul the man" (CPW.6.318).
By acknowledging the importance of a subordination of the body to reason
the Milton of Comus demands, not a denial of the body, but the need for its
integration with spirit. The dualist of the masque is Comus who has separated the
desires of the body from the desires of the spirit and hence advocates unbridled
corporeal hedonism. For Comus, the only alternative to corporeal excess is total
asceticism. The Lady, on the other hand, overcomes the opposition between
excess and abstinence with the doctrine of temperance which, as Arthur Barker
notes, opposes the "ideal integration of nature and spirit to the perverse
segregation of them in favour of corrupted nature which Comus would effect."18
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At this point it is necessary to remark that integration and subordination - a
constant theme in Milton's unremitting dualism - still maintained the inferiority
of the body, despite the worth granted to the body through the Augustinian
attribution of sin to the will. As we learn from Christian Doctrine, this is because
Milton took the idea of humanity as being made in God's image to mean that the
human form itself was in some sense divine. Nevertheless, any value attributed
to the body still took into account the divine/human dichotomy and only attributed
worth to those corporeal aspects which displayed divine resemblance. Milton's
qualified acceptance of nature and the body rested upon the belief that these
forms retained vestiges of divinity in the evidence of their creation.
The Augustinian derivation of sin from the will begins to place a
spiritual/temporal dualism within the immanence of the self. The will is the aspect
of the inner self enslaved to the body while the inwardness of reason is directed
towards spiritual aims. A consequence of this theory of the inwardly divided self
is that certain forms of inner reflection have a truly ethical and Christian value -
divine contemplation, a directedness towards the soul and the activity of virtue -
whilst other forms are a positive disruption of the harmony of the tripartite soul
and represent the beginning of embodiment. Satan's excessive self-regard is
focussed on the will and autonomy; it is a self-directed rather than other-directed
form of reflection, concerned with power rather than justice, the desires of the will
rather than those of the soul.
We can see that the character of Augustine's individualism has this much
in common with Platonism: the soul has a character which determines its proper
attitude to the world. Knowledge is partly, but not totally, receptivity. What is
given to the mind can only become knowledge when brought into line with the
soui's inner light. As Etienne Gilson notes, for both Plato and Augustine "the
manner in which the mind arrives at truth does not allow us to assume that the
mind is the author of truth."19 In Augustine the light of truth is at first inner and
individual; the Word illuminates the mind which then becomes the source of
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agreement between minds.20 Insofar as Augustine can be seen to exemplify
Christian Platonism we can say that, like Plato, the soul is both central (as our
point of reference for attaining truth and the moral life) and transcendent (as
being in the world but having its nature elsewhere). Where Augustine's
Christianity emphasises individualism is in the personalising of the inner light;
transcendent value is now no longer derived from the soul as such but from the
soul's relation to God.
After Augustine an increasingly greater dichotomy between the spiritual
and temporal spheres opens in Christian thought. The world is in no sense divine
and even less so the stage upon which divinity can be attained. The possibility of
access to transcendence is located in the individual (rather than an individual as
an active member of the polis as in the Ancients). In Augustine the true direction
for this individual light is away from the world and up to God. When attention
to the world is increased in Thomistic philosophy and justified as a step on the
way towards divine contemplation, the legacy of Augustine's turn from Platonism
remains - the world is never essentially representative of other-worldly values, only
a means to attain that end as the soul is directed away from the world. When
Aquinas appropriated Aristotle it was the picture of nature - the hierarchy of
being - which he incorporated. For Aquinas the chain of being led to preparation
for the state of grace. The institution of the Church was of central importance to
the Thomistic hierarchy. The worldly hierarchy of divine orders and its institution
of sacraments was justified by the fallen nature of the world and the necessity of
ascent by degrees. The Church and its role in temporal affairs was justified by the
necessity to bridge the gap between different orders of being. For Milton,
however, the inner light and not the institution of the Church, forms the basis for
all knowledge, activity and thought. The soul can and should have a valid role in
worldly life provided its other-worldly nature is never lost from view.
While rejecting the necessity for the hierarchical orders of the Church,
Milton retains the concept of ontological hierarchy and all the theoretical
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framework this brings in train. There is a constant stress in Milton upon the
importance of subordinating human to divine being and within human being
subordinating the body to the soul. This hierarchy is justified because it is
dictated by Scripture and the power of reason. On the other hand, the
intra-worldly hierarchies characteristic of feudal government and the mediaeval
Church have no basis in reason and are arbitrarily instituted by human law for the
purposes of temporal gain. Indeed, the fact that material rather than spiritual
ends are served by these laws testifies to their invalidity. As C.S. Lewis notes, the
"idea, therefore, that there is any logical inconsistency, or even any emotional
disharmony, in asserting the monarchy of God and rejecting the monarchy of
Charles II is a confusion."21
Thomistic thought justified an element of mundane law within Church
government because it stressed a gradual hierarchy; the Church could be seen to
govern an order of temporal decrees building up to ecclesiastical government.
The Miltonic conception, however, precludes any such compromise with a less
than divine law. Because divinity is within the soul and needs no other mediation
than the gift of grace the compromise with fallen law is unjustifiable; all law
should serve the purposes of the attainment of freedom of spirit. Aquinas could
justify positive human law because the world could have its own ends. Milton sees
the world as directly answerable to spiritual goals and hence all worldly means
should be deployed to that end. Here we can see that the Platonic character of
Milton's thought provides an answer to Roman Catholic/Scholastic Aristotelianism.
Milton retains the founding idea of Aristotelian/Thomistic ontology - that each
being has its own essence. However, Milton rejects the notion of hierarchy in
Aquinas to the extent that he no longer accepts the political conclusions which
that concept served to justify. He limits the idea of hierarchy to apply not to
relations within the world (as it had for Aquinas) but oniy to relations between the
different degrees of being Milton acknowledges - God, the soul, the will and the
corporeal. Milton makes a similar move in his reading of Augustine. For
example, he rejects the concept of sacral kingship of The City of God and for the
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most part the idea of relative Natural Law whilst drawing heavily on that part of
Augustine which did not essentially concern the structure of the institution of the
Church - the concept of the soul as the inner light of reason. In addition, the
metaphysical presuppositions of the ancients are retained by Milton. When
Milton argues for the radical individualism which acknowledges no other source
of truth than Scripture and the inner light, he employs concepts of eternal truth,
the transcendence of the soul and a strict hierarchy of value which subordinates
worldly being to the divine. For Milton there is still an eternal, centred and single
conception of truth. Furthermore, the concept of the individual employed by
Milton is that of the Platonic soul defined in Christian thought by Augustine. If
we want to examine Milton's place in Church history we would have to situate him
within the modern Protestant impulse of the seventeenth century; his conclusions
are those of his contemporaries although his means for arguing towards those
conclusions are distinctly pre-modern. When we come to read Milton's poetry it
will be seen that the definition of justice in Paradise Lost and the concept of
virtue in Comus depend upon this pre-modern metaphysic.
By situating Milton within a neo-Platonic tradition my concern is not so
much with particular issues or textual allusions. What I will be examining, rather,
is a type of world-view which historians of ideas have characterised in a number
of ways. It is the logic and character of this Weltanschauung which I wish to
examine insofar as Plato can be seen as both an exemplar and founder of a
certain way of defining being and value. Louis Dumont has defined the
pre-modern world-view as "hierarchical" and refers to "Homo hierarchicus" as
opposed to "Homo oeconomicus" or "Homo aequalitas."22 Ferdinand Toennies
refers to Gesellschaft as opposed to Gemeinschaft;23 Karl Popper and Alexandre
Koyre have called the world-view "closed" as opposed to "open." These
conclusions can be related to the way Heidegger defines modern "mathematical"
thinking in opposition to earlier scholastic thought. In all these historians, with
the possible exception of Popper,24 there is a unity of argument. Heidegger's
thought deals with metaphysics, Koyre's with cosmology, Popper's with politics and
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ethics and Toennies's with sociology. Within these areas the logic is interrelated
and structurally homologous. All theorists argue for the occurrence of a shift from
a world seen as an ordered and meaningful whole, to a world reckoned to be no
greater than the sum of its parts. Dumont's analysis of modern "economic"
ideology works on both a literal and figurative level. Alongside the foundation of
the discipline of economics there occurs a new way of seeing in which the world
is conceived "economically." All these theorists are united in seeing the shift away
from the traditional "way of seeing" as occuring in the seventeenth century.
According to the French anthropologist, Louis Dumont, the structure of
modern ideology can be defined as founded upon two interrelated concepts - the
concept of individualism and the concept of economy. Although Dumont has
noted the existence of what he refers to as "other-worldly individualism" in the
beginnings of Christian thought and in the Hindu caste system, he sees
"intra-worldly individualism" as characteristic ofmodern, equalitarian,25 economistic
societies. Pre-modern or traditional societies, on the other hand, are typified by
"holism."26 Dumont defines the individual ofmodern societies as an "independent,
autonomous, and thus (essentially) non-social moral being."27 The independence
of the individual in modern societies is intra-worldly. There is, therefore, a loss of
transcendence which completely isolates the individual who now shares no
common arena of other-worldly value and whose being is now defined in a totally
mundane sense. With the loss of hierarchy or holism (where the system of
worldly organisation is given meaning by some transcendent source) the meaning
of each entity is defined through intra-systemic relations:
The moment hierarchy is eliminated, subordination has to be explained as
the mechanical result of interaction between individuals and authority
degrades itself into power.28
This shift from authority to power is a result of the loss of transcendence.
Ontological difference had previously been derived from a natural hierarchy which
was organised by a higher presence. Now, difference results from the
inter-relation of individual entities. There is no natural authority and so order
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must be generated through power. Social order, therefore, becomes extrinsic
because the elements within society have no immanent meaning, nor is there an
innate structure to the totality; structure must be imposed. Society and law are
no longer the expression of persons but an imposed construct. In his discussion
of Hobbes Dumont sees the loss of hierarchy as concomitant with the lack of
transcendent ends:
... the hierarchical ordering of the social body is absent because the State
is not oriented towards any end which would transcend it, but is subject
only to itself.29
Persons are, therefore, not essentially social but rather pre-social units with no
law-determining essence. Dumont sees the beginning of modern individualism as
the culmination of the progressive mundanisation of the Christian soul:
"individualism was characteristic of Christian thought from the start; the evolution
was from other-worldly individualism to more and more this-worldy
individualism."30 I want to challenge Dumont's concept of "evolution" and show
how the Christian soul did not so much evolve into the modern this-worldly
individual of bourgeois economics; rather, the Christian soul in its constantly
shifting definitions, always retained some level of transcendence but encountered,
in the seventeenth century, the individual of liberal theory and became
contaminated and confused with its mundanity. What is noted by Dumont is the
importance of the English Revolution in the development of this new form of
individualism:
The equalitarian claim was extended from the religious to the political
sphere in the course of the English Revolution (1640-60), especially by the
Levellers. Although they were swiftly defeated, the Levellers had had time
to draw the full political consequences of the idea of the equality of
Christians. The Revolution itself affords one more example of the
movement by which supernatural truth comes to be applied to earthly
institutions.31
Despite the "swift defeat" of the Levellers, they were a remarkably
influential movement and their conception of the individual owes as much to a
general movement of secularisation as it does to the tradition of the Christian
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individual. When we come to examine the Levellers in relation to the theory of
what C.B. MacPherson refers to as "possessive individualism" we will see that both
politically and metaphysically the Levellers were not just developing the Christian
soul but also bringing in a new ontology within which to consider persons. Their
idea of equality was not in fact reducible to its Christian counterpart; what
separated the Levellers from the early Christians was the theory of property and
labour upon which the Leveller demands were based. And it is in this respect
that their thought differs most significantly from that of Milton, who never
adopted those foundational concepts of Lilburne's which are constitutive of
modern liberal individualism. Still, even disregarding this challenge to Dumont's
claim regarding the origins of the modern individual, his analysis is helpful as it
sets out to examine the conceptual preconditions for the emergence of
individualism in the ascendance of the notion of "economy." These preconditions
will be seen to be analogous to those Heidegger identifies in Cartesian and
Newtonian modern science. Both Dumont's idea of the individual and
Heidegger's account of the Cartesian subject rest upon the theory that the world
is conceived quantitatively in the modern era; that being loses its inner quality and
becomes pre-determined by an external, humanly constructed discipline - in
Heidegger's account modern science, in Dumont's, modern economics.
According to Dumont, the idea of economics rests upon the "recognition
of some raw material, and a specific way of looking at it."32 This idea of "raw
material" is part of a general "equalising" of the world where nature becomes a
single "matter" devoid of particularising essences33 and where meaning and identity
are imposed from without. Modern ontology disavows any discernible essential
and immanent difference between beings. The departure from the hierarchical
order of different beings and essences gives way to the importance of property
and ownership and the concomitant notion of equality. This transition occurs
because the world is no longer a sphere of distinguished spaces and beings with
their own movement and position. Now social structure is imposed by labour and
the character of human being is defined in accord with its possibility for
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appropriation of raw material. Whereas previously the theory of relative Natural
Law could be seen to dictate a pre-given system of ownership and hierarchy, the
removal of this vestige of divine law from the world necessitates that social
structure be derived from human effort. Therefore, the being of an entity is now
defined by its relation to its owner; it becomes capital. This will also have effects
on the definition of the owner and we will examine this further when we discuss
the theory of "possessive individualism" in Locke. Dumont, summarising Locke's
second treatise, refers to the shift in the conception of the world from a
hierarchy to a realm of potential capital:
Between men and beasts it is a matter of property or ownership: God has
given the earth to the human species for appropriation - and
homologously, man is, in the Second Treatise, God's work and property.
As for men, there is among them no inherent difference.34
Locke's rejection of innate ideas (an idea Blake explicitly challenges) and
his metaphor of "tabula rasa" are the psychological counterparts of this political
theory. Equality is no longer based on the sanctity of the soul but on the
emptying out of individual essence, the depersonalising of the relation with God
and the reduction of all relations (between God and persons, between persons and
persons) to the relation between owner and property. As Dumont states, Locke
denied subordination on the ontological level and reintroduced it on the
empirical.35 In Lockean society social relations have no reason other than
themselves, no transcendent justification. The social order does not exist to
express justice. The practice of justice (now law) maintains the social system.
Justice is, therefore, also defined in relation to property and the individual,
rather than from the view of the social whole. Rights are now determined
quantitatively. The individual as a self-contained, pre-social entity receives capital
according to the amount of expended labour. A previous system of social and
distributive justice attributed rights according to need and the position within the
social whole. Dumont concludes that modern juridical relations occur between
men and things, "not from the necessities of the social order, but from an intrinsic
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property of man as an individual."36 (And this individualism is the only "intrinsic"
property; "man" has no essential being other than his difference from all other
individuals.) Property is defined in terms of the individual, as the product of one's
labour. Labour is also conceived as alienable property; one is a self insofar as
one has this property of labour with which to market. Social being is then derived
from this economic fact. Justice is the protection of property, a guarantee against
invasion of property by others. It is this analysis which enables Dumont to
conclude that "economics as a philosophical category represents the acme of
individualism."37
Of course, Dumont refers to economics in the sense of a particular
discipline but both Cartesianism and aspects of seventeenth-century Protestant
individualism are based upon an "economic" ontology in the broader sense. As
an ontology, the concept of "economy" provides a metaphor for the process of
meaning and beings as such. All being is differentiated with quantitative concepts;
the world is a sphere of "raw material;" relations between things are mechanistic
and the social order shifts from being an organism to a mechanism. Interestingly
enough, we can see this shift in the opening of Hobbes's Leviathan where the
body politic is described. The concept of mechanism is introduced as a metaphor
for the human body itself and so the traditional conception of the social hierarchy
as a living organism of interdependent parts subtly shifts to a mechanism of
self-contained units:
For what is the Heart, but a Spring, and the Nerves, but so many Strings;
and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body,
such as was intended by the Artificer?38
Whereas Platonic ethics rejects any concept of economy, modern ethics
sees good as quantifiable (hence the development of utilitarianism). Virtue is now
capable of existing within a system of exchange: hence there is a need to ground
or justify ethics in relation to other ends39 (in Hobbes and Locke this is,
characteristically, the defense of property). We will now turn to Heidegger's
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analysis of the Cartesian conception of the world and see how this relates to
Dumont's theory of modern ideology as economic and equalitarian.
Heidegger's Reading of Descartes:
Heidegger summarises the standard picture of Descartes:
The story of Descartes, who came and doubted and so became a
subjectivist, thus grounding epistemology, does give the usual picture; but
it is at best only a bad novel, and anything but a story in which the
movement of being becomes visible.40
Heidegger criticises the standard definition of Descartes as a sceptic. Descartes's
project of doubt was not based on epistemological scepticism but on a prior
ontological demand. This ontological demand stemmed from a "mathematical"
conception of being. The "cogito" answers (and is defined by) the logical
requirements of this conception of being.
In Being and Time Heidegger undertakes a study of the Cartesian
conception of "world" and its definition as res external Descartes identifies two
types of worldly substance. In addition to res extensa there is res cogitans. (As
Husserl said of this Cartesian move, the cogito became a "tag end of the world"
because Descartes never radically doubted the world; he always assumed that res
cogitans was a part of the world, a substance.42) In admitting these two types of
substance Descartes claims that we cannot experience substantiality directly
(because it does not affect us); we can only experience substance in its attributes
and the primary attribute (upon which all other attributes depend) is extension.
It is this claim which characterises the Cartesian world and which represents the
explication of modern science in its "mathematical" sense. By isolating extension
as the primary attribute to which all other "qualities" can be referred, Descartes
overturns the Aristotelian conception of different modes of being with different
values in favour of a univocal conception of substance.
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In order to explain the quality of hardness, for example, Descartes defines
this quality as the extent to which an object would move given a certain force.
Rather than the quality being seen to inhere in the object, the attribute is defined
via the position of the object in space. Even the temporal phenomena of the
object's movement is reduced to a spatial explanation as a shift in position. Both
temporality and quality are defined in terms of a uniform space. A "soft" object
does not change position at the application of a certain force; a "hard" object
resists force and hence is moved. A quality of the object is thus referred to the
relative space which is the ground of all attributes. Motion (which for Aristotle
typified the being of entities - heavenly bodies move spherically for example) is
redefined as change of place.
Heidegger sees the Newtonian lex inertia (where a body left to itselfwould
continue in a straight line) as the efflorescence of this mathematical conception
of being. Entities are determined beforehand to be uniform (so that one can
refer generally to "a body left to itself') while motion, which for Descartes was
relative, is referred to a general system of points in an absolute space. Absolute
space differs from the older conception of closed hierarchy in that points in
absolute space are not places where an entity should be; such points have no
character other than their quantitative difference from any other point. Descartes
represents the emergence of this uniform principle in the characterisation of the
world as res externa. All those other aspects of experience - colour, movement,
value and so on - are not seen as different qualities of being. Rather, there is an
ideal space containing equal substances to which all these phenomenal attributes
are secondary.
It is this uniform character of being which is the condition for the
foundation of the cogito. The definition of worldly being as res externa elevates
extension as the primary attribute insofar as extension is that in the entity which
will remain the same. Shape or colour can change without altering substantiality,
the essential attribute of which is extension. The ontological ideal of regarding
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that which is constant as the reality of the entity is as old as Platonic metaphysics
but the elevation of extension (rather than essence) is modern and mathematical
and relies upon attending to a system ofmeasurement rather than the inner being
of the entity. By "mathematical" Heidegger refers to a broader ideal of which
"mathematics" (in the numerical sense) is but a privileged example. According to
Heidegger, "mathematical" for the Greeks meant that which could be known and
determined beforehand. The reduction of the world to extension enables the
world to be interpreted as a collection of entities which can be determined as
substances subject to exact calculation. Subsequently, the ideal of modern
metaphysics is the achievement of an axiomatic way of dealing with the world.
That is, rather than reference to a source of truth elsewhere, the world must yield
its own axiom. But if knowledge is to become axiomatic and certain, it needs a
foundation which would be self-grounding. According to Heidegger, it is the
complete transparence or total self-presence of the cogito which fulfils this
demand. There is no otherness in the cogito; it has no divine qualities; there are
no innate characteristics inscribed upon it; its only quality is its guaranteed
presence to all thought. Heidegger isolates the shift in the meaning of the Latin
"subjectum" as evidence for this requirement for a first principle which would be
self-evident:
One must therefore find such a principle of all positing, i.e., a proposition
in which that about which it says something, the subjectum (upokeimenon)
is not just taken from somewhere else. That underlying subject must as
such first emerge for itself in this original proposition and be established.43
The Latin "subjectum" originally referred to that which was posited. In the
search for a self-grounding axiom on which to base all knowledge, that which is
posited must be the same as that which posits. By the "I" taking itself as its
"subjectum" all doubt is removed and certainty is attained. That which alone is
certain is the Cartesian "subjectum," the modern subject, the self-present "I." The
Cartesian subject is therefore the consequence of a certain ontology. Once all
matter is reduced to a uniformity capable of being studied "mathematically," the
need emerges for a self-grounding axiom upon which to base this mathematics.
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This axiom can only be fulfilled by the "I" for the "I" is the only "subjectum" which
cannot be doubted; it is the "subjectum" par excellence, the subject. This subject
is not human in its essence but mathematical:
This T which has been raised to be the special subjectum on the basis of
the mathematical, is, in its sense, nothing 'subjective' at all, in the sense of
an incidental quality of just this particular human being. This 'subject'
designated is the 'I think'."
The universality of Cartesian subjectivity is therefore set over against the
particularity of specifically embodied human beings. As an axiom which is
self-evident and self-grounding the Cartesian "I" is transparent, uniform, the
epistemological condition for a certain conception of being. Insofar as extension
needs no other attribute in order to be, it characterises substance. But the study
of extension demands the mathematical axiom of the subject. All quality is
defined as measurable in terms of a spatial a priori which is present to the "I";
Nature is now the realm of the uniform space-time context of motion,
which is outlined in the axiomatic project and in which alone bodies can
be bodies as a part of it and anchored in it.45
While Heidegger situates his reading of Descartes within a broader critique
of being as presence, the implications for the general shift between a modern and
pre-modern world-view are also significant. The reference of attributes to space
conceived not as a system of places but as a system of equal points reduces
quality to a quantitative and measurable phenomenon. The world has no
significant limit or principle of order because nothing is posited as transcendent
to it. The equalising of the world which was the precondition for the economic
idea of "raw material" and the individual as potential labourer also grounds the
idea of the subject as the recipient of matter. The epistemological definition of
subjectivity characterises consciousness as self-presence and transparence: there
is no character of subjectivity prior to the subject's self-constitution. Descartes
does admit God into his philosophical system in order to bridge the gap between
res extensa and res cogitans. However, God is brought in as a "solution" to a
primarily materialistic problem - of how thought can act upon matter. There is
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no sense in which the character of res cogitans is derived from a conception or
definition ofGod. Cartesianism is a metaphysical explication of an ontology which
has as its cultural precondition the broader shift from hierarchic to economic
conceptions of being.
Insofar as I am attempting to delineate the conceptions of the self that
were current in seventeenth-century thought, it can be seen that Cartesian
"subjectivity" differs from the "individual" which is defined in a concrete social
human sense. Descartes's "cogito" grounds an ontological project while the
"individual" is the consequence of political theory. However, as a means of
grounding res externa the primary relation of the cogito is to substance and not
to other cogitos. It can consequently be likened to the Lockean individual's
definition in relation to property. The seventeenth-century self no longer referred
to God or the social whole but to res extensa or property. Whereas the Lockean
individual, the individual of liberal theory, is world-dependent; the Cartesian
subject has at its basis a far greater autonomy. Self-reflection is definitive of
subjectivity. The subject becomes a "subject" only insofar as it posits itself. The
subject is the paradigm of independent substance and this is revealed in a positing
which need not refer in order to be certain. It is because of a complete
coincidence of subject ("I") and subject (what is posited) that reflection has value.
The distinction between this epistemological reflection and the
Platonic/Socratic/Christian ideal of self-reflection should be clear. The earlier
form of self-reflection directed itself towards a given transcendence; Cartesian
self-reflection constitutes itself as subject. Insofar as Cartesianism is a dualism,
it is intra-worldly with res extensa and res cogitans both being grounded in a
conception of substance.
The "economic" character of seventeenth-century individualism and
ontology is nowhere better expressed than in Hobbes's conception of the self. For
Hobbes the value of a person is not an inherently ethical or theological
consideration but is determined by the "price" of the individual's power. Hobbes's
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method of defining the social self is, like Locke's, dependent upon the primary
value of property and the individual's capacity to appropriate capital:
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that
is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and
therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and
judgement of another And as in other things, so in men, not the seller
but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do) rate
themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more
than it is esteemed by others.46
The following section is heavily indebted to C.B. MacPherson's book, The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.4,1 In summarising MacPherson's
conclusions I will attend mainly to his reading of Locke and the Levellers although
MacPherson also considers Hobbes as one of the central theorists of "possessive
individualism." The importance of MacPherson's study for our purposes is
twofold. One of the most significant claims of MacPherson's book regards the
Levellers; far from being the radicals they have traditionally been conceived to be,
they actually provide the foundations for liberal economic conceptions of the
individual. This will help us to delineate the differences between their political
project and that of Milton, whose conclusions may have been similar but whose
presuppositions were quite different. Secondly, MacPherson's theory of possessive
individualism, in addition to Dumont's work, demonstrates the primacy of the
economic category in the seventeenth century and a discarding of the traditional
concepts of society. Dumont's theory of Homo oeconomicus also relies upon
Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes is usually regarded as the founder of liberal political
theory insofar as he derives rights and obligations, not from transcendent value
but from dissociated individuals. The importance of an historical assessment of
Hobbes and Locke and their relation to the more directly influential thought of
the Levellers lies in the primacy of the notion of property in their thought.
One of the central differences between the Hobbesian individual and the
Christian soul lies in Hobbes's conception of reason. Whereas Augustine had
insisted on the unfallen nature of the inner light, Hobbes insists that rationality is
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given to human beings in a sullied form. Reason is contaminated with animality;
the bodily aspect of human existence cannot be subordinated by reason alone, for
reason itself is implicated in corporeal brutishness. Hobbes still retains a dualism
between reason and carnality. However, he ceases to believe that the individual
can deal with this dualism rationally. Reason itself cannot overcome the
recalcitrance of the body. Hence Hobbes's theory necessitates the construction
of an imposed society. What characterises human being is not a soul, grace or a
privileged place in the great chain of being. Humanity is distinguished from
animal nature only by the capacity of speech. Truth and falsehood are not
determined by transcendent value. Truth is a property of statements (and their
relation to the world). The Aristotelian belief in the naturally social condition of
human beings must be done away with, for what is natural is brutish and only by
acting in opposition to nature can pure reason be achieved. Social order must
now be an imposed limit and run counter to the natural condition of human
desires. The modern idea of freedom as an assertion of right against the State
follows from this sociology, whereas freedom for the Ancients (and also for
Milton) had entailed following a law recognised as a social good.
In discussing the individualism of the seventeenth century in general,
MacPherson points to the common emphasis upon possession of property. He
argues that it is this factor which marks Hobbes and Locke as modern and
constitutes their main legacy to political thought today. The historical significance
of MacPherson's claim will become more important when we come to consider
Blake, as it is this problem initiated by seventeenth-century bourgeois liberalism
which Blake's particular humanism sets out to overcome. It is the stress on
possession as the foundation of rights that forms the unifying strand in modern
political theory; this emphasis is concomitant with a departure from traditional
holism:
. . . the difficulties of modern liberal-democratic theory lie deeper than
[has] been thought, . . . the original seventeenth-century individualism
contained the central difficulty, which lay in its possessive quality. Its
possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially
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the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for
them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a
larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. . . . Political society
becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the
maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.48
Hobbes's premise that human beings are self-moving and self-directed
mechanisms does away with the possibility of anything like a soul which could be
the foundation of virtue. Similarly, a social structure which is a site for edification
and the practice of virtue also has no place in Hobbes's theory. Consequently, the
distinction upon which Socratic ethics is based - the difference between true virtue
(with its internal benefits) and the mere appearance of virtue (and its contingent
rewards) - is rejected. Political theory is now directed solely towards the
achievement of external benefits. Virtue is now no longer an essential good
intrinsic to the soul but is defined relatively. Consequently, even the practice of
virtue is viewed competitively by Hobbes:
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for
eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in
all men, nothing would be prized.49
MacPherson's critique of possessive individualism is based upon his explanation
of a hidden assumption in modern theory which allows thinkers such as Hobbes
to derive a theory of a universal struggle for power from the concept of man as
a mechanical system. MacPherson argues "that certain social assumptions have
to be made in order to establish that all men in society seek ever more power
over others."50 That is, MacPherson questions the characteristically modern
assumptions that individuals can have no stable place in a social order, that society
is necessarily inimical to the first order desires of human beings and that persons
will always desire more property. Macpherson claims that modern thinkers have
assumed that society is a container for naturally antagonistic individuals and that
"the capacity of every man to get what he wants is opposed by the capacity of
every other man."51 That is, other persons are no longer a part of that greater
order which is also the truer expression of human being; the idea of a mutually
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beneficial social totality gives way to a collection of individuals constrained from
encroachment upon each other by positive law. This modern State is conceived
as "natural" insofar as it is necessary. The "power of men associated to transform
nature is rejected."52 When modern theorists have examined humanity in the state
of nature, MacPherson claims, they have merely subtracted law from "possessive
market society." There is an assumed social arrangement concealed in the
Hobbesian state of nature. MacPherson defines this hidden social arrangement
as "the pre-eminence of market relations and the treatment of labour as an
alienable possession."53
As we have seen in our discussion of Dumont, the concept of possession
expresses itself in Locke's political theory in his Two Treatises where his definition
of the individual is based upon property.54 MacPherson confines himself to
examining the social theory of Locke but in addition, Locke's metaphysics also
relies upon a materialist individualism. Like Descartes, Locke reduces the
individual to substance and sees human being as entirely worldly. His concept of
the tabula rasa establishes an affective metaphor for selfhood. That is, there is
no character to human being other than its receptivity. Furthermore, the idea of
experience as an impression of ideas upon the mind also defines human
experience mechanistically. The self in Locke's metaphysics is merely the
self-knowledge of ideas caused by external objects:
When we see hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know
that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and
perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self. .
. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that that
makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself
from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity.55
For Locke there is nothing like a human soul which would personalise individuals
in a transcendent sense. This modern philosophical tradition carries over into the
actual political platform of the Levellers.
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In the Putney debates over the issue of franchise the Levellers claimed to
be demanding a manhood franchise. In addition to this, however, they also clearly
excluded servants and alms-takers. In his analysis of the history of the debates
MacPherson notes that the Levellers saw no inconsistency between these two
claims. The apparent contradiction is resolved if we examine the Levellers'
definition of human freedom - freedom for the Levellers being the condition for
the right to vote. As in Locke, economic independence provided the criteria for
deciding this political right. The Levellers' belief in the natural right to property
- that God had not distributed wealth in some worldly hierarchy but that the earth
was the common property of all men equally - was associated with their belief in
the natural freedom of the individual. Because each person had an equal right
to life and the continuance of life entailed property, each individual had a right
to property. Government was therefore an establishment to enable the
preservation of property. Where the Levellers differed from the army leaders was
in the extension given to the concept of property. Like Locke (and here is their
characteristically bourgeois strain) the Levellers regarded the alienable labour of
one's own person as natural property. This alienable labour is the essence of
human selfhood. It can be bought and exchanged but not justifiably taken without
economic exchange. Richard Overton opened his pamphlet, An ArrowAgainstAll
Tyrants (1646) with this argument:
To every Individuall in nature is given an individuall property by nature,
not to be invaded or usurped by any: for every one as he is himselfe, so he
hath a selfe propriety, else could he not be himselfe, and on this no
second may presume to deprive any of, without manifest violation and
affront to the very principles of nature, and of the Rules of equity and
justice between man and man; mine and thine cannot be, except this be:
No man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man's; I
may be but an Individuall, enjoy my selfe and my selfe propriety, and may
write my selfe no more than my selfe, or presume any further; if I doe, I
am an encroacher and an invader upon an other man's Right, to which I
have no Right *
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Contrasted with the ancient concept of freedom as willing obedience to the
law, freedom here is expressed as freedom from other persons. Freedom is, more
specifically, the proprietorship of one's own labour. Hence the Levellers did have
a property qualification of sorts built into their demand for manhood suffrage.
This property qualification was enabled by their definition of labour as personal
property. The franchise could be granted to those above the level of dependence
only and hence excluded servants and alms-takers (and without question women).
The Levellers acknowledged that these groups that did not possess the "property"
of labour could have all other civil, religious and economic rights. But they were
not freely able to sell their labour and were therefore not "free" and so could not
vote. Labour was for the Levellers both a human attribute and a commodity.
Cromwell and Ireton, on the other hand, conceived freehold land of chartered
trading rights as the only valid conditions for human freedom. Both parties placed
a property qualification on the right to vote; the Levellers merely demanded only
the property of labour.
Milton, like the Levellers, acknowledges the importance of freedom in its
socio-political sense. However, for Milton, prior to political or economic freedom
there needed to be established a relation of liberty between the individual and the
law. Milton's "liberty" differed from the freedom of the Levellers in two respects.
Milton's liberty was not based on property or labour but on the ability to exercise
one's reason. Secondly, liberty for Milton, like the ancients, was willing obedience
to a law recognised as rational. Consequently, Milton's demands for liberty
appear to accord with those of the Levellers but in Milton's discussion of the
foundation of Government the more traditional conception of freedom emerges.
In the following section Milton's dependence on a pre-modern metaphysic will be
examined along with the particular conception of justice and freedom which this
metaphysic yields.
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Milton on Inner Experience: Reason of Church Government
With the development of individualism from Plato to Augustine, a certain
attitude to the world and a specific type of dualism follows. The progressive
institutionalisation of the Christian Church saw the spiritual/temporal dualism of
ethics transposed into a theory of Church and State. In the Gospels, Christianity
directs itself almost exclusively to other-worldly redemption. In the later Christian
Church there emerges a need to consider the role of the State. As the
institutionalisation of Christianity increases, so does its tolerance towards
involvement in temporal affairs. The Church, therefore, comes to demand that
the affairs of the temporal institution - the State - be subordinated to the interests
of the ecclesiastical institution - the Church. However, with this gain in the
Church's power comes the ingredient for its eventual demise. Once the Church
has allowed itself to become involved in affairs of State, it becomes subject to the
ever increasing encroachment of temporal demands. The Christianity of the
Gospels deemed this world irrelevant to spiritual issues. Divine Law was located
in an other-worldly sphere; justice could not be expected on this earth. There is
a radical difference between spiritual and political realms: "My kingdom is not of
this world" (John 18:36). While obedience to worldly authority is encouraged -
"Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities" (Rom. 13: 1-7); "Therefore
submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake" (1 Pet. 2: 13-15)
- such obedience should cease if a conflict between worldly and spiritual demands
arises: "We ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). With the adoption
of Christianity by the Roman Empire, there emerges a need for a greater
tolerance towards the State. Tertullian (150-220) in his Apology emphasises the
subordination of the temporal powers to God but in doing so he also subtly
prefigures the theory of sacral kingship. The king may be God's servant but he
is nevertheless God's servant:
For we, on behalf of the safety of the Emperors, invoke the eternal God,
the true God, the living God, whom the Emperors themselves prefer to
have propitious to them beyond all other gods. They know who has given
them the empire; they know, as men, who has given them life; they feel
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that He is God alone, in whose power they are, second to whom they
stand, after whom they come first, before all gods and above all gods. Why
not? seeing that they are above all men, and men at any rate live and so
are better than dead things. They reflect how far the strength of their
empire avails, and thus they understand God; against him they cannot
avail, so they know it is through Him that they do avail.57
For Eusebius of Caesarea (260-337) the emperor himself is not divine but one
whom God "receives:" "Thus outfitted in the likeness of the kingdom of heaven,
he pilots affairs below with an upward gaze, to steer by the archetypal form."58
This theoretical shift, which allows the consideration of temporal power,
inaugurates a history of Church/State theory which attempts to reconcile the
radical spirit of the Gospels with the practices of worldly politics. The
appropriation of Plato by Augustine unites the ancient theory of the State and its
basis in reason with the Christian soul and its spiritual demands. The worldly
involvement of the Church is allowed for in Augustine but such accommodation
is achieved only by stressing that the temporal affairs of the Church should be
subordinated to its ultimately divine function. In the City of God, written after
the fall of Rome, Augustine turns away from the demands of the Empire and
attends to the "heavenly city." It is the obligation of all Christians to bring the
earthly city into as much conformity to the heavenly city as possible. However,
Augustine exempted the State from the radical demands of the Gospels; the
kingdom of God was not expected to begin in history. Nevertheless, Augustine's
Platonism meant that the soul was an aspect of God's light in human being and
so there was still an aspect of transcendent value in the world. It no longer
manifested itself in the practice of virtue in the city-state but in the activities of
a separate institution - the Church - whose direction was other-worldly:
. .. the earthly city, that lives not by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and its
end in aiming at agreement concerning command and obedience on the
part of the citizens is limited to a sort of merging of human wills in regard
to the things that are useful for this mortal life. Whereas the heavenly city,
or rather the part of it that goes its pilgrim way in this mortal life and lives
by faith, needs must make use of this peace too, though only until this
mortal lot which has need of it shall pass away.59
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The Church should exist for the process of the edification of the inner light. The
world itself, because fallen, is opposed to divine law; hence the fallen, secondary
or relative law of the State is subordinated to the ecclesiastical demands of the
Church. Milton accepts Augustine's Christianisation of the Platonic soul but
rejects Augustine's emphasis on the world's fallenness. In response to Augustine,
Milton retrieves the Platonic idea of the world as an arena for the enactment of
the virtues of the soul. For Augustine, the Church need not aim to enact a
kingdom of equal souls for there is a discontinuity between the prelapsarian state
of nature and the postlapsarian fall into hierarchy. Milton will not allow this
discontinuity. For Milton, reason dictates that worldly government be just, despite
the fallenness of the will. The justice Milton demands is the justice of the
ancients: a self-sufficient and internally coherent virtue.
Milton therefore carries Augustine's concept of the soul further into the
world. The soul's radical other-worldliness is retained insofar as its values and
aims are transcendent but the soul now dictates the foundation of political being.
Milton restores the possibility of just government which had been lost in the shift
from the Ancient concept of justice to the mediaeval conception of relative
natural law. Government, ecclesiastical or temporal, need no longer be set over
against human will if will is subordinated to reason or the soul. Self-government
is the precondition for social and institutional government. Worldly social being,
which is anything but individualistic, depends upon a spiritual individualism. For
Milton, the grace of God has willed that some vestiges of divinity should remain
in the world. God's will acts in the cause of good in the temporal sphere; neither
the State nor the human will is entirely fallen. Because the residue of divine
goodness is located in individual souls, worldly justice can only be attained by
freely reasoning individuals.
The Early Christian Church had allowed the temporal world to exist
unaffected alongside the recognition of a higher spiritual realm. For Augustine,
on the other hand, the world, due to its fallenness, must begin to conform to
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spiritual demands and the Church must therefore play a part in the world. The
structure of this subordination is at the heart of the established Christian Church's
theory of Church and State; it is encapsulated in the late fifth century in the letter
of Pope Gelasius I to the Emperor which states the relation of power between the
State Church and royal authority. A.J. Carlyle paraphrases Gelasius's letter:
The true and perfect king and priest was Christ Himself, and in that sense
in which His people are partakers of His nature they may be said to be a
royal and priestly race. But Christ, knowing the weakness of human
nature, and careful for the welfare of his people separated the two offices,
giving to each its peculiar function and duties. Thus the Christian emperor
needs the ecclesiastic for the attainment of eternal life, and the ecclesiastic
depends upon the government of the emperor in temporal things. There
are, then, two authorities by which chiefly the world is ruled, the sacred
authority of the prelates and the royal power; but the burden laid upon the
priests is heavier, for they will have to give account in the divine judgment,
even for the kings of men; thus it is that the emperor looks to them for the
means of his salvation, and submits to them and their judgment in sacred
matters. The authority of the emperor is derived from the divine order,
and the rulers of religion obey his laws: he should therefore the more
zealously obey them.60
As Dumont notes, the reference to salvation reveals the supreme level of
consideration which hierarchises the priest's auctoritas over the king's potentas:
Here, the world begins to lose its own immanent reason of Government as the
function of the Church is to provide "sacred authority." Milton's contemporary
opponents reiterated this concept of the interrelated spheres of ecclesiastical and
temporal power. Bacon's approval of the inter-relation of Church and State
claimed that "religion hath parts which pertain to eternity, and parts which pertain
to time."61 Milton, rejecting this traditional Church/State relationship marked the
reign of Constantine as the commencement of the decline of Church government
precisely because at that point the Church became concerned with temporal
affairs. Milton, addressing the bishops in Of Reformation, saw Constantine as a
figure who epitomised tyranny and poor Church government:
Stay but a little, magnanimous Bishops, suppresse your aspiring thoughts,
for there is nothing wanting but Constantine to reign, and then Tyranny her
selfe shall give up all her cittadels into your hands, and count ye thence
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forward her trustiest agents. Such were these that must be call'd the
ancientest and most virgin times between Christ and Constantine.
(CPW. 1.551)62
Milton's opponents, on the other hand, applauded the political imperialisation of
the Church:
The Christian Church and temporall State were then divided; and the first
was persecuted by the second, till glorious Constantine obtained the
Imperiall diadem, upon the yeere 316. Afterwards by favour of the
Emperour, and other Princes, civill dignity, and temporall power were
annexed to Episcopall places, the Church and State being now united
together.63
When Milton eventually demands a complete separation of Church and State in
Of Civil Power, it is not only for the purposes of returning to the radical spirit of
Early Christianity in demanding a Church free from temporal aims. Milton's
prose career begins by demanding a purification of the Church from the corrupt
and temporal influences of political government. His vision of Church
government based on reason, the soul and its relation to transcendence eventually
provides a model for the State. In A Defence of the People of England Milton
argues that the freedom enabled by the atonement is political as well as spiritual:
I do not speak of inward freedom only and omit political freedom. The
prophecy of [Christ's] advent foretold by Mary his mother, 'He hath
scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts; he hath put down
the mighty from their seats, and exalted them of low degree,' must indeed
be but idle talk if his advent is instead to strengthen tyrants on their
thrones and subject all Christians to savage power. (CPW.4.374)
In Reason of Church Government Milton allows the practice of jurisdiction (which
rules by outward force) to continue in the political sphere. The moral sphere of
religion, on the other hand should be governed inwardly. To gain ascent to
doctrine through outward force is to mistake the essentially inward character of
Christian doctrine. Hence in Reason of Church Government Milton argues that
the spiritual affairs of the Church should not be impeded by the bodily, temporal
or material affairs of the State. The latter should be subordinated to the former.
But later, in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Milton brings this argument
regarding the internalisation of law into the political sphere so that the temporal
State, too, will benefit from its freedom from institutionalised and external law.
The commonwealth will be a function of the free and independent exercise of
reason without the impediment of arbitrary laws. Because religion is rightly a
matter of the inner soul, external institutions such as a State Church can only
impede the soul's inwardness. But, again, the premises Milton uses to argue for
the independence of religion later come to apply to the ideal commonwealth.
At the basis of Milton's theory of the Church and State is the Platonic
rejection of externally imposed laws and the embrace of internally coherent and
immanently valid laws of reason. Freedom, reason and spiritual autonomy can be
defined immanently in the temporal sphere and this because we are innately
divine and capable of a "paradise within" (which would still, nevertheless, always
be subordinated to and directed towards that transcendent paradise of the
kingdom of heaven). Milton's return to a Church/State division is therefore not
quite a return to the parallelism of the Gospels which had in no way brought its
religious concerns to issues of this world. Affairs of State, insofar as they are
directed by reason and always have freedom of conscience as their aim, are still
subordinated to the spirit which in the final instance is divine and transcendent.
But the subservience to reason, to the inner light residing in all souls, need not be
doubled by the subordination of legal practices to an institutionalised religion. If
the spirit is allowed to work freely the true practice of justice will emerge without
the government of prelates entering the picture. Milton's belief in the singularity,
plainness and attainability of truth and truth's transcendence from all worldly
difference is at the basis of this thought. Truth is attainable by each spirit; the
State, therefore, does not need the "spiritual authority" of the Church. Truth is
clear and attainable. Hence, in Of Reformation Milton remarks:
The very essence of Truth is plainnesse, and brightnes; the darknes and
crookednesse is our own. The Wisdome of God created understanding,
fit and proportionable to Truth and the object, and end of it, as the eye
the thing visible. If our own understanding have a film of ignorance over
it, or be blear with gazing on other false glisterings, what is that to Truth?
(CPW.I.566)
The radical distinction which could be drawn between Milton's
contemporaries' desire for democracy and Milton's apparently similar desire for
liberty can be accounted for by his belief in the power of reason. What Milton
desired was a form of government which enabled freedom of thought and the
development of rational capacities, so that whatever political structure was
achieved it would be based on the inner power of reason. Here is a further link
with Plato's politics.64 If Milton's demands yielded democratic practice this was
contingent; what was essential was the centrality of reason and the belief that
justice would necessarily follow. If profoundly non-democratic means needed to
be employed to achieve an ultimate freedom of the spirit then Milton would
advocate them.
In examining Milton's debt to Plato I will be examining a certain type of
pre-modern individualism, its relation to a cosmology and metaphysics and its
means of defining value in relation to a transcendent realm of being. What
concerns me, therefore, is not so much Milton's reading of Plato, nor how
consciously early seventeenth-century thought was neo-Platonic (although the
Cambridge Platonists did continue the efflorescence of Plato that had begun in the
Renaissance Florentine School). Rather, within a history of differences, from
classical and scholastic through to seventeenth-century thought, there are a certain
set of shared metaphysical assumptions which are rejected in the modern era and
it is this which I wish to examine. Consequently, in discussing Milton's emphasis
on, and valorisation of, inner experience I prefer to see this as not only connected
with Puritanism but also as the culmination of a history of thought about the
Christian soul. The difference between the Puritan emphasis on individual
experience of the Word and the pre-modern ethic lies in the relation of
transcendence to the immanence of inner experience. Milton's argument relies
heavily upon classical conceptions of the soul while his emphasis upon justice,
hierarchy and value situates his argument within the pre-modern neo-Platonic
tradition; Milton's concepts of inner experience cannot be exhaustively explained
by reference to the Puritan ethic alone.
41
What follows is an examination ofMilton's reform tracts of the early 1640s.
While Milton is here arguing for a Presbyterian form of State Church he will
eventually reject this possibility and demand the disestablishment of any State
Church whatsoever. Of the two hottest politico-religious issues of Milton's day -
disestablishment and toleration - Milton argued more fervently for the former,
whereas the Levellers placed their stress on the demand for tolerance. Milton's
emphasis on disestablishment can be explained with reference to the metaphysic
which is already expressed in the Presbyterian tracts of the 40s - the logical
conclusion of which is Milton's eventual position on complete State/Church
independence. The issue of disestablishment was of primary importance for
Milton because he believed that a deinstitutionalisation of the Christian spirit
would yield a flourishing of individual virtue. If attention was directed inwards
truth would follow and all those values which were eternally and essentially true
- justice, toleration and worldly liberty - would ensue. The Levellers, on the other
hand, had a sense of the law which was far more positive. The importance of
institutions for the protection of freedom was therefore important; their belief in
the primacy of property entailed a desire for its protection. Furthermore, for the
Levellers tolerance would be an issue even in an ideal world. For Milton all free
spirits could be expected, of their own accord, to alight upon the truth in their
own hearts; no such confidence could be held by the Levellers. There would
always be a plurality of beliefs - hence toleration was part of that demand for
freedom which precluded the encroachment of any other upon one's individual
person.
Milton begins his Reason ofChurch Government by referring to Plato and
the importance of persuasion in the education of government:
In the publishing of humane laws, which for the most part aime not beyond
the good of civill society, to set them barely forth to the people without
reason or preface, like a physicall prescript, or only with threatenings, as
it were a lordly command, in the judgement of Plato was thought to be
done neither generously or wisely. His advice was, seeing that persuasion
certainly is more winning, and more manlike to keepe men in obedience
then feare, that to such lawes as were of principall moment, there should
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be us'd as an induction, some well temper'd discourse, shewing how good,
how gainfull, how happy it must needs be to live according to honesty and
justice, which being utter'd with those native colours and graces of speech,
as true eloquence the daughter of vertue can best bestow upon her
mothers praises, would so incite, and in a manner, charme the multitude
into the love of that which is really good as to embrace it ever after, not
of custome and awe, which most men do, but of choice and purpose, with
true and constant delight. (CPW.1.746)
Laws should not be imposed; they should be seen to be good and adopted for
their own sake. Reason of Church Government's emphasis upon reason (and its
manifestation in the immediacy of the Gospel rather than textual tradition) relies
upon the Platonic belief that laws should be valued in and for themselves and
should be internally valid and not arbitrarily prescribed. This argument is
reiterated in Of Reformation when Milton states that "Custome without Truth is
but agednesse of Error" (CPW.1.561). Milton's reference to Plato displays a
difference in emphasis between his particular conception of reason and the
general Puritan belief in inner experience. The stress on the value of reason and
the importance of sound civil practice for the edification of individuals (that is, the
importance of the law as a recognised and reasoned social practice) derives from
the classical tradition of defining individuals as essentially political animals and this
by virtue of the fact that they are endowed with souls. Social structure is
therefore founded upon and directed towards the interests of inner experience.
What unites all sections of Reason of Church Government (including the
autobiographical "digression") is an argument about the relations between the
inward and outward spheres of human being. The inward spirit is identified with
reason, the eternal, the divine and the essential, while outward corporeality is
aligned with the contingent and the temporal. In his thinking through of this
metaphysic Milton reinforces his Protestant doctrine with the logic of Plato's
argument concerning the soul. Furthermore, whereas radical Protestant thought
more often than not rejected Church government of any form as essentially a
contamination of the pure individualism of the inner light, Milton at this point still
conceives the worldly practice of Christianity as appropriately embodied in a
trans-individual structure such as the Church. When Milton eventually demands
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Church/State separation he is still not opposed to institutions per se, for the
practice of civil law and magistrates is valued. But the condition for their valid
existence is the attainment of the knowledge of virtue which can only be achieved
by the individual examining scripture and their own heart.
Milton's reference to Plato is significant precisely because Platonic thought
and the Christian tradition of neo-Platonism are based upon a valorisation of
inner experience (which is at the same time a relativising of the world). This
tradition, accordingly, defines values "intrinsically." What is important about Book
One of the Republic, for example, is not its definition of justice or any particular
value but the articulation of a certain method of defining virtues. Thrasymachus,
Socrates's main opponent, believes that justice is the advantage of the powerful.
This is a non-universal, contingent and relative conception of justice. For
Thrasymachus, justice has no internal character but is defined by those in power
in order to maintain their position of power. Socrates, on the other hand, argues
that justice, as a virtue, has its own value and character; a virtue has its own
reason and is desired for its own sake. The foundation of the recognition of the
internal value of justice lies in the role of reason. As Kimon Lycos's reading of
Plato notes, the pre-Socratic conception of justice as a cosmic force is re-situated
in the Republic so that Plato's "solution . . . consists in 'internalising' this
supra-personal dimension of justice, in identifying it with the power obtained when
intellect and reason rule over appetite and passion in the minds of individuals."65
This tradition of the ethics of "internalising" value is continued and Christianised
in Augustine's conception of the soul where reflection on the inner light leads to
the recognition of divinity. It is a move away from the bodily and the temporal
towards transcendent truth and grace.
The Platonic and neo-Platonic soul/body ethic is articulated within a
metaphysic of the worldly and the other-worldly. Whereas modern philosophy
sees the Cartesian dualism between mind and body as a division within the world
which causes epistemological problems, the Platonic division enables an ethics
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which informs the world with transcendent value. This difference between
Platonic and Cartesian dualism becomes important for a consideration of the
differences between Christian and modern individualism. Within the Platonic
tradition the truly valuable is that which is other-worldly. Transcendence may play
a role in worldly life, may be discovered through worldly practice and may bestow
a value upon the world. Nevertheless, its origin and essence is eternal and
other-worldly and herein lies its validity. When Milton considers the role of the
State in individual flourishing, it is essential for him that laws be framed in accord
with truth and reason which is God's will; this is achieved through self-reflection
so that law "if it be at all the worke of man, it must be of such a one as is a true
knower of himselfe" (CPW. 1.753). Self-knowledge, therefore, is at the heart of
sound government.66
By beginning Reason of Church Government with a reference to
persuasion, therefore, Milton invokes the Platonic tradition of demanding an
understanding and embracing of law in addition to obedience. Milton claims that
when the "multitude" embrace justice and honesty through "custome and awe" they
cannot truly be happy. It is when a "love of that which is really good" leads to a
"choice and purpose" that justice is appropriately conceived (CPW. 1.746).
Milton's discussion of "justice" itself is significant insofar as the concept of justice
provided the central point of meditation for classical ethics. Justice was a social
virtue whereas modern theory is concerned with more individualistic concepts such
as "rights." Modern "contract theories" of government presuppose the existence
of individuals who then decide on a mutually beneficial law. Milton, on the other
hand, recalls the example of Old Testament law which, though external, is not
human but divine in origin and can therefore be understood rationally. Even Old
Testament law recognised the need for rational government. Now that the
atonement has installed an inner light in the human soul the necessity for
internalised law should be imperative:
If then in the administration of civill justice, and under the obscurity of
Ceremoniall rites, such care was had by the wisest of the heathen, and by
Moses among the Jewes, to instruct them at least in a generall reason of
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that government to which their subjection was requir'd, how much more
ought the members of the Church under the Gospell seeke to informe
their understanding in the reason of that government which the Church
claimes to have over them: especialy for that the Church hath in her
immediate cure those inner parts and affections of mind where the seat of
reason is; having power to examine our spirituall knowledge, and to
demand from us in Gods behalfe a service intirely reasonable.
(CPW.1.747-48)
Milton's rejection of "contracts and mutual rights of man" in favour of an
internalised law which was derived from thoughts of God and true human nature,
can be seen in contradistinction to the social contract theory of law which was
articulated in the seventeenth century by Hobbes. In modern contract theory laws
were imposed upon limitless desires; for the ancients laws derived from, and
fulfilled, higher order desires. The idea of "contracts and mutual rights of man"
(where contracts defend property and rights exclude encroachment upon others)
sees law as negative. Contract theory sees pre-social individuals entering into
society in order to achieve rights; such rights guard against exploitation by others.
Ethical theories based on justice, on the other hand, rely upon a desire inherent
in human souls to achieve their true nature as politikon zoon - that is, as
essentially and already social beings. Milton's conception of law was
eudaimonistic; law was a means to an end as well as an end in itself. Although
Milton uses a form of contract theory to explain the origin of kingship in The
Te?iure of Kings and Magistrates Milton's conception of a contract only explained
the conditional handing over of power to a king in order to safeguard the interests
of reason. Unlike Hobbes, Milton did not see reason as fallen and therefore did
not see kingship as an unconditional handing over of rights. Prior to the handing
over of power to a sovereign a commonly agreed social arrangement is
constructed; the social whole, therefore, precedes and governs kingship:
... they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury,
and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or
opposition to such agreement. Hence came Citties, Townes and
Common-wealths. And because no faithe in all was found sufficiently
binding, they saw it needfull to ordaine som authoritie, that might restrain
by force and punishment what was violated against peace and common
right. This autoritie and power of self-defence and preservation being
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originally and naturally in every one of them, and unitedly in them all, for
ease, for order, and least each man should be his own partial Judge, they
communicated and deriv'd either to one, whomfor the eminence of his
wisdom and integritie they chose above the rest, or to more then one
whom they thought of equal deserving: the first was call'd a King; the other
Magistrates. Not to be their Lords and Maisters . . . but to be their
Deputies and Commisioners, to execute, by vertue of thir intrusted power,
that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of Cov'nant
must have executed for himself, and for one another. (CPW.3.199)
Milton insists that law is not a result of fallenness and thus disagrees with the
history of relative natural law which explained away worldly inequality and the
difference between individual good and legal right as due to our postlapsarian
condition. Law only appears alien to desire when its origin in human reason and
the natural superiority of reason have been forgotten. Milton is therefore
advocating neither unquestioning obedience to authority nor a radical and
unlimited freedom. True freedom entails recognising the value of law in willing
and reasoned obedience, so that as created beings God's law is our own good.
Law, order and limit are intrinsic to human being as such and not merely in its
postlapsarian state:
And certainly discipline is not only the removall of disorder, but if any
visible shape can be given to divine things, the very visible shape and
image of vertue, whereby she is not only seene in the regular gestures and
motions of her heavenly paces as she walkes, but also makes the harmony
of her voice audible to mortall cares. (CPW. 1.751-52)
The soul has a determined and structured character which accords with law
and virtue; it is in recognising and achieving this essential being that freedom is
attained. Were human nature to be purely open, undefined and characterless law
would have no essential basis and would be alien rather than essential. For
Milton, goodness itself is limited, defined and marked out while discipline plays
a role even in paradise as Reason of Church Government goes on to argue:
The state also of the blessed in Paradise, though never so perfect, is not
therefore left without discipline, whose golden survaying reed marks out
and measures every quarter and circuit of new Jerusalem. (CPW.1.752)
There is, therefore, a law which is divine and eternal, which is not a
restriction to the flourishing of the soul. In fact, divine law is the condition for the
soul's fulfilment. In his reform tracts of the early 1640s Milton uses the distinction
between divine and human law to argue for a certain type of Church government
grounded on inner experience. OfPrelatical Episcopacy opens with the question
whether episcopacy "is either of Divine constitution, or of humane" (CPW.1.624).
This distinction between human and divine value aligns Milton with a pre-modern
method of conceiving value where value is derived from a transcendent and
supra-human source. Furthermore, this distinction underlies and enables the
further distinctions which are articulated in Milton's prose tracts: between outward
and inward human experience, between State law and Church government,
between magistrates and ministers, between the temporal and the eternal,
between jurisdiction and censure, between the texts of the Fathers and Holy
Scripture and between sophistry and true reason. Ultimately, the foundational
value and that which decides and determines all other values is that of reason;
and reason is embodied in scripture and the inner light. Milton's conception of
the true nature of the Church follows from this.
Ernst Troeltsch's examination of the history of Christian thought has
identified a tension between two conceptions of the nature of the Church.67 The
Church can be conceived in a worldly sense as an institution for the enactment of
holy sacraments and as an enabling governing body which would rule by the will
of God and derive its power over individuals from natural law. This universal
institution is the arbiter of truth and in order to effect the sacrament of grace
embraces secular institutions to achieve its ends. On the other hand, the Church
can be seen less as a worldly institution than as a collection of believers and a
representation of the body of Christ, as a symbol of mediation between God and
world - as a supra-individual projection of the inner spirit which each believer
possesses. Here, the practical behaviour of its individual members rather than the
distribution of sacraments is what constitutes the institution as holy. Troeltsch
sees this as the difference between Church and sects.68 This distinction - between
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the Church as worldly institution and the Church as a symbol of the spirit - is not
expressed explicitly by Milton but his idea of reform relies upon the latter
conception of the Church. Whereas Troeltsch sees the conception of the sects as
precluding anything like Church government,69 Milton maintains the sect idea of
fellowship while still arguing for Church government. He therefore overcomes the
opposition between institution and individual participation which Troeltsch sees
as the primary contradiction of Christian thought. He does this by making that
institution, rather like the ancientpolis, an essential expression of individual being
rather than an imposed externality. Milton, accordingly, imagines the Christian
commonwealth as a projection of individual being:
... a Commonwealth ought to be but as one huge Christian personage,
one mighty growth, and stature of an honest man, as big and compact in
vertue as in body; for looke what the grounds and causes are of single
happiness to one man, the same yee shall find them to a whole state, as
Aristotle both in his ethicks, and politicks, from the principles of reason
layes down. (CPW. 1.572)
Milton's emphasis upon the historical importance of Constantine in Of
Reformation reveals his recognition that it is after the State is Christianised that
the Church loses its inward character and becomes worldly and outward-directed.70
The adoption of the Church by the State is conceived as a loss of original purity
and a move towards the body - from inherent value to the appearance of value.
Furthermore (and this idea will become particularly important with Blake) the
forgetting of the spiritual and inner origin of Christianity is linked to a seizing of
political power:
But when through Constantine's lavish superstition they forsook their first
love, and set themselves up two Gods instead, Mammon and their Belly,
then taking advantage of the spiritual power which they had on men's
consciences, they began to cast a longing eye to get their body also and
bodily things into their command, upon which their carnal desires, the
Spirit dayly quenching and dying in them, they knew no way to keep
themselves from falling to nothing, but by bolstering and supporting their
inward rottenes by a carnal and outward strength. (CPW.1.576-77)
The idea of a "lavish Superstition" which enslaves the spirit continues Milton's
earlier condemnation of Constantine's fixing of fasts and feasts (CPW.1.556).
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Outward display and theatricality emerge when inner spirit weakens and atrophies.
Attention to the body is both symptomatic of, and causally related to, a loss and
forgetting of "inward Sanctity" (CPW.1.556). It is important to realise that this is
not a total denegration of the body but is part of a tradition of insisting upon an
ethical hierarchisation of the soul and body.
In the Phaedo Socrates insists that the practice of philosophic
contemplation in this world can raise the soul to its non-corporeal status; on the
other hand allowing the body to dictate value will embody the soul. In Augustine
the soul can look down towards the body or up towards God. This is not so much
a denial or radical dualism of the body so much as it is a subordination. In
keeping with this, Milton acknowledges the importance of bodily action when it
accords with spirit. In Book Three of Paradise Regain'd once Satan is "confuted
and convinced / Of his weak arguing" he is compelled to admit the integrity of
Christ's character. Christ's virtue entails the realisation of inner good with outer
action, the manifestation of spirit in words and deeds:
Thy actions to thy words accord, thy words
To thy large heart give utterance due, thy heart
Conteins of good, wise, just, the perfet shape. (PR.3.9-11)71
That is, the "shape" of goodness lies in the heart. The origin of outer value is
inward in character. In Book Four, when Satan tempts Christ with worldly power,
claiming that it is a condition for the emancipation of the people, Christ claims
that power may be a necessary but is certainly not a sufficient condition for
freedom. Just as OfReformation states that spiritual enslavement is the first and
most important loss of freedom, Christ stresses that the "degenerat" are "by
themselves enslav'd" and asks rhetorically who "could of inward slaves make
outward free?" (PR.4.144-5). Once again, this is not a denial of the significance
of bodily enslavement; rather, it is a statement that imprisonment of the body
presupposes a loss of spiritual autonomy, that the condition for political tyranny
is an abnegation of inner strength. And it is in this sense that Christ claims that
the people are "Deservedly made vassal" (PR.4.133) because frugality and
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temperance have given way to "lust and rapine" (PR.4.137). Bodily excess,
individual desire and denial of limits leads to corporealisation of the spirit. Such
hedonistic individualism results in a loss of spiritual autonomy which is the
precursor to corporeal enslavement. Excessive self-regard within the world leads
to a failure to see the truly other-worldly dimension of the self. The Church since
Constantine, according to Milton, has exploited this process of embodying the
spirit as a means for enslaving its members.
Milton, therefore, saw reflection upon Church government by individuals
as a moral duty, for only an institution grounded upon individual reason could be
valid: "how much more ought the members of the Church under the Gospell
seeke to informe their understanding in the reason of that government which the
Church claimes to have over them" (CPW.1.747). It is with the development of
theocracy after Constantine that value is derived from a mediate body - the
emperor - and the individualism of early Christianity gives way to a subordination
to divine right. In the opening of Of Reformation Milton compares the history
of the Church and Christian doctrine with the body of the resurrected Christ:
. . . after the story of our Saviour Christ, suffering to the lowest bent of
weaknesse, in the Flesh, and presently triumphing to the highest pitch of
glory, in the Spirit, which drew his body also, till we in both be united to
him in Revelation of his Kingdome: I do not knowe of any thing more
worthy to take up the whole passion of pitty, on the one side, and joy on
the other: then to consider first, the foule and sudden corruption, and then
after many a tedious age, the long deferr'd, but much more wonderfull and
happy reformation of the Church in these latter dayes. (CPW.1.519)
When Milton likens the Church to a body of Christ he de-institutionalises and
re-individualises the Church. This sentiment is heightened in Reason of Church
Government with the depiction of the reformed Church as analogous to the
resurrected Christ. It is through examination of the soul that we shall "accomplish
the immortall stature of Christ's body which is his Church in all her glorious
lineaments and proportions" (CPW.1.757). The idea of the Church as Christ's
body will become particularly important for Blake who extends the concept of
Christ's body to include not only the Church but all believers and their
imaginations. The Church, as an image of Christ's body, should be an
externalisation of the divine spirit which resides in the soul. In this sense, Milton's
Christianity can be regarded as humanist insofar as it places the human capacity
for divinity before the institutionalisation of divinity.
The Socratic insistence upon the universal value of justice as a virtue
depended upon internalising the definition of virtues in reason. Despite Milton's
agreement with the tradition of demanding that virtue be internally coherent, he
also emphasises the transcendent origin of ethics so that reason, for Milton, is
conceived in the Augustinian sense of God's light installed in human being. Both
Plato and Milton insist that justice should direct power and not be defined by
power - that justice is a value independent of the State and that values are known
via contemplation of the soul which is universal, essential and rational. True
values are still "internal" for Milton insofar as their basis is the inner sanctity of
the soul but they are transcendent precisely because the soul is divine in nature.
Reason ofChurch Government therefore argues that Church discipline is "beyond
the faculty of man to frame" and should not be "left to man's invention"
(CPW.1.756). Nevertheless, though transcendent, the rules for Church
government should not be seen as alien. The foundation of law which is the will
of God still reveals itself in the human soul:
the soule of man ... is his rationall temple and by the divine square and
compasse thereof [it can] forme and regenerate in us the lovely shapes of
vertues and graces. (CPW. 1.757-58)
The Church in its true foundations is grounded upon the act of inward reflection,
is centred upon the soul and in itself is a projection of the "greater man" whose
soul and virtue is a model for individual existence. The Church, ideally, is not a
disciplining force but an exemplar of that internalised discipline which is the
individual's true nature.
If Law is "politicall," according to Milton in Reason ofChurch Government,
"than no Christian is oblig'd in Conscience" (CPW.1.764). That is, if the origins
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of a law are worldly no citizen can be inwardly impelled. Reasons for obedience
could only reside in expediency and prudence; law would therefore be
non-universal and contingent. However, Milton identifies another possibility
whereby law would be "morall." In this sense the law would be "substantially and
perpetually true and good" (CPW.1.764). There are two means of attaining
"morall" law. The first is by "what we fetch from those unwritten lawes and Ideas
which nature hath ingraven in us" and the second is through Gospel law
(CPW.1.764). Milton thereby identifies innate human law, the law "ingraven in
us" with Divine (or Gospel) law and sets this law over and against a tradition
which "copies out" from "borrow'd manuscript" (CPW.1.764). What is "ingraven"
within human hearts has the same status as the moral law of the Gospels, as that
which is divinely ordained. The aspect of human nature which is eternally and
substantially true is divinity, the divine law harboured within. The soul is
other-worldly and therefore provides "morall" law. Human law, which is
"politicall," relies upon constructed hierarchies within the world and not the
natural law of the soul's subordination to God. "Politicall law" therefore is not
only lacking in the validity of "morall law" but contradicts the doctrine of Christian
individualism. Political law comes into conflict with individual moral law because
it is corporeal. Its justification relies on outward force rather than inward assent,
on arbitrary worldly hierarchies of power: "For the ministration of the law
consisting of carnall things, drew to it such a ministery as consisted of carnall
respects, dignity, precedence, and the like" (CPW.1.766).
A worldly hierarchy of power based on "dignity and precedence" leads,
according to Milton, to a "pomp and glory of the flesh" (CPW.1.766). Milton
acknowledges and approves of only one hierarchy - the subordination of the
worldly to the inner sanctity of the soul and the soul's natural subordination to its
Creator. Milton does employ the scholastic notion of hierarchy in Paradise Lost
and his insistence upon the subordination of the human to the divine depends
heavily upon a notion of hierarchy in cosmology. However, unlike the scholastics,
Milton believes that any hierarchy within the world relies upon a merely human,
53
contingent and unjustifiable construction of value (because ungrounded in reason
or Gospel law). Here Milton brings the universality of the soul into accord with
the practice of Church government. Whereas the mediaeval Church had justified
worldly inequality as a consequence of the fall, Milton's insistence upon the divine
nature of the soul, and the possibility of obtaining truth and right from the soul,
demands that true law be in accord with individual moral good. Milton's concept
of inner freedom and equality is not a compensation for worldly hierarchy and
inequality. Rather, individual freedom dictates the reclaiming of law by individual
reason and attacks the institutional Church's concept of divine will which dictates
the good rather than acting according to the reason of good. Hierarchy in the
world is a condition for the loss of spiritual autonomy and depends upon the
forgetting of the true hierarchy which would subordinate human to divine value.
Whereas the early Church allowed radical spiritual individualism and equality to
exist alongside worldly hierarchy, Milton demands that worldly practice be
governed by the doctrines of the soul and this because inward freedom is
threatened by an attention to mundane honour. For Milton, the parallelism of
early Christianity is inadequate precisely because of his Platonic insistence upon
the internalisation of the validation of the law:
... if the forme of the Ministry be grounded in the worldly degrees of
autority, honour, temporall jurisdiction, we see it with our eyes it will turne
the inward power and purity of the Gospel into the outward carnality of
the law; evaporating and exhaling the internall worship into empty
conformities and gay shewes. (CPW.1.766)
Milton's critique of the effect of worldly power on inner experience
underlies his distinction between jurisdiction and ministry. Jurisdiction deals with
imposition and with the negative aspect of law in the form of restraint and
punishment. (This is the role of magistrates.) Ministry, on the other hand, deals
with "censure," the promulgation of virtues for their own sake and the constitution
of the good in individual discipline. Ministry entails sustaining "the person of
Christ" (CPW.1.767) in the role of preaching. Prelacy, on the other hand,
introduces the worldly "politicall" role ofjurisdiction into Church government (with
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ecclesiastical courts, for example). Episcopacy's appropriation of juridical
practices represents a contamination of the spiritual sphere with external
constraint. The prelate who governs but does not preach, has put the temporal
before the spiritual:
... why should the performance of ordination which is a lower office exalt
a Prelat, and not the seldome discharge of a higher and more noble office
which is preaching & administring much rather depress him? (CPW.1.767)
Milton accepts the role of jurisdiction in the political sphere but wishes to
subordinate outward law to spiritual truth. Original teachings of the Gospels
claimed an equality of souls before God. Such equality for Milton also applies to
the temporal sphere. Prelacy, on the other hand, not only imposes jurisdiction
and inequality on individual souls, it does this for temporal gain. Consequently,
an equality and involvement of all believers must be preceded by the destruction
of the prelatical hierarchy:
So that Prelaty if she will seek to close up divisions in the Church, must
be forc't to dissolve, and unmake her own pyramidal figure, which she
affirms to be of such uniting power, when as indeed it is the most dividing,
and schismaticall forme that Geometricians know of, and must be faine to
inglobe, or incube her selfe among Presbyters. (CPW. 1.790)
Just as government must be subordinated to spiritual ends so Milton
hierarchises knowledge. The "contemplation of naturall causes and dimensions"
is a lower wisdom compared to the knowledge of God. Christian discipline is
grounded in the higher aim. Milton refers to "the only high and valuable wisdom"
as knowledge of God which entails "the improvement of these his entrusted gifts"
which are "summes of knowledge and illumination" (CPW. 1.801). Consequently,
self-reflection and cultivation of inner experience are precursors to the knowledge
of God. Milton unites his discussion of Christian wisdom with the issue of prelacy
by claiming that the worldly power of the prelates has been achieved by directing
attention away from inner truth through the allure of "the fals glitter of deceitfull
wares." Milton therefore sees a political motivation behind the corruption of
knowledge and the dehumanising of the Church's members:
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Therefore by gratifying the corrupt desires ofmen in fleshly doctrines, they
stirre them up to persecute with hatred and contempt all those that seek
to bear themselves uprightly in this their spiritual factory. (CPW.1.802)
Milton then follows this observation with his autobiographical "digression" - the
motivation of which has been implicitly justified by the preceding book which
elevates inner truth above external law, which values self-contemplation over
self-regard. John S. Diekhoff claims that the autobiographical sections of
Milton's prose function as a reassurance to the reader of the writer's fitness to
discuss doctrine: "these 'digressions' of autobiography, self-congratulation, and
self-praise are parts of the ethical proof."72 In addition, however, the act of
autobiographical reflection itself can be seen to have its own value given the
argument of the pamphlet. Milton not only defends the motivation for his
arguments and argues that he is not self-interested, he also demonstrates that his
arguments are sound because they are the product of self-reflection. Milton
insists that his impulses are not personal but are inward in a deeper and higher
sense. The fact that he is directed by conscience testifies to his denial of personal
interest: "neither envy nor gall hath enterd me upon this controversy, but the
enforcement of conscience only" (CPW.1.806). Milton argues that his inspiration
stems from an "inward prompting" (CPW.1.810); this insistence on the inward
origins of the pamphlet sets out to universalise rather than personalise the impulse
of his writings. The autobiographical digression forms part of the argument which
urges that to "look upon Truth herselfe" (CPW. 1.818) necessitates looking inward.
This inward direction is anything but individualism in its bodily, empirical or
possessive sense; what is sought in the inward gaze is transcendent. Just as Milton
rejects giving any precedence to the tradition of Christian exegesis rather than
Scripture itself, so, in writing he turns away from "Dame Memory and her Siren
daughters" towards the "eternall Spirit who can enrich with all utterance and
knowledge" (CPW.1.820). Milton rejects tradition or memory in favour of original
scripture and inspiration, for only the latter is truth itself. The former may still
be of value but only within the context of a vigilant attention to original and pure
thought - the thought which would yield an inspired poetics, a disciplined life and
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a religion which is "pure, spirituall and lowly, as the Gospel most truly is"
(CPW. 1.766).
After Milton's autobiographical digression he returns to a critique of the
prelates' attention to worldly value. Milton's self-reflection rejected the primacy
of personal desires in favour of a higher truth. The prelates' ecclesiastical
mismanagement, on the other hand, has as its basis a forgetting of the divine
origin of value: "it consists in a bold presumption of ordering the worship and
service of God after man's own will in tradition and ceremonies" (CPW.1.826).
The "traditions and ceremonies" which have obscured the primordial truth are
merely human; the "pure simplicity of saving truth" is lost due to a lack of
immediacy. Truth is now mediated by the worldly institution of the Church and
its tradition:
. . . mistrusting to find the autority of their order in the immediat
institution of Christ, or his Apostles by the cleer evidence of Scripture, they
fly to the carnal supportment of tradition. (CPW. 1.827)
Milton associates tradition with corporeality because both are set over
against the pure spirit of original and immediate truth. Similarly, "the pervers
iniquity of sixteen hundred yeers" (that is, human history) must be
epistemologically subordinated to "him that is eternal" (CPW. 1.827). There is a
confusion in Church government between true and false hierarchies - a confusion
between the ontological hierarchy of the spiritual and temporal with the political
hierarchy of episcopacy. This confusion stems from a failure to acknowledge the
finite nature of human experience in its relation to the divine: "instead of shewing
the reason of their lowly condition from divine example and command, they seek
to prove their high pre-eminence from humane consent and autority"
(CPW.1.827).
Milton does not wish to devalue the divine potential of human being. It
is, rather, a sense of worldly individualist autonomy which he sees as the cause of
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error. It is essential that the possibility for the attainment of truth be awakened
within each individual. However, the self-reflection which leads to truth should
reveal the dependence and finitude of the individual alongside the selfs divinity.
The knowledge of that which is most divine in human being relies upon not
mistaking that which is merely mundane and secondary - the body, positive law,
sophistry and temporality - for what is divine:
... ye think ye by these gaudy glisterings to strive up the devotion of the
rude multitude; ye think so, because ye forsake the heavenly teaching of
5. Paul for the hellish Sophistry of Papism. (CPW.1.828)
Milton's denegration of the "hellish Sophistry" which appeals to the "rude
multitude" reinforces his extra-mundane individualism. When the self is part of
a worldly multitude it is led into error; truth is achieved when the self turns away
from the world to its personal relationship with God.
Just as individuals are led astray by falling into corporeality, so it is when
the Church as
a decay'd nature seeks to the outward fomentations and chafings of worldly
help, and external flourishes, to fetch, if it be possible, some motion on her
extream parts, or to hatch a counterfeit life with the crafty and artificial
heat of jurisdiction. (CPW. 1.833)
Milton's rejection of jurisdiction as an ecclesiastical function places worldly
discipline in the realm of the State with the Church enforcing only "the mighty
operation of the spirit." Milton stresses the independence of the Church, for
worldly activity of the nature of the State can only act as a contamination to the
ideals of the Gospels. But, concomitant with this, the State as it stands at the
moment must not bring inward experience into its service: "the Magistrat hath
only to deal with the outward part, I mean not only the body alone, but of the
mind in all her outward acts" (CPW.1.835). However, Milton later, in The Tenure
ofKings and Magistrates, argues that the inward demand for justice which rightly
grounds Church government should also apply to the temporal sphere for "Justice
is the onely true sovran and supreme Majesty upon earth" (CPW.3.237). In
Reason of Church Government Milton goes on to stress the importance of civil
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peace and sound government as "undoubtedly the first means to a natural man"
who might then "open his eyes to a higher consideration" (CPW.1.836). Justice
in this world creates an environment conducive to "higher considerations."
Milton's rejection of any interplay between Church and State practices, in Reason
of Church Government, is a result of his vision of the political sphere as based on
temporal, external and contingent values. But even temporal government must
be such that it allows the free working of the spirit in the Church. The Church
does not embrace secular institutions for its purposes; it merely requests that
these relative institutions do not interfere with its progress and do not provide
conditions which preclude its development.
Milton discusses the nature of God and how this again must be seen within
the distinction between the inner light which is reason and the values which found
the mundane order of government. Whereas jurisdiction (as opposed to the
moral censure of the Church) acts outwardly and by force and judgment, Milton
stresses that God is "now no more a judge after the sentence of the Law, nor as
it were a schoolmaister of perishable rites" (CPW. 1.837). Milton's rejection of
an external and punishing figure of God depends, once again, on the radical
individualism of the Christian soul. God is not an external disciplining force set
over and against human beings precisely because inner being is in accord with
divine will. Milton then derives the nature of true Church government from God's
benign paternalism and the inner light: "in the sweetest and mildest manner of
paternal discipline he hath committed this other office of preserving in healthful
constitution the inner man, which may be term'd the spirit of the soul to his
spiritual deputy the minister of each Congregation" (CPW.1.837).
Milton goes on to state that jurisdiction in general would be supererogatory
if humans bore an "inward reverence for their own persons." Such "inward
reverence" would not be an attention to personal selfhood but would lead away
from self-interest to love of God - precisely because of the divine nature of the
soul: "And if the love of God as a fire sent from Heaven to be ever kept alive
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upon the altar of our hearts, be the first principle of all godly and vertuous actions
in men, this pious and just honouring of our selves is the second" (CPW.1.841).
But in order to attain this inward reverence the individual must play a role in
Church government; only this will bestow the dignity which will edify the soul to
the point of attaining "the true likenesse and visage of what she is indeed"
(CPW.1.844).
The self, therefore, achieves its essence by rejecting tradition, external
government, corporeal desires and positive law. It attains its likeness by an active
participation in the activity of reason through taking part in a Church founded on
spirit. This is why, according to Reason of Church Government, "the functions of
the Church government ought to be free and open to any Christian man"
(CPW. 1.844). Intervention and participation in Church government is not so
much a duty as a necessary condition for spiritual edification and this because the
Church should be composed of individuals and not be an institution for the
distribution of sacraments. Only by being a participating individual can the soul
be related to the Church in an authentic manner.
From this we can see that in the seventeenth century there were two
radically distinct forms of individualism: the traditional Christian, other-worldly
individualism embraced by Milton and the modern, secular, mundane
individualism ofmodern philosophy. These two forms of individualism are central
to two opposed ideologies. The older theological ideology is hierarchical, static
and holistic. The individual gains access to eternal truth by contemplation of the
divinity within or by consulting scripture. The modern ideology is open,
equalitarian and relational; value is defined contingently and the individual
competes with other individuals for what is valuable. Milton deals with the
emergence of this non-hierarchical concept of value through a dramatic dialogue
with his characters Comus and Satan. The arguments adopted to refute these
characters express the same confidence as the prose tracts of the 1640s regarding
the plainness of truth and the universality of reason. The premises which ground
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Milton's epics are fundamentally those first expressed in Reason of Church
Government: the soul is the seat of right reason; reason can discern what is
eternally and universally true, and good and reason are God's divine light in
human being.
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The tradition of classical ethics and metaphysics which Milton affirms in
order to refute Satan has its beginning in the Platonic conception of virtue.
Plato's dramatisation of Socrates's refutation of the Sophists is at the heart of the
transcendent definitions of value which ground the Western philosophical tradition
of ethics prior to the seventeenth century. In Plato's Republic Thrasymachus
defines justice as "what is in the interest of the stronger party:"1
Each ruling class makes laws in its own interest, a democracy democratic
laws, a tyranny tyrannical ones and so on; and in making these laws they
define as 'right' for their subjects what is in the interests of themselves, the
rulers, and if anyone breaks their laws he is punished as a 'wrongdoer'.2
Thrasymachus therefore claims that the structure of the state and its laws rest
upon power, that laws serve the maintenance of the state for the advantage of the
state and that justice has no inherent quality but is a concept used to dominate
the less powerful. He argues that in some ways the current perception of justice,
ethics and value is a form of deception, that what is commonly accepted as justice
is not justice at all but power appearing as justice. Socrates's refutation of
Thrasymachus consists in demonstrating that whatever justice is, it cannot be
defined in this contingent way. Justice is not a concept to be used for political
ends but is a virtue and therefore has its own validity. According to Socrates, a
practice or techne does not look to its own interests but to the interests of its
subject: "Medicine therefore looks to the interest not of medicine but of the
body."3 Similarly, justice seeks not to maintain its own practice but to act for the
good of its object: "no ruler of any kind qua ruler, exercises his authority,
whatever its sphere, with his own interest in view, but that of the subject of his
skill."4
Thrasymachus, however, restates his position in response to Socrates by
claiming that the political power of rulers is directed towards economic gain: "the
rulers of states, if they are truly such, feel towards their subjects as one might
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towards sheep, and think about nothing all the time but how they can make a
profit out of them."5 In describing the exploitation enabled by the spurious justice
of the state Thrasymachus demonstrates that the practice of justice only brings
benefits to rulers: "but you ought to consider how the just man always comes off
worse than the unjust."6 Thrasymachus's conclusion formulates a relativist ethics
based on self-interest and power: "injustice, given scope, has greater strength and
freedom and power than justice; which proves what I started by saying, that justice
is the interest of the stronger party, injustice the interest of oneself."7 Socrates
argues that the competitive quality of injustice makes it an incoherent practice:
"And so with any two individuals. Injustice will make them hate each other, and
they will be at enmity with themselves and with just men as well."8 Socrates then
goes on to argue the similar effects of injustice on the state:
Injustice, then, seems to have the following results, whether it occurs in a
state or family or army or anything else: it renders it incapable of any
common action because of factions and quarrels, and sets it at variance
with itself and with its opponents and with all just men.®
Injustice also has a comparable effect on the individual: "It renders him incapable
of action because of internal conflicts and division of purpose."10 The weight of
Socrates^ refutation rests upon the claim that a virtue, such as justice, is not
reducible to the external benefits which may attach to it. Justice, as a practice,
has its own function or good and that good is integral to human happiness.
Socrates refutes Thrasymachus's sophistry through the practice of reason.
Reason reveals the true nature of a virtue, its essential rather than its contingent
goods. Thrasymachus can be refuted because his sophistry still pretends to right
reason. The exploitation which Thrasymachus claims is at the heart of the concept
of justice can be refuted by examining the intrinsic character of the practice of
justice. Sophistry, therefore, differs from modern moral relativism, which not only
denies the intrinsic character of virtue, as Thrasymachus attempts to do, but also
denies the validity of right reason. Plato's sophists employ the use of what only
appear to be reasonable arguments to argue to certain ends. The sophist can
therefore be refuted by reason, for the whole concept of sophistry rests upon the
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possibility of right reason. In its modern form relativism claims that concepts such
as reason, justice and right are only ever contingently defined to serve those in
power, that their actual ends are extrinsic to their de facto definition. The
modern relativist is therefore less easy to refute; the relativist rejects the
distinction between false and right reason. For the moral relativist all reason is
sophistry. Despite the distinction between relativism and sophistry the two
positions have much in common. The connection can be seen in Milton's Satan
and Comus, who put forward both relativist and sophistical arguments.
What characterises pre-modern examinations of sophistry is that
non-universal definitions of value are refuted by a demonstration that concepts
such as reason, justice and virtue are intrinsically valid and that any accusation of
their contingency is parasitic and self-refuting. Consequently, there is a recurrent
insistence by Milton on the untenability of the sophist's position. The truth of
moral value inevitably manifests itself; relativism is self-refuting: "evil on it self
shall back recoyl . . . Self-fed, and self-consum'd" (COM. 593-97). Virtue is the
foundation of the world's being and is therefore anathema to the "eternal restless
change" of evil. Consequently, speaking of the purity of goodness the elder
brother in Comus asserts: "if this fail, / The pillar'd firmament is rott'nness, / And
earths base built on stubble" (COM.597-99). Hence, the practice of virtue is
foundational to the being of the world and not an arbitrary practice with external
ends. As Milton states in Eikonoclastes practice of the virtues is integral, not
contingent, to the well being of a state and its individuals:
The happiness of a Nation consists in true Religion, Piety, Justice,
Prudence, Temperence, Fortitude, and the contempt of Avarice and
Ambition. They in whomsoever these vertues dwell eminently, need not
Kings to make them happy, but are the architects of their own happiness;
and whether to themselves or others are not less then Kings.
(CPW.3.542)
In Paradise Regain'd, which, as Northrop Frye has noted, resembles a
Platonic dialogue," Satan is eventually "confuted and convinc't / Of his weak
arguing, and fallacious drift" (PR.3.3-4). His unsound reasoning is eventually
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defeated. Similarly, Comus's sophistry is overcome by the lady's virtue - a victory
that is anticipated by the Elder brother's invocation of Minerva's chastity "that
dash't brute violence / With sudden adoration, and blank aw" (COM.451-52).
Comus is compelled to recognise the validity of the lady's utterances: "She fables
not, I feel that I do fear / Her words set off by som superior power"
(COM.800-01). Nevertheless, Comus continues to employ a rhetoric of moral
relativism for the purpose of persuasion. He claims that the lady's ethics are
"moral babble" and yet he can only challenge her virtue by invoking "canon
laws":
... I must dissemble,
And try her yet more strongly. Com, no more,
This is meer moral babble, and direct
Against the canon laws of our foundation;
(COM. 805-08)
The arbitrariness of moral discourse which Satan and Comus assert in
order to achieve their own ends is inevitably overcome by true reason. According
to the Miltonic view relativist claims can only ever be sophistical; they must be the
product of unsound reason. However, some notion of essential truth will always
be hidden in the arguments of the sophist. The distinction between truth and
feigned reason can be clearly made because there is a universal arbiter of value.
For Milton, like Plato, access to this transcendent source of value lies in the soul
and reason. The purpose for our discussion of this distinction between sophistry
and right reason lies in the assessment of the character of Satan. Satan, in many
ways, represents the Thrasymachan attitude toward justice. Like Thrasymachus
his arguments are self-refuting and dependent upon the very concepts he sets out
to invalidate. In addition, Satan's sense of self is modern insofar as he manifests
all those hallmarks we have identified in the emergent possessive individualism of
the seventeenth century. Satan's emphasis upon the power of the "unconquerable
Will" (PL. 1.106) renounces the Platonic subservience of the will to reason and
resembles a more Hobbesian stress on self-assertion. Satan's claim that freedom
depends upon absolute self-determination, self-grounding and self-origination
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presents all other individuals as threats to the self; this is also a characteristic of
Hobbesian individualism. Finally, the structure of Satan (and Comus's) thought
is economic or equalitarian rather than hierarchical. Satan states that "Orders and
Degrees / Jarr not with liberty, but well consist;" (PL.5.792-3) but this
acknowledgement is actually used to refute hierarchical ordering, for Satan takes
the presence of liberty in all degrees as entailing a society of equals:
. . . and if not equal all, yet free,
Equally free; for Orders and Degrees
Jarr not with liberty, but well consist.
Who can in reason then or right assume
Monarchic over such as live by right
His equals, if in power and splendor less,
In freedom equal? . . . (PL.5.791-97)
Satan's initial statement that hierarchy and liberty are not mutually exclusive is
contradicted by his faulty conclusion that there is an equality of liberty which
invalidates any assumption of right or authority. His conditional premise ("if not
equal all") which admits hierarchy is refuted by the later assumption that equality
of liberty precludes hierarchy ("Who can in reason then or right assume").
Nevertheless, his final return to "power and splendor ■ less" demonstrates that he
cannot discharge the first premise, that there is an ontological hierarchy. It should
be noted here that Satan uses notions of reason and right despite the fact that his
leap from "free" to "equally free" to "equals" is a faulty syllogism.
Satan's sense of value arises not from a sense of order and due
subordination but from power and domination so that quantitative issues such as
force, rather than qualitative issues such as right and merit, determine law and
justice. It has been claimed that many of Satan's arguments resemble radical
Protestant beliefs and that Milton was therefore implicitly sympathetic to the
character of Satan.12 In the reading of Paradise Lost which follows it will be
argued that it is precisely the radical modern type of individualism which Milton
rejects. Satan's arguments are consistently represented as flawed and the basis for
Milton's refutation is his assertion of those universal conceptions of truth and
justice which featured in his earlier writings such as Reason ofChurch Government.
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The whole issue of the distinction between spurious moral rhetoric and moral
truth stems from Milton's belief in the essential, eternal and rational character of
truth. In fact, there is a contradiction at the heart of Milton's sophists which is
an outgrowth of Milton's presentation of sophistry as logically self-refutable.
Comus and Satan at once use the appearance of reasoned arguments in order to
compel certain ends and deny any essential or universal definitions of truth or
reason. We will consider these two aspects in turn beginning with the semblance
or claim to reason.
Milton's Satan, like Comus of the Masque, is a sophist. Both Satan and
Comus claim at some times to be using the appearance of reason while at other
times they make actual claims to rationality. Comus himself claims to have
"power to cheat the eye with blear illusion, / And give it false presentments"
(COM.155-56). He also admits that he works "under fair pretence of friendly
ends, / And well plac't words of glozing courtesie / Baited with reasons not
unplausible" (COM. 160-62). Reason, therefore, is for Comus a means to be used
and not an end or virtue. In Paradise Regain'd Satan admits to using "well-coucht
fraud, well woven snares" (PR. 1.97). But he also constructs arguments which
appear to be compelling syllogisms. When Satan tempts Eve in paradise it is with
"Reason, to her seeming" (PL.9.738). Satan's arguments directed to Christ in
Paradise Regain'd and against God in Paradise Lost employ the use of concepts
such as reason, right and justice. Satan employs these concepts of reason while
he also acknowledges that he works by irrational means or "well woven snares."
Throughout Paradise Lost, there is insistent mention of the spurious character of
Satan's reason: "By som false guile ... glozing lyes" (PL.3.92-93), "So spake the
false dissembler" (PL.3.681), "Which marrd his borrowd visage, and betraid / Him
counterfet" (PL.4.116-17), "and with calumnious Art / Of counterfeted truth thus
held their ears" (PL.5.770-71).
Milton not only accuses both Satan and Comus of sophistry; he also
demonstrates the way in which their arguments are parasitic upon true and
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authentic moral discourse. The refutation of Satan and Comus by their opponents
lies in the identification of the distinction between the appearance and reality of
reason. The Lady in Comus sees Comus's arguments as "false rules pranckt in
reasons garb" (COM.758). Her refutation then extends into an observation
regarding the sophist - that it is an inner lack of worth and an inability to receive
reason which makes rational argument seem for him "moral babble" (COM.806):
"Thou hast not Eare, nor Soul to apprehend / The sublime notion" and "Thou art
not fit to hear thyself convinc't" (COM.784-92). Similarly, Christ's reply to Satan
states that he is "compos'd from lyes / From the beginning, and in lies wilt end"
(PR.1.407-08). In addition, Christ identifies the hallmark of sophistry - its
dependence upon the appearance of truth: "that hath been thy craft, / By mixing
somewhat true to vent more lyes" (PR.1.432-3). Christ's observation reinforces the
essential nature of true reason and the parasitic nature of sophistry. However
much Satan and Comus may insist upon the arbitrariness of truth, their sophistry
must appeal to those concepts of truth they rhetorically deny. Throughout
Paradise Lost Satan presents several arguments to justify his rebellion; these
arguments produce notions of right, justice and equality. When addressing the
fallen angels he uses the concept of justice to express a notion of sacral kingship,
the type of kingship he has (unjustly) attributed to God:
Mee though just right, and the fixt Laws of Heav'n
Did first create your Leader, next, free choice,
With what besides, in Counsel or in Fight,
Hath been achievd of merit. . . (PL.2.18-21)
By referring to the fixed laws of heaven in order to legitimate his rule Satan
invokes a concept of the divine right of kings which, given his rebellion, would
actually conflict with his own notion of "just right." Satan claims for himself what
can only be attributed to God. He cannot lead by "just right" for there is no
hierarchical distinction which would raise him above his fellow angels. He next
refers to free choice, despite the fact that his previously invoked idea of "fixed
laws" would seem to contradict any form of democracy. He then concludes with
the idea that merit has achieved free choice thus commencing the fallacy he
repeats throughout the epic: that the angels revolted in the name of freedom, that
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their free choice has been achieved by a form of merit and not that it has been
bestowed by God.
Both Satan and Comus claim that moral concepts have no intrinsic
meaning but are defined contingently. This produces an ethics of prudence rather
than an ethics of virtue. That is, while virtues are ends in themselves, characters
like Comus and Satan see moral behaviour and moral discourse as useful means
to some external end. Hence Comus states that the distinction between good and
evil rests upon discovery: "Tis only day-light that makes Sin" (COM.126).
Similarly, Satan refers to God as "Our great Forbidder, safe with all his Spies /
About him" (PL.9.815-16). In keeping with this external conception of moral
discourse Satan continually expresses a rule-based morality. He refers to God as
"Heav'ns high Arbitrator" (PL.2.359). Milton, on the other hand, sees Chaos
(where "Chance governs all") as the "high Arbiter" who rules "by decision" rather
than order or justice (PL.2.907-10). Satan's view of God as tyrannical is based
upon a reduction of the universe to a Chaotic realm where the only laws are
instituted "by decision." For the fallen angels the only possible basis for God's
supremacy is "strength, or Chance, or Fate" (PL.1.133). Similarly, Sin sees the
universe ruled by God's "wrauth, which he calls Justice" (PL.2.733).
Milton's fallen characters, therefore, live in a rule-based and externally
ordered universe. Milton, on the other hand, depicts God as freely giving the
world a natural law which God (because he involves no contradiction) cannot
subvert at will. Hence God states that Adam must be expelled from paradise
because "The Law I gave to Nature him forbids" (PL.11.49). God does not decide
what is right; Christ, in answering God says that He "judgest onely right"
(PL.3.155). What is right is logically antecedent to God's judgement. Accordingly,
for Milton, justice is a concept not decided by God but fulfilled by God because
he is just. Just as Adam must be expelled from paradise to accord with the
natural law which God has freely ordained, so Adam must fall in accord with
justice: "Die hee or Justice must" (PL.3.210). The concept of justice is prior to
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God's will. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic Satan attempts to ground his
definition of justice in power. For Satan, God's being is not co-incident with right;
rather it is God's position of power which enables Him to decide what justice or
right is:
. . . hee
Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid
What shall be right: fardest from him is best
Whom reason hath equald, force hath made supream
Above his equals . . . (PL.1.245-49)
The concept of right, for Satan, is not based upon reason but upon divine
fiat. Satan sees reason neither as an endowment from God, nor as an inner
faculty leading to the spiritual edification of human being. Satan here is at once
a modern rationalist13 (claiming that reason equalises, that all beings possess
reason to the same degree, and that reason is the highest mode of being and
hence unsurpassed by God to whom it is equal) and a voluntarist (reason does not
generate a universal concept of good; only force decides what shall be right).
Here, reason is set against the structure of law rather than law being seen as the
outgrowth of reason. Hence, for Satan, laws of obedience must be set against
knowledge; according to Satan reason would reveal that all moral concepts are
merely the advantage of the powerful. However, in Book Six of Paradise Lost
God declares that it is only when reason (which would reveal that Christ rules by
merit) has failed that laws must be imposed by force:
. . . and to subdue
By force, who reason for thir Law refuse,
Right reason for thir Law, and for thir King
Messiah, who by right of merit Reigns. (PL.^.40-43)
Reason for Satan is an equalitarian faculty rather than the foundational
principle of hierarchy. Satan refers to God's commands to Adam and Eve as
"Envious commands, invented with designe / To keep them low whom Knowledge
might exalt / Equal with Gods" (PL.4.524-26). Satan assumes that the hierarchy
in heaven is a continual reassertion of God's power and therefore sees no reason
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why he should "bow and sue for grace . . . and deifie his power" (PL.1.111-12).
He sees God's reign as tyrannical because, for Satan, there is no order other than
force which "now triumphs" and "holds the Tyranny" (PL.1.123-24). God is
sovereign, not because of any ontological hierarchy, but because he is "Whom
Thunder hath made greater" (PL.1.258). However, Satan also possesses a
peculiarly modern psychologistic sense ofwill which he sets against physical power.
Hence he claims that "who overcomes / By force, hath overcome but half his foe"
(PL.1.648-49). This struggle between an inner spirit and outward force is a
modern Hobbesian analysis of the individual's relationship to law and will be
considered at greater length in the following section on Satan's individualism.
The justification of God's ways to man in Paradise Lost rests upon the
assertion of a hierarchical conception of value, a universal definition of justice
(with the addition of the Christian concept of grace), a refutation of the logical
possibility of relativism, a rejection of Satanic individualism and an insistence upon
the ability of reason in the human soul to alight upon truth. Christopher Hill
claims that Milton felt a need to justify God because of the failure of the
revolution and that Paradise Lost represents a departure from Milton's earlier
faith in the possibility of justice.14 In contradistinction to Hill, however, I would
argue that Paradise Lost still retains faith in the power of reason. Milton still
considers this aspect of human being capable of attaining the light of truth.
Nevertheless, there is a greater emphasis in Paradise Lost upon the corruption of
the will and self-enslavement as a result of the postlapsarian disturbance of the
correct hierarchy of the tripartite soul. The survey of history by Michael in Books
Eleven and Twelve, for example, demonstrates the progressive degeneration of
Church government as spiritual values are increasingly contaminated by and
subordinated to carnal desires.
The presence of the concept of hierarchy in Paradise Lost has been
commented upon by a number of critics. C.S. Lewis draws attention to the
distinction between the ontological hierarchy which Milton asserts between men
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and God and the political hierarchy he rejects which would subordinate some men
to others. In his book, The Great Chain of Being, A.O. Lovejoy also frequently
quotes Milton in relation to the concept of hierarchy. The purpose of the
discussion which follows will be to demonstrate the ways in which the concept of
hierarchy is inextricably intertwined with the Miltonic conceptions of value and the
soul and the incompatibility of the Satanic world-view with Milton's commitment
to hierarchy.15
The passage which most clearly demonstrates the "great chain of being" in
Paradise Lost is the speech of Raphael (here significantly called "the winged
hierarch") to Adam:
O Adam, one Almightie is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not deprav'd from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Indu'd with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;
But more refin'd, more spiritous and pure,
As neerer to him plac't or neerer tending
Each in thir several active Sphears assignd,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportiond to each kind. So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
More aerie, last the bright consummat floure
Spirits odorous breathes: flours and thir fruit
Mans nourishment, by gradual scale sublim'd
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,
To intellectual, give both life and sense,
Fansie and understanding, whence the Soule
Reason receives and reason is her being,
Discursive or Intuitive; discourse
Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours,
Differing but in degree, of kind the same. (PL.5.469-90)
Milton adopts the Augustinian conception that evil arises not from the corruption
of natural being but in the ability of free human wills to aspire upwards towards
God, becoming more spiritual, or downwards towards the less rational positions
in the ontological hierarchy. Milton therefore places the origin of evil not in
matter as such ("one first matter all") but in the possibility, stemming from free
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will, that human beings can either aspire to their appropriate character or refuse
God's grace and remain bound to the fallen disruption of the hierarchy of reason,
will and passions. The assertion that all things proceed from and return to God
(an idea of Plato's Timaeus which influenced Plotinus and Christian
neo-Platonism) enforces the idea of a totality in which all being is subsumed
beneath its transcendent source. The expression of hierarchy in this tradition sees
the upward progression as a process of spiritualisation (as does Socrates in the
Phaedo). Hence entities are "by gradual scale sublim'd." The traditional concept
of the chain of being also sees the character of each member of the hierarchy
assigned to a particular sphere of activity: "Each in thir several active Sphears
assignd" and "in bounds / Proportiond to each kind." The presence of reason in
the soul is a function of the position of human being in the hierarchy and it is the
possession of reason which characterises the appropriate mode of being for
human life: "whence the Soul / Reason receives, and reason is her being." The
idea of the proper station of being is repeated throughout Paradise Lost both for
angels ("Each had his place appointed, each his course" PL.3.720) and for human
beings. Raphael warns Adam against both aspiring beyond his being's capability
for knowledge and against "attributing overmuch to things / Less excellent"
(PL.8.565-66). The appropriate kind of knowledge is knowledge of one's own
proper mode of being: "but to know / That which before us lies in daily life, / Is
the prime Wisdom" (PL.8.192-94). Consequently, not only does Raphael assert
the existence of the chain of being; he also prompts the suggestion by Adam that
an awareness and contemplation of this hierarchy is the appropriate and edifying
object of human knowledge:
. . . and the scale of Nature set
From center to circumference, whereon
In contemplation of created things
By steps we may ascend to God . . . (PL.5.509-12)
The acknowledgement of hierarchy and degree is here connected with moral
knowledge in two respects. First, as we have just seen, knowledge of the "scale of
Nature" provides the contemplative wisdom which yields a moral life capable of
spiritualising human being. This idea is reiterated in Book Seven where the
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ascension towards God is qualitative and by steps: "till by degrees of merit rais'd"
(PL.7.157). Secondly, like Plato and Augustine, Milton asserts a hierarchy within
the individual in accord with the doctrine of the tripartite soul.16 We have seen
that in Reason of Church Government Milton's insistence upon the distinction
between bodily and spiritual values stressed a subordination rather than a
mortification of the body. The idea that the mind itself had both spiritual and
temporal aspects is evidenced in the distinction between reason and the will. In
Paradise Regain'd the hierarchy within the mind is seen as both prior to and more
important than worldly hierarchy. Christ's refusal of the wealth offered by Satan
is based on the impossibility of salvation for the inwardly enslaved. The necessary
efficacious power for just government therefore, results not from worldly power
but from inner hierarchy: "Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules / Passions,
Desires, and Fears, is more a King" (PR.2.466-67). In Paradise Lost this notion
of inner hierarchy is more specifically expressed in terms of the Platonic
conception of the tripartite soul. The unfallen Adam insists upon the distinction
between certain aspects of inner experience which are duly subordinated to
reason: "in the Soule / Are many lesser Faculties that serve / Reason as chief'
(PL.5.100-2). Even in Eden, Adam is warned by Raphael to maintain the
subordination of will and the passions to reason: "take heed lest Passion sway /
Thy Judgement to do aught, which else free Will / Would not admit"
(PL.8.635-37). Rather than be transported by the "outside" of Eve's appearance
which would lead to "subjection" as opposed to "honour" (PL.8.568-70) Raphael
states that the appropriate love:
. . . refines
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat
In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale
By which to heav'nly Love thou maist ascend,
Not sunk in carnal pleasure . . . (PL.8.589-93)
After the fall the subordination of the lesser faculties to reason which had
produced the prelapsarian inner harmony gives way to a disruption of hierarchy.
Adam and Eve, like the fallen Satan, now have minds which are divided. As J.B
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Broadbent has noted the characters of Paradise Lost do not soliloquise until they
have fallen.17 What was once a "calme Region" for Adam and Eve is now an
inner hell; this disturbance of inner harmony is a consequence of the usurpation
of reason by the appetite which sways the free will to its demands:
. . . nor only Teares
Raind at thir Eyes, but high Winds worse within
Began to rise, high Passions, Anger, Hate,
Mistrust, Suspicion, Discord, and shook sore
Thir inward State of Mind, calme Region once
And full of Peace, now tost and turbulent:
For Understanding rul'd not, and the Will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual Appetite, who from beneath
Usurping over sovran reason claimd
Superior sway . . . (PL.9.1121-31)
Despite Satan's continual insistence upon a form of mind/body split ("the mind is
its own place"), his mental life is depicted by Milton and admitted by Satan to be
a "Hell within him" (PL.4.20). While "Vaunting aloud," he is "rackt with deep
despaire" (PL.1.126). Satan sees an illegitimate hierarchy as the condition for
God's tyranny but his despair is in actual fact a product of the disruption of his
own inner hierarchy which would rightly recognise the supremacy of God. For
when reason is dominant, laws, virtues and obedience do not appear forced but
are conducive to the well being of rational creatures. Reason is not set over and
against the passions for the practice of the virtues yields "a wel-govern'd and wise
appetite" which recognises that "that which is not good, is not delicious"
(COM.704-05). For Milton, the concept of reason is inextricably intertwined with
a directedness towards God, virtue, goodness and the appropriate mode of being
of the soul. In Paradise Regain'd Christ answers Satan by expounding this
relationship:
And reason; since his Word all things produc'd,
Though chiefly not for glory as prime end,
But to shew forth his goodness, and impart
His good communicable to every soul . . .
(PR.3.122-25)
The faculty of reason, therefore, has a telos which entails both a directedness
towards God and an issuing of divine goodness to each individual soul. The
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hierarchy which subordinates human to divine being is validated by the very
essence of human reason and also defines and generates universal good. The
character of the soul therefore participates in the definition of goodness.
In Samson Agonistes the chorus asserts that "Just are the ways of God, /
And justifiable to Men" (SA.293-94). The concept of justice is reiterated
throughout Samson Agonistes, Paradise Lost and Paradise Regain'd,18 Milton's
entire concept of free will and his rejection of Calvinistic predestination is a
consequence of his determination that God is just. If God were to have decreed
absolutely that Adam were to fall, then he could not justly condemn him for an
action over which he had no control. Furthermore, if God were then to bestow
grace upon some and not upon others, this would also contradict justice. It would
condemn some for refusing a grace that they were never offered. Justice would
not be universal and compelling but a function of arbitrary choice. In Christian
Doctrine Milton reiterates that the use of the word "elect" in scripture is to refer
to those who choose to believe (CPW.6.180). God's salvation and grace towards
believers is just because he has left each rational being with a free will.
Consequently, the purpose ofGod's description of human free will is that it "clears
his own Justice" (PL.3.Argument).19
The significance of Milton's allegiance to the integrity of the concept of
justice in the face of the Protestant emphasis on God's will, underlines the poet's
traditional conception of the virtues. Milton's refusal to divorce the concept of
justice from the being of God stems from his classical identification of reason
with virtue and other-worldly directedness. A virtue must be seen as having an
inherent value and desired for its own end. If God's decrees were seen to be
arbitrary and at odds with the inner coherence of classical conceptions of ethics,
then moral behaviour in this world would lose its intrinsic worth and become a
means to an end (salvation and the manifestation of election) rather than an end
in itself. The Calvinistic conception of election has frequently been seen to
support a modern ethic because it reduces emphasis on other-worldly
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contemplation and inherently moral action. The most famous statements of this
idea are Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and R.H.
Tawney's Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.20 Milton's belief in the essential
nature of truth, justice, reason and virtue simply cannot allow such an arbitrary
God. The good, for Milton, can be proved to have an almost logical necessity
insofar as the very being and character of the world arises from a good and
rational God. The addition of the Christian concept of grace does not weaken the
integrity of the virtue of justice. Grace is necessary in Milton's Christian
conception, not because justice is at odds with the world nor because justice is not
desirable in itself, but rather because human fallenness requires the light of God
in order to attain justice.21
Despite Satan's attempts to invert ethics, his "evil be thou my good"
embodies as much contradiction as Thrasymachus's argument that justice is the
advantage of the powerful. Just as Thrasymachus's argument in the Republic
never steps into full-blown relativism, soMilton demonstrates that Satan never can
renounce the true concept of good. In Paradise Regain'd Satan states:
... I have not lost
To love, at least contemplat and admire
What I see excellent in good, or fair,
Or vertuous, I should so have lost all sense
(PR.1.379-82)
In order to demonstrate that this is not just further sophistry on Satan's part
Milton later writes that Satan is "strook / With guilt of his own sin" (PR.3.146-47).
In Paradise Lost Satan repeatedly attempts to shift his centre of value from good
to evil. At first Satan is complicit with Chaos who claims that his behaviour will
be based on gain rather than good: "Havock and spoil and ruin are my gain"
(PL.2.1009). Satan then attempts a complete reversal of ethical terms: "Evil be
thou my Good" (PL.4.110). But all this effort to invert the dichotomy of good and
evil fails primarily because the dichotomy is not symmetrical. Neither term can
simply be chosen arbitrarily at will; for reason, being, order and the universe are
in accord with good while evil is a parasitic negation of that good.22 Hence the
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centrality of goodness always forces Satan in the end to recognise the character
of virtue. After announcing that evil will be his good Satan encounters the
unfallen angels, Zephon and Ithuriel:
. . . abasht the Devil stood,
And felt how awful goodness is, and saw
Vertue in her shape how lovly, saw, and pin'd
His loss; but chiefly to find here observd
His lustre visibly impar'd; yet seemd
Undaunted . . . (PL.4.846-51)
The rebuke of Ithuriel and Zephon causes Satan to realise that he simply cannot
adopt evil as a good and that virtue has an inherent value that cannot be
exchanged. More importantly, Satan is aware that the fall has had a deleterious
effect on his own being ("His lustre visibly impar'd"); the loss of virtue is at odds
with the total well-being of the body. This contradicts Satan's dualist valorisation
of the "unconquerable Will" and reinforces the Platonic idea that virtue
contributes towards outward appearance insofar as it maintains the stable
hierarchy between reason and the passions. Satan's fallenness is manifested by
the fact that he is "chiefly" disturbed by the loss of outward lustre at the same
time that he laments the loss of virtue which is the prime cause for the
impairment.
The necessity of the acknowledgement of virtue and the universal beauty
of the good, in no way contradicts free will. Simply because virtue prompts
admiration this does not entail that virtue will be followed. In fact, Satan himself
states that "most men admire / Vertue, who follow not her lore" (PR. 1.482-83).
Furthermore when Satan encounters Eve's "Heav'nly forme / Angelic" and his
malice is "overawd" (reinforcing the sense of "awful goodness"), he is "Stupidly
good" (PL.9.457-61). While being struck by the impressive value of virtue he is in
no way determined by it; the recognition does not yield virtuous action or
knowledge. Milton enforces the sense of the necessity and inevitability of
goodness and thus does away with any form of relativism or voluntarism while at
the same time reinforcing the importance of moral knowledge. Virtue has an
efficacy and value which cannot logically be denied ("Evil be thou my good"
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paradoxically presents "good" as valuable at the same time that it attempts to deny
"good"); but virtue must also be embraced by reason and faith if it is to be virtue
and this is what Satan fails to do. Freedom is inextricably intertwined with virtue
despite the fact that virtue is a compelling and essential feature of God's created
world:
Love vertue, she alone is free,
She can teach ye how to clime
Higher than the Spheary chime;
Or if Vertue feeble were,
Heav'n it self would stoop to her. (COM.1019-23)
In Paradise Regain'd Christ rejects Satan's claim that he has aided God by
forming part of the divine plan of redemption; Satan's testing of Job, though
producing virtue, is not a virtuous act because it is caused by fear and a desire for
pleasure: "Wilt thou impute to obedience what thy fear / Extorts, or pleasure to
do ill excites?" (PR.1.422-23). Christ also rejects the peripatetics who as "teachers
best / Of moral prudence" argue for virtue for reasons of extrinsic gain
(PR.4.263-64). Virtue is incompatible with compulsion because it is intertwined
with reason and "Reason is also choice" (PL.3.108). After being overawed by Eve
Satan commences a characteristic soliloquy in which we realise just how
assiduously he has to endeavour to deny the "compulsion" of goodness:
Thoughts, whither have ye led me, with what sweet
Compulsion thus transported to forget
What hither brought us, hate, not love, nor hope
Of Paradise for Hell, hope here to taste
Of pleasure, but all pleasure to destroy,
Save what is in destroying . . . (PL.9.473-78)
Harold Bloom claims that prior to Satan's speech on Mount Niphates the
Satanist critics (such as Empson, Blake and Shelley) are right and that the rest of
Paradise Lost confirms the arguments of the anti-Satanists (critics such as C.S.
Lewis).23 Bloom's interpretation is based upon Satan's shift in attitude at this
point in the epic. With his remark, "how I hate thy beams / That bring to my
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remembrance from what state / I fell," (PL.4.37-39) Satan becomes the envious,
bitter and hubristic monster the anti-Satanists claim he is throughout. At this
point, according to Bloom, Satan's admission of God's "surpassing glory" vitiates
his prior glorious rebellion against tyranny. From here on, for Bloom, Satan's
values are the same as those ofGod; he acknowledges God's goodness but merely
rebels because he can now no longer be part of that goodness: "Be then his Love
accurst, since love or hate,/To mee alike, it deals eternal woe" (PL.4.69-70).
However, Bloom's argument that Satan's rhetoric is coherent prior to Book Four
cannot be sustained. We have already seen how Satan at once employs arguments
about "justice" and "right" (PL.2.18) while at the same time denying the validity
of such principles insofar as the rebellion itself is based upon the rejection of just
right to rule. In addition, the futility and self-contradiction of Satan's position is
made clear prior to Book Four. Satan announces that, "To do aught good never
will be our task" and goes on to say that his aim is "out of good still to find means
of evil" (PL.l.159-65). Milton makes it clear at this point that these aims are not
only impossible (all Satan's evil will "heap on himself damnation"); they are also
based on the incorrect belief that Satan is an absolutely self-determining being.
God decides to unchain the rebel angels from the burning lake and it is clear that
this is because Satanic evil is a self-destructive mission:
. . . the will
And high permission of all-ruling Heaven
Left him at large to his own designs,
That with reiterated crimes he might
Heap on himself damnation, while he sought
Evil to others, and enrag'd might see
How all his malice serv'd but to bring forth
Infinite goodness, grace and mercy . . .
(PL.1.211-18)
The rebel angels, on the other hand, attribute their freedom to their own power,
ironically revealing their ignorant self-directedness:
. . . glorying to have scap't the Stygian flood
As Gods, and by thir own recoverd strength,
Not by the sufferance of supernal power.
(PL.1.239-41)
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Satan's position is therefore both logically inconsistent and based on error.
The undeniable presence of truth and the compelling nature of virtue forms part
ofMilton's justification of the ways of God. If right is what God decides, then the
fall which is based on the concept of transgression of right, becomes an arbitrary
and, by implication, malicious act of divine will. If on the other hand justice has
its own character which God (because he is divine) fulfils, then the expulsion of
Adam from paradise, becomes part of a logical process of justice. God cannot
simply will away the transgression of justice. Milton states in the argument to
Book Three: "grace cannot be extended toward man without the satisfaction of
justice." Grace is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the salvation of
human life. If only justice were to be fulfilled the fall would have been the end
of the story, for the disobedience in Eden is justly answered by the expulsion from
paradise. The Christian concept of grace is therefore an essential aspect of
redemption. Despite this fact Milton's continual additions of the concept of grace
to the concept of justice do not affect the value or character of the concept of
justice which is insistently recalled throughout Paradise Lost. As the argument
states, justice must be fulfilled prior to grace, for without the virtue of justice
human life cannot be good. Obedience to God is therefore not a matter of force
or prudence but a question of the natural tendency of human being given its finite
nature. Referring to the creation of man God says, "I made him just and right"
(PL.3.98). The existence of hell is also a function of justice: "Such place Eternal
Justice had prepar'd" (PL.1.70). The hierarchy which places God above finite
created rational creatures is just; for contemplation directed towards God
produces the wisdom, order and grace conducive to human flourishing. The
endowment of grace is therefore intertwined with the enactment of justice.
Although mercy is the first and last principle of redemption it must be coupled
with justice, for justice is part of the order of the created world: "Man therefore
shall find Grace, /. . . in Mercy and Justice both, /' Through Heav'n and Earth"
(PL.3.131-33). If God were not justly to decree against insubordination then he
could be seen to countenance the inner torment of the disrupted fallen soul.
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Paradise Lost therefore continually stresses the justice of God's will which is in
accord with human flourishing.
God's speech on free will and reason reiterates the adequate creation of
human being as directed towards right: "They therefore as to right belongd , / So
were created, nor can justly accuse / Thir maker" (PL.3.111-13). The process of
salvation shall be instituted through the virtue of justice. Fallen man is
disobedient and hence unjust. Christ's sacrifice will be a substitution of justice for
injustice; his purpose is to "redeem / Mans mortal crime, and just th' unjust to
save" (PL.3.214-15). This redemption will be an act of "charity" and so Milton
again adds a Christian virtue to the classical concept of justice in order to
reinforce the dependence upon God for the renewal of justice after the fall. The
atonement needs charity as its impetus but its logic accords with justice: "So Man,
as is most just, / Shall satisfie for Man" (PL.3.294); "So onely can high Justice rest
appaid" (PL. 12.400). The salvation shall then be followed by a world of justice;
it will be a "New Heav'n and Earth wherein the just shall dwell" (PL.3.335).
Natural Law and the Human Soul
The compelling character of the concept of justice is bound up with the
mode of being appropriate to the human soul and the natural law inscribed
therein. Insofar as the idea of the Christian soul enabled a theory of universal
truth and its accessability, claims regarding the specific and eternal nature of
virtues could be made. The concept of natural law can be interpreted in a
number of conflicting ways. In Milton's time, the argument of natural law justified
both disagreements with positive law in the name of a higher justice and the
transgression of justice by temporal powers in the name of relative (or fallen)
natural law. For this reason, the concept of natural law was one of the most
important points of interpretation in the debates surrounding Church government
and was employed in varying forms by Independents, Presbyterians and Royalists.
Milton's concept of the virtues which stressed the inherent worth of concepts such
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as justice precluded any argument of sacral kingship or relative natural law which
permitted injustice to be the way of the world. If reason is akin to virtue, and
reason (unlike the will) is unfallen, then with the help of grace natural law will
accord with positive law and justice. If however, the faculty of reason is not
sovereign, then the ensuing enslavement following from the loss of virtue will yield
a tyranny in the world which will be a fulfilment, rather than a denial, of justice:
. . . Therefore since hee permits
Within himself unworthie Powers to reign
Over free Reason, God in Judgement just
Subjects him from without to violent Lords;
. . . somtimes Nations will decline so low
From Vertue, which is Reason, that no wrong,
But Justice and some fatal curse annext
Deprives them of thir outward Libertie,
Thir inward lost: . . . (PL.12.90-101)
The argument of fallen natural law - that positive law need not accord with justice
because man is fallen - is here rejected. Worldly injustice is a consequence
neither of divine wrath nor of the contamination of the capability of justice; it is,
rather, the just consequence of the refusal of the faculty of reason. The
identification of virtue with free reason and its connection with divine justice is in
accord with the Socratic emphasis that virtues are only virtues if they are adopted
freely and for the right reasons. Tyranny and the loss of outward freedom is a
consequence of the disruption of inner hierarchy. Milton's concept of "Rational
Libertie" (PL. 12.82) contradicts the modern and Satanic concept of freedom which
marks all alterity, limits and constraints as obstacles to liberty. The hierarchical
ordering of the soul is part of the character of unfallen humanity. The
subordination of the passions and the presence of law is not a lamentable feature
of a once primitive or natural man (Rousseau/Hobbes) but the only situation in
which true liberty inheres:
Since thy original lapse, true Libertie
Is lost, which alwayes with right Reason dwells
Twinnd and from her hath no dividual being:
Reason in man obscur'd, or not obeyd,
Immediatly inordinate desires
And upstart Passions catch the Goverment
From Reason, and to servitude reduce
Man till then free. . . . (PL. 12.83-90)
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The radical distinction of the primitive Christian Church between this world
and God's kingdom is replaced by Milton with an application of divine law to this
world. The established Church's tradition of relative natural law which had
justified the involvement of the Church with temporal issues is also rejected with
Milton's insistence that this world and human being is imbued with God's being
- both "endu'd /With Sanctitie of Reason" (PL.7.507-08) and implanted with grace
(PL.11.23). The transcendence-in-immanence of the human soul should not
therefore accommodate itself to mundanity; rather, the temporal sphere - the
world of government, religion, marriage and literature - should aspire to the
spiritual. Although Milton's doctrine of accommodation in Christian Doctrine
insists that we distinguish between the literal and figural, the issue of an
anthropomorphic presentation of God is solved by his insistence that a "human"
God would be no less divine:
... if God attributes to himself again and again a human shape and form,
why should we be afraid of assigning to him something he assigns to
himself. (CPW.6.135-36)
The similar suggestion in Paradise Lost that the "Earth / Be but the
shaddow of Heav'n" (PL.5.574-5) does not contradict Milton's valorisation of
spiritual over temporal being; it posits the possibility that the earth may be a
realm of divine rather than merely mundane value so that the prelapsarian earth
which "Seemd like to Heav'n, a seat where Gods might dwell" (PL.7.329) may be
regained when "God shall be All in All" (PL.3.340). Milton's Christian humanism
is connected with this belief in the achievable divinity of the world. Just as the fall
is a consequence of forsaking their "Makers Image" (PL.11.515) so redemption lies
in an adherence to the "Divine similitude" (PL.11.512) which is retained after the
fall. Like Blake, Milton insists on the divinity of human being. In a phrase which
is to become important for Blake, Milton refers to the "human face divine"
(PL.3.44). Adam and Eve are "Godlike erect" with "looks Divine" and a bearing
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in which the "image of thir glorious Maker shon" (PL.4.289-92). Significantly, this
image expresses "Truth" and "wisdom."
In Eden there is a harmony between the body and the soul such that the
physical appearance of Adam expresses a natural hierarchy which places rational
human being above nature: "His fair large Front and Eye sublime declar'd /
Absolute rule" (PL.4.300-01). The consequence of the fall is a disturbance of this
lordly rule of nature as the body becomes a vehicle of enslavement. The body is
no longer an expression of reason but the site of passions which sway the body.
The embodied self becomes an imprisoned self after the fall. Hence Samson in
a soliloquy says to himself, "Thou art become (O worst imprisonment!) The
Dungeon of thyself' (SA.155). This concept of self-imprisonment if the clear light
of the soul falls into corporeality is expressed as early as Comus:
He that has light within his own cleer brest
May sit i' th center, and enjoy bright day,
But he that hides a dark soul, and foul thoughts
Benighted walks under the mid-day Sun;
Himself is his own dungeon . . . (COM.381-85)
When Satan comes to lament his rebellion it is after a realisation that his spirit
is becoming progressively corporeal; he expresses his fallenness as a process of
embodiment:
... I who erst contended
With Gods to sit the highest, am now constraind
Into a Beast, and mixt with bestial slime,
This essence to incarnate and imbrute,
(PL.9.163-166)
Satan is presented as a self-divided being; not only is he continually engaged in
soliloquy and reversal, all his actions and aims work against himself. Following
on from the passage just quoted we learn that "Revenge, at first though sweet,
bacIL
/ Bitter ere long^on it self recoiles (PL.9.171-72). This reinforces the sense of the
futility of evil but also manifests the divided character of the Satanic self. Satan's
continual expressions of mind/body split will be examined in the following section.
However, it is worth noting at this stage that as the first fallen being in Paradise
Lost, Satan is the exemplar of fallen dualism. His incessant and regressive
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narcissism is an aspect both of his failure to be other-directed and his enthralment
within his own body. The radical divide between spirit and body which is to
become the lynch-pin of Cartesian philosophy is seen by Milton as a consequence
of the fall. Platonism valorises the spirit and subordinates the corporeal but
always holds as a possibility the harmonious government of the passions by reason.
The naked majesty of Adam and Eve which expresses lordly rule in Eden is
replaced by a controlling and usurping body. Hence the discourse of postlapsarian
sex is permeated with compulsion: "in Lust they burne," "contagious Fire," "Her
hand he seis'd," "sleep / Oppressd them" (PL.9.1015-1045). This sense of
compulsion is coupled with the contamination of the faculty of reason and the
presence of error: "that fallacious Fruit,. . . / About thir spirits had plaid, and
inmost powers / Made erre" (PL.9.1046-49). Significantly, this corruption of
reason is concomitant with the loss of virtue; Adam and Eve are "destitute and
bare / Of all their vertue" (PL.9.1056). The fall from "native Righteousness" is a
loss of both rational and ethical capacities. The interdependence of virtue and
reason throughout this section expresses Milton's profound debt to the Socratic
tradition of ethics as moral knowledge. The significance of this interdependence
lies in the challenge it presents to any claims which would base questions of justice
upon power, prudence or property. Because reason and virtue are inextricably
intertwined and because reason is the apportioned end of human life then the
ethical and contemplative life is intrinsically justifiable. The foundation upon
which this verification is based, therefore, is the human soul - the "living Oracle"
which dwells in "pious Hearts" providing "all truth requisite for men to know"
(PR.1.460).
Milton's concept of the soul as a "living oracle" is an aspect of his
Protestantism insofar as the emphasis upon spirit directs attention away from
sacraments, tradition and the established Church and focuses upon individual
belief. However, the confident belief that contemplation by individual souls will
yield universal truth, justice, reason and light is traditional and Platonic in
character. The more individualistic strains of the radical Protestant sects went so
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far as to identify God with individual spirit - a feature and tendency of
seventeenth-century Protestantism which contradicts entirely the otherworldly
directedness of Milton's soul. Milton insists that the "paradise within" has its
source and being in a transcendent source. This is revealed both in Milton's
invocations where the classical concept of the muse is Christianised to become the
influx of divine light and in the narrative of the epic itself where Adam and Eve
are granted "implanted grace" and "umpire conscience."
In the invocation to Book One Milton expresses both the nobility and the
dependence of the human spirit; the "upright heart and pure" is set before all
"temples" at the same time that the spirit is invoked for assistance: "What in mee
is dark / Illumin, what is low raise and support" (PL.1.22-23). In the second
invocation at the commencement of Book Three, the spirit appealed to is ascribed
certain qualities: light, eternity, purity ("essence increate") and ontological priority
("Before the Sun, / Before the Heav'ns thou wert"). These attributes are set
against the poet's corporeal limits: "these eyes, that rowle in vain / To find thy
piercing ray, and find no dawn" (PL.3.23-4). The overcoming of bodily finitude
is achieved through the influx of spirit towards the poet's soul thereby achieving
immortal vision:
So much rather thou Celestial Light
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight . . .
(PL.3.51-55)
A similar transition is made at a broader level in Samson Agonistes where
Samson's initial conflation of physical and spiritual blindness is overcome by a
realisation of the distinction between corporeal and divine vision. At first Samson
expresses a total exclusion from the realm of divine light: "Light the prime work
of God to mee is extinct, / And all her various objects of delight / Annulld"
(SA.70-72). As the tragedy progresses Samson discerns the transcendence of
inner vision. The chorus reminds Samson that directedness towards God and not
"objects of delight" is the condition for retrieving vision: redemption cannot be
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gained "Unless he feel within / Some sourse of consolation from above"
(SA.663-64). Finally, the distinction between physical light and the inward
illumination of the visionary brings about Samson's triumph as he becomes "With
inward eyes illuminated / His fierie vertue rouz'd" (SA.1689-90). This distinction
between the inward vision "from above" and the physical vision of the world
becomes the condition for the possibility of redemptive action. The identification
of the poet with the prophet rests upon the common influence of holy light. The
function of poet and prophet alike is to shift attention from the literal act of
seeing to the vatic state of vision.
One of the necessary conditions for acquirement of vision is the recognition
of the dependence of the soul upon extra-mundane light as its source of truth.
Thus in each invocation Milton expresses the impotence of individual genius
without divine aid: "my prompted Song else mute" (PR.1.12). As we will see in
the following section on Satan, the fallacy of total self-origination precludes all
possibility of right reason. Satan is led astray by those aspects of truth in his
discourse which he fails to see as stemming from God. Hence Christ answers his
sophistry: "Such are from God inspir'd, not such from thee" (PR.4.350).
The Christian concept of grace also reinforces the frailty and finitude of
fallen human being. The internal coherence of the virtues is not sufficient to
produce moral behaviour given the fall of reason from its position of supremacy
and so grace is added to the classical conception of the virtues. The
self-contained individual is not an adequate agent for redemption; there must be
an aspect of other-directedness. So God insists that salvation is the consequence
of universal grace restoring the proper hierarchy of the soul:
Yet not of will in him, but Grace in mee
Freely vouchsaft; once more will I renew
His lapsed powers, though forfeit and enthralld
By sin to foul exorbitant desires;
Upheld by mee, yet once more he shall stand . . .
By mee upheld, that he may know how frail
His fall'n condition is . . . (PL.3.174-81)
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The acknowledgement of human frailty intersects with an emphasis upon
hierarchy and proper ontological ordering. The direction of attention away from
the corporeal towards the source of all being, the acceptance of finitude and the
limits of worldly being eventually enables a transcendence of those limits.
Through the act of "contemplation ... we may ascend to God" (PL.5.511)
because consciousness of the soul yields knowledge of those transcendent qualities
which worldly self-regard denies. Self-knowledge therefore converges with
devotion insofar as reason produces awareness of God's transcendence:
. . . endu'd
With Sanctitie of Reason, might erect
His Stature and upright with Front serene
Govern the rest, self-knowing, and from thence
Magnanimous to correspond with Heav'n,
But grateful to acknowledge whence his good
Descends . . . (PL.7.507-13)
This is neither Cartesian nor Satanic self-reflection; its aim is neither certain
knowledge of this world nor an absolute sense of self-origination. The fall stems
from a failure of self-knowledge. Adam and Eve defile their own likeness by
failing to sufficiently know the divinity imparted to the human soul: "Therefore so
abject is thir punishment, / Disfiguring not Gods likeness, but thir own, /... since
they / Gods Image did not reverence in themselves" (PL.11.520-28). Similarly, the
demise of Samson is brought about by a neglect of due self-reverence: "She sought
to make me Traitor to my self' (SA.401). Consequently self-betrayal, like the
self-enslavement which precedes tyranny, is prior to actual betrayal: "I to myself
was false ere thou to me" (SA.824).
Prior to the fall Adam and Eve had been sufficiently endowed with reason
and virtue to resist temptation; they were created "Perfet within, no outward aid
require" (PL.8.642). This adequacy of the unfallen soul vindicates God's justice.
The ability of the sou! to act virtuously without the intervention of grace prior to
the fall is bound up with the structure of the virtue of justice. We have noted that
Paradise Lost insists upon the presence of justice in God's works and in the
process of salvation. We have also seen that despite the just character of the
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human soul, tyranny falls on nations who are self-enslaved. This justifies the
presence of evil in the world with the doctrine of free will. Because human beings
have been created capable of virtue it is perfectly just that they should suffer if
they fail to practice virtue. The possibility for overcoming worldly injustice lies in
the power of God's implanted conscience to retrieve self-government. As Christ
replies to Satan in Paradise Regain'd: "Let his tormentor Conscience find him out
/ . . . That people victor once, now vile and base, / Deservedly made vassal"
(PR.4.130-33). The tradition of relative natural law which had accounted for
worldly injustice by positing a less just world as a consequence of the fall allows
for the presence of tyranny regardless of the character of the persons tyrannised.
Milton's explanation of evil in the world sees tyranny as a consequence of present
human self-enslavement: "For God hath justly giv'n the Nations up / To thy
Delusions; justly, since they fell / Idolatrous" (PR.1.442-4). It follows, therefore,
that if through the power of reason the disparity between positive law and natural
law is perceived there can be a just rebellion against tyranny in the name of
universal justice. This is the argument ofMilton's Tenure ofKings and Magistrates
which is also found in Samson Agonistes.
The interpretation of Samson Agonistes in this respect is of significant
importance in considering Blake's response to Milton. Critics such as Stephen
Behrendt and Joseph Wittreich have seen Samson Agonistes and Paradise
Regain'd as companion works with the latter operating as a type of critique of the
former.24 According to this view, the distinction operating between Samson
Agonistes and Paradise Regain'd is that of true and false prophecy with the violent
apocalyptic tone of Samson Agonistes being sublated by the humanist doctrine of
redemption of Paradise Regain'd. It is then argued by Behrendt and Wittreich
that Blake's illustrations and poetry extend the realisation (supposedly made by
Milton) that the prophet figures of Samson Agonistes ana Paradise Lost, are in
some ways false prophets. One of the problems with this argument is evidenced
by Blake's own poetry. The earlier figure of Ore (as opposed to the later
imaginative and reconstructive Los) manifests all those characteristics of violence,
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apocalyptic negation and iconoclastic destruction which Blake (according to
Behrendt and Wittreich) rejects in the Milton of Samson Agonistes. A problem
also arises when the text of Samson Agonistes itself is examined in conjunction
with Milton's other statements regarding regicide and rebellion. An additional
problem connected with the coherence ofMilton's statements on regicide, is the
problem of dating the composition of Samson Agonistes. In order to deny validity
to the arguments for violent rebellion in Samson Agonistes the work must be
subordinated to Paradise Regain'd. Maintaining the traditional later dating of
Samson Agonistes (1666-70) is necessary in order to interpret the work as a
companion piece to Paradise Regain'd. This traditional dating has been
convincingly challenged25 and the new earlier dating (1647-53) places the work
closer to the composition of The Tenure ofKings and Magistrates and the first and
second defences of the execution of Charles.
The traditional later dating has recently been re-asserted by Frank
Kermode and Christopher Hill.26 The reasons given by both writers are based on
the tragic tone of the work and its concern with the seemingly inexplicable
character of divine justice. As we have just seen, however, Paradise Lost locates
worldly injustice where the hierarchy within the soul is already corrupted; in this
sense it does explain the failure of the revolution but the structure of this
argument is also compatible with a positive pre-revolutionary position. If tyranny
is attributed, not to divine wrath, but to the failure of reason then a seizure of
power may be validated upon the basis of the retrieval of the light of God. As
Milton states in The Tenure ofKings and Magistrates:
If men within themselves would be govern'd by reason, and not generally
give up their understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom from without,
and blind affections within, they would discerne, what it is to favour and
uphold the Tyrant of a Nation. (CPW.3.190)
This argument - that a loss of reason precedes tyranny - is indeed the position of
Samson Agonistes but it is also the logical conclusion ofMichael's survey of history
in Paradise Lost. The argument, therefore, that the two works must be written
during the same post-Restoration period is not compelling insofar as the argument
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for the justification of God's ways is compatible with a pre-revolutionary and
post-revolutionary position depending upon the inflection given to the argument.
Indeed, as we shall see, the expression of the concept of justice in Samson
Agonistes does have a pre-revolutionary character. I would therefore disagree with
the distinction Wittreich makes between the worldly apocalypse of Samson and
the divine apocalypse of Christ and the radical disjunction he sees between type
and truth.27 Mundane and divine action are not incompatible but hierarchical, for
Milton sees the virtue which orders worldly justice as one of the conditions for
other-worldly salvation.
The justification for overriding positive law in Tenure of Kings and
Magistrates (1649) rests upon the existence of a natural law which is prior to the
state. For Milton this natural law is not the law of democracy but the law of
"Justice, which is the Sword of God, superior to all mortal things" (CPW.3.193).
In order to challenge the authority of a temporal power there must be some
ground for right other than the tradition of law or the will of the people. In the
Tenure and the pamphlets by other writers involved with the debate it was argued,
from Scripture, that action could be taken against a temporal power in the name
of the people even without their consent. This appeal to natural law was neither
the divine right of lex rex (the natural law of the royalists) nor the democratic
salus populi suprema lex (the natural law of the Presbyterians); it was God's law
of right which transcended human will and temporal powers and revealed itself
to the souls of the enlightened: "For if all human power to execute, not
accidentally but intendedly, the wrath of God upon evil doers without exception
be of God; then that power, whether ordinary, or if that faile, extraordinary so
executing that intent of God, is lawfull, and not to be resisted" (CPW.3.197-98).
What was at issue was whether or not the rebelling agent claiming revelation was
acting as a private person or for the sake of divine justice. The Representation
presented by ministers expelled after Pride's Purge stressed the primacy of
democracy and denied the validity of any individual's action against such
government because the state transcended the collection of "Private Persons."
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For the Lawes of God, Nature, and Nations, together with Dictates of
Reason, and the common consent of all casuists allow that to those which
are intrusted with managing the Supreame Authoritie of a State or
Kingdom, which they do not allow to a multitude of Private Persons.28
Milton agrees that an individual has no right to act against the government insofar
as he acts as a private person. In the Tenure Milton asserts that David did not
slay Saul, not because the providence of God had intervened to prevent the
destruction of a ruler as the Royalists claimed, but because David was acting as
a "privat person" and would have "bin his own revenger, not so much the peoples"
(CPW.3.216). But Milton also insists (and this is implied in his discussion of
David and Saul), against the Representation and the Royalists, that an individual
can act rebelliously if not acting as a private person. In Samson Agonistes this is
precisely the position Samson places himself in: "I was no privat but a person
rais'd / With strength sufficient and command from Heav'n" (SA.1211-12). The
radical individualism of Samson Agonistes which reiterates the concepts of inner
light, election, and self-redemption ("Making them each his own Deliverer"
[SA.1289]) is in no way incompatible with the doctrine that rebellion is only
legitimate if carried out for universal rather than personal ends. Samson is
"perswaded inwardly that this was from God" (SA.argument); his action is guided
by an individual and privileged access to truth. At the same time the truth he acts
upon is for the public good and is part of the universal justice informing the world
despite the lack of public support prior to his act. The violence of Samson
Agonistes is therefore not an act of a personal will but a justifiable part of God's
revelation. To claim, as Wittreich and Behrendt do, that there is an implicit
rejection of the violent action of Samson in Samson Agonistes is to ignore both
its possible earlier dating and Milton's clear defences of non-democratic rebellion.
As Christopher Hill maintains, we may not approve such violence but disapproval
cannot justify a denial that Milton did see violence as a valid means for dealing
with tyranny and infidels:
There is no evidence that Milton ever abandoned his belief that it was a
religious duty to fight against God's enemies, to slay them when this
seemed to serve God's cause. The High Court of Justice which
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condemned Charles I, Milton thought, was a representation of the great
day, when the saints shall judge all worldly powers.29
The Character of Satan
John Carey has recently argued that it is impossible to claim that Satan is
either right or wrong in Paradise Lost)30 the history of disagreements between
critics as to the value of Satan as a character or moral being testifies to a
fundamental ambiguity at the heart of the representation of the rebel angel which
no reading could conclusively or justifiably disprove. However, following on from
the previous discussions of the sophistical character of Satan's rhetoric it may be
argued that the indeterminacy which has characterised discussions of Satan is due
to an historical confusion regarding the nature of individualism. From our
discussions ofMilton's work so far it is evident that the poet endorses an intensely
other-worldly individualism. This individualism is to be distinguished from its
modern form precisely insofar as it directs itself towards a transcendent realm of
value at the same time as it sees itself as essentially partaking in that realm.
Modern individualism is both non-hierarchical and totally self-grounding. The less
traditional strains of radical protestant individualism tend to embody this more
modern form of self-directedness.31 In fact, the protestant sects of the seventeenth
century can be seen to occupy a liminal position between the traditional
theological individualism of holistic societies and the equalitarian individualism of
modernity. While Milton clearly endorses the former, Satan's individualism is of
the latter variety. The confusion as to where the sympathy of the poet lies arises
from the similarity of the two positions - both Satan and Milton are individualists.
This confusion is evidenced by arguments, such as those of Fredric Jameson, in
which it is claimed that Satan represents an older order of feudalism: Satan is not
a modern revolutionary but a "great feudal baron" whose rebellion is "a
reminiscence of the distant feudal past."32 On the other hand, Hugh M. Richmond
has argued that "Milton's organicism of the soul" supported "a possessive
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individualist poetic."33 The purpose of this section will be to identify the distinction
between Satanic and Miltonic individualism and the implicit rejection of the
former as an ethical possibility.
Satan's belief that God is a tyrant who reigns by power rather than right
has already been identified as a function of the fallen angels' failure to understand
the hierarchical arrangement of divine government. In contradistinction to
Milton's statement that reason, freedom and virtuous action are intertwined, Satan
defines freedom as a total absence of alterity. He therefore identifies any limits
to the self as the expedient commands of an envious God. His outlook is open,
equalitarian and "economic." As Louis Dumont has demonstrated in his essay on
Hitler's Germany, this type of world-view is the condition for totalitarianism; for
if any order or limit to one's being is regarded as anathema to the natural desires
of the self then any laws or social structure will have to be imposed on unwilling
subjects.34 According to Dumont totalitarianism "results from the attempt in a
society where individualism is deeply rooted andpredominant, to subordinate it to the
primacy of the society as a whole. It combines, unknowingly, conflicting values."35
It is the nature of laws themselves to be tyrannical; the will of the people simply
cannot enter the picture. Satan's belief in the "unconquerable Will" and his
refusal to allow any limit to his own freedom therefore precludes him from being
anything other than a tyrant himself. If he denies God's right to rule and then
claims such a right for himself his position is either contradictory (as when he does
acknowledge God's right) or totalitarian (as when he places himself above the
rebel angels).
Satan's refusal to acknowledge any limits to his own being is revealed in
several aspects. First, his definition of freedom as an absolute rejection of alterity
produces the belief that all authority is a denial of the governed seifs worth.
Consequently, the rebel angels "while they feel / Vigour Divine within them, can
allow / Omnipotence to none" (PL.6.157-59). The distinction between liberty and
licence which Milton insists upon is lost to Satan. Satan believes that his first
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impression that "Libertie and Heav'n / To heav'nly Soules had bin all one"
(PL.6.164-5) is contradicted by the elevation of Christ. He feels his freedom
impaired by the existence of a duty to serve and therefore attributes obedience
to a lack of power and will.
The fallen angels are characteristically self-directed. In Book Two they sing
of "Thir own Heroic deeds" (PL.2.549). This ironically parallels the heavenly
choir's praise of God. Like Hobbesian individuals they aim to see all value as
emanating from themselves. Mammon's advice is to "seek / Our own good from
our selves, and from our own / Live to our selves" (PL.2.252-54). Satan's sin of
pride, both in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regain'd, involves a type of
self-consciousness which produces self-deception regarding Satan's origins. In
Paradise Regain'd Satan upbraids Belial for being so self-obsessed as to see all
others as like himself: "Belial, in much uneven scale thou weigh'st / All others by
thyself' (PR.2.173-74). Despite this criticism Satan is no better; if Belial has
assumed Christ will be tempted by women and pleasures of the flesh, Satan
commits a similar error by assuming that Christwill be tempted with worldly glory.
Milton describes Satan as he "who self-deceiv'd / ... had no better weigh'd / The
strength he was to cope with, or his own" (PR.4.7-9). Satan is at once
self-directed and lacking in self-knowledge. The idea that Satan adopts a stance
of self-deception as a consequence of his excessive pride is extended in Paradise
Lost. Despite Satan's subsequent claims that it is God's priority which causes his
subjection, ("The Gods are first, and that advantage use / On our belief,"
[PL.9.718]) prior to the war in heaven he alleges total self-creation:
. . . who saw
When this creation was? rememberst thou
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being?
We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais'd
By our own quick'ning power, . . .
Our puissance is our own, our own right hand
Shall teach us higher deeds, by proof to try
Who is our equal: . . . (PL.5.856-866)
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Satan's discourse here exploits the epistemology of a modern rationalist. If
something is not known its existence is open to doubt. Adam in Eden receives
revealed knowledge and accepts Raphael's word because of the limits of his
knowledge: "for who himself beginning knew?" (PL.8.251). Satan, on the other
hand, transposes his epistemological finitude into his ontology. If his creation by
God cannot be known, seen or remembered (because it is transcendent to
experience) Satan, who cannot acknowledge transcendence, rejects God's
creation. He therefore demands proof of God's power and denies any hierarchy.
After the war in heaven, once Satan has had to acknowledge God's priority,
he attempts to confound ontological with temporal priority. God may be first
temporally but Satan adopts a concept of progressive improvement. On hearing
of the creation of earth he asks: "For what God after better worse would build?"
(PL.9.102). To acknowledge that God's creations are good is one thing - to argue
that Eden must be greater than heaven because it is God's second creation is to
deny the perfection of God; it is to imply that God may get better at creation with
practice. It is certainly a non-hierarchical way of thinking; it relies on
accumulative value rather than ontological ordering. Satan's transition from a
rejection of God's priority to the implication that priority is equivalent to
inferiority is an indication of his self-deception. What is at issue for Satan is not
truth but the argument which will serve his pride.
Milton reinforces the sense of Satan's self-directedness through a
juxtaposition with the other-directedness of the unfallen angels, Christ and Adam
and Eve in Eden. The unfallen angels sing not of their own deeds or desires but
of God's glory. Raphael's excursion to Eden with his discourse upon God's
creation evidences the angel's knowledge of the divine hierarchy and his willing
obedience. Abdiel's reply to Satan conflates the law of servitude to God with
natural law because of God's excellence and explains that such obedience is just
and commensurable with freedom:
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Unjustly thou deprav'st it with the name
Of Servitude to serve whom God ordains,
Or Nature; God and Nature bid the same,
When he who rules is worthiest,and excells
Them whom he governs. This is servitude,
To serve th'unwise, or him who hath rebelld
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee,
Thy self not free, but to thy self enthrall'd;
(PL.6.174-181)
Satan's self-enthralment is contrasted in several episodes with the Son of God.
Christ's offering of himself for the atonement through charity is contrasted with
Satan's volunteering of himself to enter Eden for reasons of glory. The holy
Trinity and Christ's position as the substantial expression of God's goodness is
contrasted with the birth of Sin and Death. Whereas the relationship between
God and Son is one of expression and action the relationship between Satan, Sin
and Death is of narcissistic and incestuous self-directedness. The birth of Sin from
Satan's head amplifies the sense in which Satan's fall is due to his "own
suggestion" and that he was "Self-tempted, self deprav'd" (PL.3.130). Not only
does it strengthen the argument that evil arises from Satan's will rather than God's
creation, it also reveals Satan's self-directedness. While the angels in heaven
recoil from Sin, Satan becomes familiar with, and then captivated by, this image
of himself:
. . . but familiar grown,
I pleas'd, and with attractive graces won
The most averse, thee chiefly, who full oft
Thy self in me thy perfet image viewing
Becam'st enamourd . . . (PL.2.761-65)
Satan's attraction to Sin is a portent of the narcissism which inspires Satan to deny
the role of God as creator. Eve, on the other hand, while initially mesmerised by
her own image, is called away by the voice of God towards Adam. Significantly
Satan later appeals to her self-love in order to tempt her to eat the forbidden
fruit. The significance of this incident is that Milton sees certain types of
self-consciousness as unethical and self-deceptive. The allegory of Sin and Death
reveals how self-directedness becomes self-destruction. Sin's "odious offspring",
Death, turns upon his mother and becomes her "inbred enemy" and rapes her to
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produce monsters for his own devouring. The relationship between Sin and Death
then becomes a circle of violence, incest and consumption with the destruction of
Sin by Death prevented only by Death's desire for further prey. Not only does
this episode reveal the products of Satan's imagination to be hideous and
destructive; the image of continual and circular violence connects with the
insistence throughout Paradise Lost that evil redounds upon itself.
Milton's individualism does depend upon some distinction between mind
and body and as early as Comus the possibility is expressed of inward freedom in
the face of corporeal enslavement: "Thou canst not touch the freedom of my
minde / With all thy charms, although this corporal rinde / Thou hast immanacl'd,
while Heav'n sees good" (COM.663-65). The fact that this freedom is dependent
on the presence of heaven is significant. The mind is indomitable while "heaven
sees good" - hence the mind in this instance is not an isolated entity but gains
autonomy from the body by virtue of divine influence. Comus is clearly more
adamant with regard to the distinction between mind and body than Milton's later
works. In Paradise Lost the unfallen body is an expression of the divine image
while in Christian Doctrine the entire salvation of human being involves the body.
Nevertheless, there is still a sense in Comus of a subordination of the body rather
than its rejection. A lack of virtue "Lets in defilement to the inward parts, / The
soul grows clotted by contagion, / Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite loose /
The divine property of her first being" (COM.466-68). While virtue is the soul's
being it also, although directed towards the non-corporeal, has its effect on the
body:
Till oft convers with heav'nly habitants
Begin to cast a beam on th'outward shape,
The unpolluted temple of the mind,
And turns it by degrees to the souls essence,
Till all be made immortal . . . (COM.459-63)
Redemption of the body is conditional upon communion with transcendence and
does not depend upon a dualism which isolates the mind from either the body or
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alterity in general. The transition must also be by degrees and moral action and
cannot occur through an act of will.
In Paradise Lost Satan's emphasis upon the will refuses to acknowledge the
influence or transcendence of God. Satan asserts that he possesses a "mind not
to be chang'd by Place or Time" (PL.1.253). Beelzebub maintains that "the mind
and spirit remains / Invincible" (Pl.l.139-40) and that God's "force" is a physical
power only which will have no effect upon inner being. He also puts forward the
idea that God "Have left us this our spirit and strength intire" (PL.1.146) in order
to increase their suffering. Satan leaps upon this idea and urges retaliation on the
basis that "to be weak is miserable" (PL.1.157). Satan's acceptance of the
invincibility of the mind and spirit produces a dualism in which "the mind is its
own place." Both Milton and Satan believe that hell can be a state of mind.
Satan at first claims that an act of will can produce heaven or hell: "The mind is
its own place, and in itself / Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n"
(PL. 1.254-55) Milton, on the other hand, sees the inward character of hell or
heaven as due not to an act of will but to the position of the soul in its relation
to God. Because Satan has turned away from God and towards himself, his mind
is an arena of turmoil. Hell is pictured as self-enthralment and as the logical
outcome of the sort of claims which reduce heaven or hell to willed psychological
states of an autonomous mind:
And like a devilish Engin back recoiles
Upon himself; horror and doubt distract
His troubl'd thoughts, and from the bottom stirr
The Hell within him, for within him Hell/He brims} and round aboiA him, (\orfrcft)
One step no more than from himself can fly ^
By change of place: Now conscience wakes despair
That slumberd, wakes the bitter memorie
Of what he was, what is and what must be
Worse; of worse deeds worse sufferings must ensue.
(PL.4.17-26)
Satan's obsessive self-directedness has paradoxically led to his self-enslavement.
He has lost control of his thoughts (which are distracted by doubt - a malaise from
which Blake's characters also frequently suffer). He is not so much a spirit as a
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mechanism marked with compulsion. Despite his earlier protestations that his
mind could decide its own being he is here plagued by the memory of his original
and proper station to which he cannot at will return. Furthermore, Satan's
attempts to deny the force of ethics and virtue are here negated by the return of
conscience. It is after the return of conscience that Satan acknowledges that he
has misconstrued the nature of God's power. He then concedes that his mind is
not an inward heaven amidst the physical hell but a greater and "lower deep":
Which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell;
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threatning to devour me op'ns wide,
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n.
(PL.4.75-78)
It is significant that at this point Satan's economic or quantitative
conception of God's power is problematised. Although he still uses an economic
metaphor, Satan sees that his error lay in interpreting obedience to God in terms
of quantitative difference - thinking that,
. . . one step higher
Would set me highest, and in a moment quit
The debt immense of endless gratitude,
So burdensom still paying, still to ow;
Forgetful what from him I still receivd,
And understood not that a grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays, at once
Indebted and discharg'd; what burden then?
(PL.4.50-7)
Satan, at this moment of reawakened conscience, acknowledges that God's
position as creator places him qualitatively higher and that His continual
sovereignty is due to the fact that creatures owe their existence to their maker.
However, Satan's irreparably fallen character induces him to see this as a "burden"
and "debt immense" although he goes on to assert that it is not a burden and that
such owing "owes not." Satan's discourse is here straining at its limits. Unlike
Abdiel who has a coherent conception of justice and obedience, Satan is still using
quantitative metaphors to express essentially qualitative distinctions. His rebellion
was prompted by an economic conception of value - by seeing the presence of the
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Son as doubling the honour he would have to pay to God: "Knee-tribute yet
unpaid, prostration vile, / Too much to one, but double how endur'd"
(PL.5.782-83). Consequently, when Satan considers repentance he knows he
would be unable to sustain reconciliation. He calculates such a return to
obedience as of little worth, again in economic metaphors: "so should I purchase
deare / Short intermission bought with double smart" (PL.4.101-02). Satan then
announces that evil will be his good; he somehow wishes to absent himself from
the infinite debt to God. His inversion of good and evil implies that the terms
have an exchange value and that his reign in hell will be equivalent to God's reign
in heaven. So, when Satan returns to hell after tempting Adam and Eve he
proclaims that the rebellion has in the end proved a worthwhile bargain: "AWorld
who would not purchase with a bruise" (PL.10.500). The logic of the narrative
of Paradise Lost proves Satan wrong, however; goodness and God's kingdom
ultimately overcome the force of hell and Satan's claims to value are "counterfet"
(PL.4.117). Raphael warns against such a concept of exchange value. Adam
should not see Eve's "shows" as exchangeable with "realities" (PL.8.575); there
should be a hierarchical relationship recognising difference where value and profit
are based on just and right and not on free exchange:
. . . weigh with her thy self;
Then value: Oft times nothing profits more
Then self-esteem, grounded on just and right
Well manag'd; . . . (PL.8.570-73)
Raphael here endorses a conception of value in which each being can be weighed
and its value decided. An economic conception accounts for value quantitatively
and homogenously. All entities are exchangeable and hence no one being (virtue
or good) has any a priori merit over any other. Satan can thereby justify his
"purchase" of the world with evil.
The doctrine of economy rejects the limits and inherent qualities of
particular beings; it is therefore linked to doctrines of excess. Comus's art of
persuasion also employs an economic conception of value. His endorsement of a
doctrine of excess rejects the insistence upon human finitude and limit which is
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a feature of Raphael's speech to Adam and Eve. If nature is defined as property
for human utility then a doctrine of temperance would leave aspects of nature
purposeless: "Th'all-giver would be unthank't, would be unprais'd, / Not half his
riches known, and yet despis'd, / And we should serve him as a grudging master,
/ As a penurious niggard of his wealth" (COM.723-26). For Comus there is a
natural law of property (and significantly he includes the Lady's self in this
property) which lends nature to all and demands free distribution. So, replying
to the Lady he responds: "But you invert the cov'nants of her trust, / And harshly
deal like an ill borrower" (COM.682-83). Immediately prior to embarking upon
an extended metaphor which uses currency as a vehicle for nature, Comus rejects
the Lady's doctrine of chastity with a reply that reduces the virtue to its rhetorical
use: "be not cosen'd /With that same vaunted name Virginity" (COM.737-38). He
then follows with a trope of free economy:
Beauty is natures coyn, must not be hoorded,
But must be currant, and the good thereof
Consists in mutual and partak'n bliss, (COM.739-41)
The lady repudiates this doctrine of excess and the metaphor of open economy
with a distribution based upon limit and proportion: "Natures full blessings would
be well dispenc't / In unsuperfluous eeven proportion" (COM.772-73). Although
Satan does not use the metaphor of currency his arguments to Eve are of a
similar structure. In Eve's dream Satan describes the good not in the terms of
discipline, temperance and limit but in distribution, increase and excess: "And why
not Gods of Men, since good, the more / Communicated, more abundant grows,
/ The Author not impaird, but honourd more?" (PL.5.71-73). Raphael, on the
other hand, in describing heaven claims that "full measure onely bounds / Excess"
(PL.5.639-40). For Raphael, the presence of plenty does not demand
consumption but rather allows the free and self-disciplined imposition of limits,
whereas scarcity might produce a desire for more.
The arguments of the chain of being, the emphasis upon the endowed
character of the soul, the qualitative conception of value based on just and right
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and the stress on limit rather than excess are all concomitant with a pre-modern
ontology which sees value as based on the inherent character of a being. Such
a concept of value has an ethical meaning insofar as all arguments regarding
justice, right and government are referred to a transcendent concept of good
which informs and orders all entities. Satan's equalitarian, economic and
eventually excessive conception of value derives the concept of good either from
its use in a discourse of power or from a qualitative notion of gain. In the final
books of Paradise Lost Michael presents a vision of history in which the former
hierarchical conception of value falls under the influence of power and gain.
Church Government and Hierarchy
Milton makes it clear in Reason of Church Government that the distinction
between spiritual and temporal values has been continually effaced in the
progression from primitive Christianity to the established Church. In Paradise
Lost Michael's vision of the fallen world therefore includes an observation of the
increasing worldliness of religious institutions. Michael's vision is anticipated by
Milton's description of the fallen angels (who will become pagan deities) in Book
One:
By falsities and lyes the greatest part
Of Mankind they corrupted to forsake
God thir Creator, and th' invisible
Glory of him that made them, to transform
Oft to the Image of a Brute, adorned
With gay Religions full of Pomp and Gold,
And Devils to adore for Deities: (PL.1.367-73)
The heathen religions of the fallen angels are based upon "lies" and "falsities."
This connection between unreason and pagan religion reinforces Milton's
conception of the rationality of Christianity. This passage also reiterates the idea
of the fallen angels as Sophists and links their deception to a process of
corruption where the invisibility of God is transformed into images. Although
Milton is here describing pre-Christian forms of worship Michael's description of
the Church after the apostles in Book Twelve is similar:
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Wolves shall succeed for teachers, grievous Wolves,
Who all the sacred mysteries of Heav'n
To thir own vile advantages shall turne
Of lucre and ambition, and the truth
With superstitions and traditions taint,
Left onely in those writt'n Records pure,
Though not but by the Spirit understood.
Then shall they seek to avail themselves of names,
Places and titles, and with these to joine
Secular power, though feigning still to act
By spiritual, to themselves appropriating
The Spirit of God, promisd alike and giv'n
To all Beleevers; and from that pretense,
Spiritual Lawes by carnal power shall force
On every conscience; Laws which none shall finde
Left them inrould, or what the Spirit within
Shall on the heart engrave. What will they then
But force the Spirit of Grace it self, and binde
His consort Libertie; what, but unbuild
His living Temples, . . . (PL.12.508-527)
Michael has previously explained to Adam that the "various laws" given to
humanity are "to evince / Thir natural pravitie" (PL. 12.287). Such laws are
imperfect until the covenant of the atonement where law will not be imposed but
ingraven on hearts. Only the spirit can discern this inward law. The
appropriation of discipline by secular and institutional authorities is therefore a
corruption and denial of God's grace. Furthermore, the use of such external laws
for the advantage of the powerful causes an atrophy of the individual spirit which
should rightfully be deciding on law; it "unbuilds" the inner temples. When Milton
argues decisively for the disestablishment of the church in his sonnet "On the Ae.*/
Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parlament" he specifically refers to forcers
of conscience. The presbyters have attributed to themselves the law which is
actually discernible in the spirits of all individual believers; the ministers of the
established church introduce "Civill Sword" into the realm of grace and conscience.
Not only is there a contamination of the spirit with secular power, the secular
authority claims to be acting through spiritual jurisdiction: "feigning still to act /
By spiritual." Like all laws which are used by the powerful, the control of church
law by state power can only be a semblance of what it claims to be. By failing to
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subordinate worldly power to spiritual value the individual conscience of believers
and the true character of the law will be violated. Milton equates liberty not with
the rejection of law but with the internalisation of law. The rejection of "outward
rites and specious forms" in favour of the spirit of God "promised alike and given
/ To all believers" reiterates the concept of the universal attainability of truth and
law in Reason of Church Government. If, as Christopher Hill has maintained,
Milton eventually lost faith in the ability of human reason to achieve justice and
that Paradise Lost expresses that disillusionment, then that inability was attributed
by Milton not to the character of the human soul but to the corrupting nature of
Church government. While Milton always maintained that self-enslavement
preceded institutional tyranny, he also saw the character of the established Church
as conducive to the loss of reason rather than edification. His pronouncements
on the essential character of the human soul and its capacity to grasp truth,
however, reveal the hope that worldly hierarchies would ideally be overcome by
the internalisation of law and the predominance of spirit in all persons.
In OfReformation Milton had argued for a system of Presbyterianism; in
doing so he had challenged the "No Bishop, No King" argument. Presbyterianism,
he claimed, supported rather than threatened the continuation of kingship. At
that stage of his career Milton was only transposing the idea of a kingdom of
equals into the ecclesiastical sphere and had yet to make any political demands.
By the time Milton comes to write Paradise Lost he has already refuted the
validity of political as well as ecclesiastical hierarchies. Not only does The Tenure
of Kings and Magistrates argue against any form of natural lordship, the divorce
tracts also demand the freedom to divorce by denying the magistrates right to
govern in the domestic sphere. The rejection of worldly hierarchy is therefore
transposed, from the ecclesiastical realm, into political and domestic life. At the
basis of all Milton's arguments for the rejection of worldly hierarchy is his
assertion of spiritual hierarchy. Because of the divine transcendence and natural
superiority of reason, there is no justification for the subordination of individuals
to external or "corporeal" institutions. Paradise Lost, therefore, is a text both of
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subordination and liberation. The criticisms of Satan's rebellious desire to govern
tyranically are laid alongside the call for a governing and upright reason. In his
divorce tracts Milton also articulates a hierarchy of both subordination and
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Milton's refutation of Satanic individualism clearly advocates a pre-modern
orientation towards virtue and transcendence. The open, competitive and
autonomous selfhood of Satan is defeated by the doctrine of the rational,
subordinated and hierarchised Christian soul. But not only does Milton's rational
theology promulgate a certain form of individualism, it also entails a hierarchical
theory of gender. While Milton defends the rationality of all individuals (including
women), he also acknowledges the capacity for other aspects of the self - the
body, the will and the passions - to impede the soul's rational activity. In the case
of Satan, as we have seen, reason is adversely affected by the will. In the case of
women Milton articulates an anxiety regarding their attachment to the visual,
bodily and specular aspects of being. In Reason of Church Government Milton
had made the historical association between corporeality, specularity and
Constantine's corruption of the Church through the State. In the divorce tracts
and Paradise Lost Milton associates these fallen aspects of being with
femininity.
Like the debate on Milton's "Satanism," the readings of Milton's attitude
towards women appear to be divided between two critical camps. Critics who
defend Milton's discussions of women and femininity operate from a basis of
context and intent. So, their argument runs, while Milton's texts may have been
written and interpreted within a patriarchal context which devalues women, the
broader aim of Milton's corpus is the extension of Christian liberty to all persons.
On the other side of the critical debate are the critics who attack Milton's position
on women, finding themselves unable to subordinate the "sexist" utterances in
Milton's poetry to the fallenness of Milton's characters. These critics refer
Milton's texts, not to the broader context of Milton's intentions, but to the
responses they have experienced as critics and readers of Milton. In these cases
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the patriarchal readings and uses of Milton's texts are seen as inextricably
intertwined with the text itself.
Both Diane McColley and Barbara Lewalski have attempted to excuse
Milton's sexism on the basis of historical difference claiming that it is
unreasonable to expect a seventeenth-century individual to totally transcend
contemporary attitudes.1 Such a defence is no doubt reasonable but there are
defenders of Milton's portrayal of women, such as Joseph Wittreich and Jackie
DiSalvo who want to go further and claim that the effect of Milton's texts is to
actually challenge patriarchy.2 So the debate is not merely between critics who
want to attack and critics who want to excuse Milton's "sexism." What is at issue
is the ideological function of Milton's work and whether it enforces or challenges
patriarchal ways of seeing. Laudatory readings such as Wittreich's, which see
Milton as overcoming the sexism of his time open the field for responses made by
critics such as Christine Froula and Sandra Gilbert who argue that by refusing to
acknowledge the poet's misogyny the patriarchal canonisation of Milton's texts
continues a gender bias which cannot be localised in the past but continues with
every act of reading.
Critics such as Sandra Gilbert and Christine Froula argue their
interpretation from a position of response. Both these critics begin their
assessment of Milton with reference to VirginiaWoolfs characterisation ofMilton
as the crippling patriarchal "bogey" of the literary canon.3 Gilbert's argument is
based upon the response of nineteenth-century women writers to the presence of
Milton while Froula reiterates the supposedly undeniable validity of her own
response in reply to challenges of her reading.4 Critics such as Diane McColley
and Barbara Lewalski argue from a more intentionalist basis - claiming that
Milton's further discussions of marriage in his divorce tracts and the tenor of
Paradise Lost as a whole should be taken into consideration and that claims that
Milton is sexist cannot be substantiated in the broader context of Milton's
argument for Christian liberty. Joseph Wittreich employs both response and
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intentionalist methods, arguing that Milton's admiring early female readership and
his revolutionary position in the tradition of visionary poetry yield a "feminist
Milton."5 The intentionalist critics not only implicitly answer the response-oriented
critics; the recent history of feminist criticism has yielded a pattern whereby an
article claiming Milton's misogyny is followed by a corrective "answer" which
situates the misogynist utterances within a broader context.6
Now, even if we accept the claim made by Wittreich and DiSalvo that
Milton challenges misogyny, the discourse that Milton uses to undertake this
putative challenge - the discourse of reason, justice and theology - despite its
pretensions to be gender neutral is, I will argue, embedded in a history of sexist
bias. This chapter will deal with Milton's argument for Christian liberty in his
divorce tracts (the passages most often cited to defend Milton's attitude towards
women) and certain passages in Paradise Lost in order to challenge Wittreich's
position that Milton's texts are liberating for feminists. While agreeing with those
critics who claim that there is an implicit rejection of misogynist utterances in the
poetry it does not follow that because Milton is opposed to a certain form of
misogyny that he is necessarily "feminist" or that there is no gender bias in his
thought. The fact that certain readers such as VirginiaWoolf have found Milton's
texts alienating despite attempts by other critics to "frame" misogynist statements
should lead to a questioning of the possibility of distancing the "brutal and
dictatorial"7 misogyny of the fallen Adam from authorial intent.
If feminist criticism is to decide simply whether a text is "sexist" or not then
the debate will only continue with two sides arguing from incommensurable
premises - between critics of response and critics of intent. If, however, response
can alert us to problems with the representation of intent then the radical divide
between advocators of a "feminist Milton" and Milton as patriarchal "bogey" can
lead us to question why, if Milton did intend a liberating and humanist justice for
all God's creatures, his intention in some cases (that ofwomen) seems to go awry.
The answer to this question, I believe, lies in Milton's use of the concept of reason
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and the concomitant hierarchical relationship between the soul and the body. If
men have traditionally been considered essentially more rational and women
essentially more directed towards the body, then any adoption of reason as the
telos of human being, unless it undertakes a radical redefinition of gender, will be
prejudiced against women.8
Northrop Frye has noted the analogous relationship between the hierarchy
of the soul and the hierarchy of gender:
There is a rough but useful correspondence between the hierarchy of
reason, will and appetite in the individual and the social hierarchy of men,
women and children that would have developed in Eden if Adam had not
fallen.9
This observation can be confirmed by Milton's expression of hierarchical natural
law in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce:
The good man or master of the familie is a person, in whome resteth the
private and proper government of the whole houshold, and he comes not
into it by election, as it falleth out in other states, but by the ordinance of
God, setled even in the order of nature. The husband indeed naturally
beares rule over the wife; parents over their children, masters over their
servants: but that person who by the providence of God, hath the place of
a husband, a father, a master in his house, the same also by the light of
nature, hath the principalitie and soveraignitie therein and he is
Paterfamilias, the father and chiefe head of the familie: to him therefore
the true right and power over all matters domesticall, of right appertaineth.
(CPW.2.353)
The hierarchical natural order expressed here is remarkably feudal. The idea that
someone (either husband or master) "naturally beares rule" would seem to be at
odds with Milton's previous anti-hierarchical arguments against episcopacy and his
later anti-hierarchical arguments against the divine right of kings. There are two
explanations for this contradiction. The first is that Milton, like later liberal
thinkers, refuses to transpose the tenets of individualism into the sphere of
marriage so that while he rejects natural hierarchy in other spheres he maintains
a hierarchy of gender.10 However, here, and later in Tetrachordon Milton invokes
natural political and social hierarchies in addition to the familial hierarchy. It is
possible to explain this by seeing Milton's expression of hierarchy in the divorce
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pamphlets as a transitional point in the development of his thought. Until the
divorce pamphlets Milton's prose had dealt with Church government and the
unjustified worldly hierarchy of the prelates in the ecclesiastical sphere. In the
divorce pamphlets Milton begins to transpose the qualities of original and unfallen
existence into the temporal sphere with his demand that marriage be a spiritual
union as it was in Eden. By the time Milton writes his "political" pamphlets
hierarchy will be seen as invalid in the temporal sphere as a whole because Milton
will demand those original conditions of justice and liberty for the worldly domain
of the present.
In Tetrachordon Milton invokes the idea of a secondary natural law of
nature and nations to explain the presence of injustice in the world. This is to
bring his reading of the New Testament in accord with the Mosaic sanction of
Divorce. The Old Testament allowed divorce because of the world's fallenness
but the new Testament emphasises that such practices were not necessary in
Eden: "in the beginning it was not so." The "beginning" according to Milton is the
unfallen condition of Eden where woman was a spiritual helpmeet. The
secondary law of nature is used to explain worldly conditions in contradistinction
to the original state of nature. If Milton were to follow the secondary law
argument accordingly he would argue for allowing the presence of unfit marriages
on the basis of human fallenness. But Milton, of course, argues precisely the
opposite and here, as in his reform tracts, he believes in the duty to restore as far
as is possible the condition of Eden on earth. Therefore Milton argues for
divorce in order to do away with marriages which do not meet the spiritual
condition of the original marriage between Adam and Eve. In order to do this
the faculty of reason must judge, against magistrates, what is its own good.
Reason and liberty:
shall restore the much wrong'd and over sorrow'd state of matrimony, not
onely to those mercifull and life-giving remedies ofMoses, but as much as
may be, to that serene and blissful condition it was in at the beginning;
(CPW.2.240)
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In Tetrachordon Milton adopts the theory of secondary natural law - a theory
characteristically used to account for the presence of worldly injustice. But Milton
uses the theory of secondary natural law only as a means of arguing towards the
possibility of attaining the conditions of original nature; secondary natural law is
neither an essential aspect of his thought nor is it an idea to which he logically
and consistently adheres.
Ernest Sirluck claims that the distinction between primary and secondary
natural law is introduced in Tetrachordon and overcomes a problem encountered
in The Doctrine and Discipline ofDivorce (the relation between Mosaic and New
Testament law):
... where had Milton learnt to improve his argument by distinguishing, not
between Pharisees and other men, but between the primary and secondary
laws of nature? He had not known how to use this distinction for his
purposes early in 1644.11
Like Sirluck, Arthur Barker claims that Milton introduced a new concept - an
accommodation of worldly experience - in his divorce tracts which contradicted
the tone of his earlier work:
... compared with his reasoning on the church, Milton's divorce argument
thus involves a remarkable shift in the centre of his thinking. The basic
principle of divine prescription is replaced by the basic principle of human
good, temporal as well as spiritual.12
The problem with Barker's argument that secondary natural law evidences a
greater direction towards human good, however, is that the structure of the
secondary natural law argument actually serves to explain and justify the presence
of unjust hierarchies which contradict the primitive Christian ideal of a kingdom
of equals. We can see this from Milton's own definition of the doctrine:
. . . partly for this hardnesse of heart, the imperfection and decay of man
from original righteousnesse, it was that God suffer'd not divorce onely, but
all that which by Civilians is term'd the secondary law ofnature and nations.
He suffers his owne people to wast and spoyle and slay by warre, to lead
captives, to be som maisters, som servants, som to be princes, others to be
subjects, hee suffer'd propriety to divide all things by severall possession,
trade and commerce, not without usury; in his common wealth some to be
undeservedly rich, others to be undeservedly poore. All which till
hardnesse of heart came in, was most unjust; whenas prime Nature made
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us all equall, made us equal coheirs by common right and dominion over
all creatures. (CPW.2.661)
What Milton, in fact, argues for in his divorce pamphlets is the use of worldly law
to return to the original state of nature (where law would not have been
necessary) and not the continuation of fallen practices. Sirluck and Barker are
correct in noting that Milton introduces the idea of secondary natural law for
pragmatic purposes of argument and that it is contrary to Milton's previous
statements on law. But even in the divorce pamphlets Milton never fully adopts
or follows through the consequences of secondary natural law theory. Milton's
definition of secondary natural law is in accord with the standard
seventeenth-century definitions; secondary natural law justifies the presence of
unjust hierarchies in the fallen world. Despite this definition Milton's arguments
for divorce are based on the premise that it is both desirable and possible to
restore the Edenic condition of marriage on earth. What we see here in the
divorce pamphlets is not the introduction of a new concept of human morality.
In his Reform tracts Milton demanded a primitive unity and purity for the Church.
The chronological development we witness in Tetrachordon is not a radical change
of policy but an extension of the demand for original conditions - which Milton
had previously demanded for the ecclesiastical sphere - into the domestic realm.
The essence of Milton's use of secondary natural law is not that it "prevents]
Christians from being held to a higher moral duty than that imposed by natural
law."13 It is not a compromise measure. Rather, Milton's justification of his
proposed divorce laws is the possibility of attaining the original conditions of
marriage of the "lost Paradise" (CPW.2.316) where divorce laws were not
necessary. In his reform tracts Milton rejects Hooker's idea that Church
government be suited to the conditions of the temporal state; Milton demands an
original condition of purity for the Church independent of the fallen state. In The
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce Milton begins to transpose the elimination of
worldly hierarchy into the temporal sphere by demanding a Christian liberty not
governed by magistrates for domestic life. By the time of the Tenure and
Eikonoclastes Milton has also rejected the natural rule of kings by transposing
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Christian rationalism into the political sphere. Although Milton eventually rejects
natural hierarchy in unjust practices of State he will always retain a gender
hierarchy, as we see in Paradise Lost. This is because the hierarchy of gender,
unlike political and ecclesiastical hierarchy, is not due to any secondary condition
of fallenness but is part of the harmonious subordination to natural order in
Eden.
The hierarchical relationship between Adam and Eve is not incidental to
Paradise Lost; it plays an important part in the logic of the narrative. As Diane
McColley and Stevie Davies note, Milton's depiction of married life in Eden does
much towards overcoming the merely domestic role of women. Eve is shown as
inventive and rationally independent. However, Eve must also be subordinate.
It is when she oversteps the mark between rational independence and a
self-directed desire for autonomy and superiority that she succumbs to Satan's
temptation. The hierarchical relation between Adam and Eve is first noticed by
Satan who sees in this situation the possibility for successful temptation. It is from
Satan's point of view that the famous "Hee for God only, shee for God in him" is
delivered. This remark echoes The Doctrine and Discipline ofDivorce: "Who can
be ignorant that woman was created for man, and not man for woman"
(CPW.2.344).
Milton's hierarchical and yet ennobling depiction of Eve can be illuminated
with reference to his doctrine of the body. The hierarchical relationship between
reason and the body does not seek to pervert or deny the body but to bring it
closer to the character of reason. As early as A Mask presented at Ludlow-Castle
Milton introduces the idea of a "wise appetite" and in Christian Doctrine Milton
claims that the process of resurrection is the attainment of the condition of the
soul for all aspects of human being including the body, Just as this doctrine in
many ways revalues the body and overcomes dualism so Milton's attitude toward
women and their ontological inferiority is at first glance ennobling. The
government of reason is not repressive but enables a stable and free body and
130
will. In Milton's picture of marriage the wife's due reverence of her husband will
mean she is more than a corporeal chattel; she will become a rational and
spiritual partner and this will in turn dignify the sexual aspect of marriage. One
central argument of Milton's divorce pamphlets is that a law which permits
divorce only for adultery or absence of sexual consummation characterises
marriage as a contract between bodies. Milton does not simply want to add the
issue of spiritual compatibility; in fact he sees the issue of intellectual
companionship as being more important due to the very character of gender
relations. Just as Milton sees the practice of justice as being the end of the State
and therefore argues against the state becoming a law unto itself, so spiritual
compatibility is the virtue towards which marriage is directed. Milton here, as
elsewhere, refuses to place the institution before the ethical reason for its
existence. Marriage is correctly a spiritual bond and not a civil contract; its end
is the edification of human being. Therefore, while being bound by an
institutional and scriptural tradition of the inferiority of women, Milton sees this
inferiority as placing women not in an entirely other category of being altogether14
but as differing in degree (like Adam from the angels). In fact the relationship
between woman and man is structurally analogous to that between man and
Christ.15 It is for this reason that woman should not be servile but edified by her
relation to a similar yet superior version of herself: "man is not to hold her as a
servant, but receives her into a part of that empire which god proclaims him to,
though not equally, yet largely as his own image and glory" (CPW.2.589). Just as
God must create human beings free so that they can be obedient in a worthy
manner, women must be rational and noble inferiors in order to be a glory of
man's image: "for it is no small glory to him, that a creature so like him, should
be made subject to him" (CPW.2.589). Just as the human soul carries the image
of a higher transcendence, so the woman if correctly directed towards her proper
mode of being sees her image in man: "the woman is not primarily and
immediately the image of God, but in reference to the man" (CPW.2.589). In
Paradise Lost Adam refers to Eve as "Best Image of my self and dearer half'
(PL.5.95). Accordingly, the appropriate direction of attention for women is to the
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image of God in their husband. This is the aspect of Milton's thought which
critics like McColley and Lewalski feel gives more to women than it takes.16 True,
Milton reinforces inferiority, the argument runs, but that is a function of his
historical tradition. What is more important is that he sees women as ideally
rational, capable of education, responsible and primarily souls rather than bodies.
According to Northrop Frye, Milton's rejection of the idea that women are
the bearers of sin and should be subservient because of their collusion with and
responsibility for the fall therefore condemns the blaming sentiments expressed
by the fallen Adam in Book Ten of Paradise Lost:
Out of my sight, thou Serpent, that name best
Befits thee with him leagu'd, thy self as false
And hateful; nothing wants, but that thy shape,
Like his, and colour Serpentine may shew
Thy inward fraud, to warn all Creatures from thee
Henceforth; lest that too heavenly form, pretended
To hellish falsehood, snare them. But for thee
I had persisted happie, . . . (PL.10.867-74)
Despite Frye's claim, Milton does characterise women as the bearers of sin
in Tetrachordon (although Frye is correct in noting that Milton does not see them
as essentially and universally in this way): "from her the first sin proceeded, which
keeps her justly in the same proportion still beneath. She is not to gain by being
first in the transgression, that man should furder loose to her, because already he
hath lost by her means" (CPW.2.590). Frye's later argument - that the logic of
Paradise Lost implies that Adam would have done well to divorce Eve and thus
place divine before human loyalty - suggests that man could have been without sin
had he divorced the fallen woman.17 Sin, according to this picture, should be
recognised and cast out, and in the divorce pamphlets sin more often than not
comes in the form of a woman. One of Milton's arguments in The Doctrine and
Discipline of Divorce takes as its supposedly undeniable premise the correctness
of "divorcing an Idolatresse, which was, lest she should alienate his heart from the
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true worship ofGod" (CPW.2.260). From this premise Milton extends the reasons
for divorce to include unsociability of the wife: "what difference is there whether
she pervert him to superstition by her enticing sorcery, or disinable him in the
whole service of her unhelpful and unfit society, and so drive him at last through
murmuring and despair to thoughts of Atheism" (CPW.2.260). This right to
divorce a threat to one's faith could logically apply to the divorce of husbands by
faithful wives. However, Milton's rhetoric of idolatry and bewitchment associates
the heretic partner with the corporeal and the attractive - qualities specifically
associated with the feminine in Milton's poetry. In the broader context of
Paradise Lost Adam is wrong to attribute his fall to Eve's "too heavenly form," for
he did choose his fate. Nevertheless, it is significant that although he has no right
to see Eve as the cause for his fall, the suggestion she provides is associated with
"shew / Rather than solid vertu" (PL.10.884). Eve is seen as deficient in inner
experience; her "hellish falsehood" is achieved by "inward fraud" - by not having
the gifts of virtue to match her outward appearance. Adam warns other creatures
of the danger of feminine wiles, of the "innumerable / Disturbances on Earth
through Femal snares" (PL. 10.896-97). According to Milton's philosophy Adam
is wrong to demand that God should have populated the universe with masculine
spirits (PL. 10.893) for free will should be able to experience and resist temptation.
But Eve is a temptation and even if we see the limits of Adam's speech that fact
remains. The devil tempts through sophistry but Eve, Adam claims, appeals not
through reason but by "Femal charm."
Milton sees the female usurpation of the role of master in a marriage as
justifiable if it stems from an (exceptional) superiority of reason. More often than
not, though, such challenges to power are a result of female pride. It is common
that the man may be "contended with in point of house-rule who shall be the
head, not for any parity of wisdom, for that were something reasonable, but out
of female pride" (CPW.2.324). It is therefore "likely that God in his Law had
more pitty towards man thus wedlockt, then towards the woman that was created
for another" (CPW.2.325). Milton's individualism reinforces the right of divorce
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for husbands afflicted with heathen wives; in this way Milton ties in the concept
of the internalisation of law with the right of men to dispose of wives who do not
fulfil the conditions of "helpmeet:" "For ev'n the freedom and eminence of man's
creation gives him to be a law in this matter to himself, being the head of the
other sex which was made for him" (CPW.2.347). Milton's position in
Tetrachordon repeats the warning against the power of women - against being
fondly overcome with female charm. A man cannot be truly said to love a
woman who poses a threat to his faith: "For either the hatred of her religion, &
her hatred to our religion will work powerfully against the love of her society, or
the love of that will by degrees flatter out all our zealous hatred and forsaking and
soone ensnare us to unchristianly compliances" (CPW.2.682). It is possible to
argue, therefore, that Milton is against a form of misogyny which would reduce
women to embodied and irrational beings. Women can and should aspire to be
rational. In fact, the entire logic of the divorce pamphlets devolves upon the
original state of marriage where hierarchical differences - between the soul and
the body and male and female - were properly ordered: "mariage is a human
society, and that all human society must proceed from the mind rather than the
body, els it would be by a kind of animal or brutish meeting" (CPW.2.275). If the
exercise of reason is to be the foundation of marital law and the edification of the
soul is the end of marriage then women as well as men are spiritually ennobled
in the Miltonic schema. From this we can see that overtly misogynist remarks
which would reduce women to entirely irrational and corporeal beings would both
sully the relation of marriage and defile the male partner. The feminine must be
like enough to the masculine to reflect his rationality and only inferior in the sense
of providing subordinated but not valueless virtues of attractiveness and charming
diversion: "wherin the enlarg'd soul may leave off a while her severe schooling; .
. . which as she cannot well doe without company so well as where the different
sexe in most resembling unikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but please
best" (CPW.2.597). Milton sees marriage as governed by the same laws of
hierarchy which operate in the universe as a whole. If a man has married an
idolatresse or a woman whose society is such as to bring him into despair and
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hence atheism he should divorce her for the sake of a higher divine good: "for
there is a certain scale of duties, there is a certain hierarchy of upper and lower
commands, which for want of studying in right order, all the world is in confusion"
(CPW.2.264).
Not only does Milton invoke a natural hierarchy to govern marital law, he
also argues for a transcendental concept of "divorce" in which the creation of the
world is seen to begin with an originary act of division of like from unlike: "[By
God's] divorcing command the world first rose out of Chaos, nor can be renew'd
again out of confusion but by the separating of unmeet sorts" (CPW.2.273). This
argument for divine divorce is extended into a concept of the natural propensity
of the universe to produce meetings of similar kinds: "God's doing is ever to bring
the due likenesses and harmonies of his workers together." Unfit marriages are
therefore "against the fundamental law book of nature" and it is the function of
divorce laws to restore that state of nature where like resides with like. Milton
also uses the doctrine of similarity to reject the argument that the Mosaic law
sanctioning divorce accommodated a sinful people. For Milton, sin and law are
contraries and such contraries can have no truck with each other: "sin can have
no tenure by law at all, but is rather an external outlaw, and in hostility with law
past all attonement: both diagonall contraries, as much allowing one another, as
day and night together in one hemisphere" (CPW.2.288). The significance of this
doctrine of contraries for gender relations should be clear.18 The feminine when
"other" to the masculine creates a cosmic disorder which it is the function of
reason, in the form of the divorce laws, to expunge. The feminine, then, though
possessing an inclination for difference must see its image in the masculine at the
same time as it subordinates itself to that image.
It is difficult to minimise the significance ofMilton's hierarchical distinction
between men and women, for the hierarchical conception impedes the possibility
of female rationality at the same time that it asserts that women should aspire to
the condition of reason away from embodiment. For Milton, the inferiority of
135
women is not due to any imperfection of their creation: "God .. . hath done his
part" (PL.9.375). Women's inferiority lies in the greater propensity for female will
to be directed towards the body and for the female body to direct other wills
toward sin. But as long as responsibility lies in free human will God cannot justly
be accused of disadvantaging female being. By adopting a hierarchical
arrangement rather than an ontological dualism Milton can assert both that
women are ideally rational and that they are attracted towards the body to a
greater extent. To establish reason as the end and mode of human being cannot
be a gender-neutral argument when reason is articulated within a hierarchical
discourse of related, subordinated and valorised terms and when one gender is
seen to have a greater directedness towards the subordinate term in the
dichotomy.
Just as Milton's arguments on Church government claim that institutions
should be based on the validity of inner experience and reason, so his divorce
tracts claim that marriage is properly a private and spiritual contract. Excessive
attention to the bodily or external aspects of such institutions leads to idolatry, for
Milton claims that the divorce laws against which he is arguing make an Idol of
marriage: "to injoyn the indissoluble keeping of a mariage found unfit against the
good of man both soul and body ... is to make an Idol of mariage, to advance
it above the worship of God and the good of man" (CPW.2.276). What is at
issue for Milton in his pamphlets is the possible spiritual corruption of the soul
that becomes chained to the institution. Although Milton argues that both men
and women can divorce a heathen or incompatible partner as a threat to the
spiritual solace of the faithful partner, Milton's poetry as well as the examples
offered in his prose tend to depict the contamination of partner spirits as a
process of "unmanning" or "effeminising." Thus the divorce laws Milton advocates
assert the right of a man to be released from an Idolatresse: "This law therfore
justly and piously provides against such an unmanly task of bondage as this"
(CPW.2.626). In The Doctrine and Discipline ofDivorce Milton claims that being
forced to remain in a marriage with a woman who is no meet help threatens both
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the husbands soul and his manhood: "to constrain him furder were to unchristian
him, to unman him" (CPW.2.353). The effects of women upon men could also
extend into the political sphere. In his History of Britain Milton denies that
women can play any role in the framing of law, (CPW.5.32, 74 & 79-80) despite
the fact that his reform tracts demanded that all Christian citizens had a duty to
oversee right government. In Eikonoclastes Milton comments on Charles' letters:
"to sumn up all, they shewed him govern'd by a woman" (CPW.3.538). Again in
Eikonoclastes, Milton attributed the declension of sound government in his day to
a process of effeminisation: "Examples are not far to seek, how great mischeif and
dishonour hath befall'n to Nations under the Government of effeminate and
Uxorious Magistrates" (CPW.3.421).
Such rhetoric inveighing against the effects of effeminacy was not Milton's
alone. Shakespeare had seen the power of feminine beauty to be possibly
unmanning. In Romeo and Juliet Romeo exclaims, "O sweet Juliet / Thy beauty
hath made me effeminate." One aspect of Puritan thought concerned an anxiety
that male spectators of the theatre as well as the boys playing women would be
effeminated by female dress. Such a fear was stated in John Rainolds's Th'
Overthrow of Stage Plays (1599). Stephen Gosson in The School ofAbuse (1579)
claimed that theatre had the power to "effeminate the minde."19 In his
anti-theatrical tract Histrio-mastix William Prynne warned against the effeminising
effect of the stage because empty outward spectacle directed attention away from
the soul.20 The significance of this traditional association between femininity,
theatricality and degeneration of the soul is twofold. Milton associates the
attrition of the soul with a process of effeminisation. He also associates women
with spectacle and outward attraction. In the vision of history in Book Eleven of
Paradise Lost Adam sees a "fair femal Troop" whose singing and dancing cause
the "sober Race of Men" to "yeild up all thir vertue" (PL.11.614-25). Adarn
concludes from this that women are the originary corruption of male virtue and
attributes evil and fallenness to the feminine. Michael corrects Adam by pointing
out that women are not the bearers of evil: "From Mans effeminat slackness it
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begins" (PL.11.634). What is to be feared, therefore, is not so much the evil
female but the feminine evil in men which follows upon the spectacle of female
beauty or "Goddesses" (PL.11.615). In Paradise Regain'd, when Christ answers
Satan's offer of power to free the enslaved nations, he replies that such people
are "Deservedly made vassal" and that such self-inflicted slavery is a consequence
of "effeminacy" and materialism: "Luxurious by thir wealth, and greedier still, /
And from the daily Scene effeminate" (PR.4.141-42). In SamsonAgonistes Samson
claims that all his fortitude and temperance had been in vain due to his eventual
collapse. Not only does Samson fall through temptation by a woman, he sees his
being as contaminated by femininity: "I yeilded, and unlockd her all my heart, /
Who with a grain of manhood well resolv'd / Might easily have shook off all her
snares: . But foul effeminacy had me yoked" (SA.407-10). Later, reinforcing the
idea that his downfall is due to his own effeminacy, he says, "What boots it at one
gate to make defence, / And at another to let in the foe / Effeminatly vanquisht?"
(SA.560-62).
In Paradise Lost Adam relates to Raphael the attraction he felt for Eve
after their "wedding":
Nor vehement desire, these delicacies
I mean of Taste, Sight, Smell, Herbs, Fruits, and Flours,
Walks, and the melodie of Birds; but here
Farr otherwise, transported I behold,
Transported touch; here passion first I felt,
Commotion strange, in all enjoyments else
Superiour and unmov'd, here onely weake
Against the charm of Beauties powerful glance.
Or Nature faild in mee, and left some part
Not proof anough some Object to sustain,
Or from my side subducting, took perhaps
More than anough; at least on her bestowd
Too much of Ornament, in outward shew
Elaborate, of inward less exact.
For well I understand in the prime end
Of Nature her th' inferiour, in the mind
And inward Faculties, which most excell
In outward also her resembling less
His Image who made both, and less expressing
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The character of that Dominion giv'n
Ore other Creatures . . . (PL.8.526-46)
Milton gives Adam the free will to resist such "commotion" but maintains the
ideological association between women and the power to make men "vehement"
or irrational. Raphael warns Adam against Eve with the rebuke, "what transports
thee so; / An outside?" (PL.8.567-68). When Adam relates his dream of Eve's
creation he says it is her "looks" which "infus'd Sweetness" into his heart
(PL.8.474). Part of Milton's assertion of Adam's capacity to have withstood the
fall lies in situating Adam's failure, not in his reason, but in his attraction to Eve:
"Against his better knowledge, not deceav'd / But fondly overcome with Femal
charm" (PL.9.998-99). Eve's bodily appearance causes a suspension of reason in
Adam; her "Heav'nly forme" - the aspect which is not so much feminine as divine
stuns Satan and overawes his malice (PL.9.460-1). Hence, when Eve's beauty can
be referred to a non-feminine and transcendent other it has the power to elicit
virtue. However, when it is seen as self-sufficiently perfect - when Adam sees the
world "in her summd up, in her containd" - her beauty causes distraction
(PL.8.473). The feminine, for Milton, is therefore capable of reason but has a
greater degree of embodiment. Eve prefers Adam to relate Raphael's warning
because he will "intermix / Grateful digressions, and solve high dispute / With
conjugal Caresses, from his Lip / Not words alone pleas'd her" (PL.8.54-57).
Consequently, the feminine is not simply devalued by Milton. Like the body it is
a valuable aspect of experience if subordinated to masculine reason. If due
hierarchy is maintained the feminine can be rational; if this hierarchy is disrupted
the feminine can contaminate and ensnare reason. Christ tells Adam that his
failure to acknowledge this natural law of gender is the cause of his fall and that
Eve's visual adornment should not have been allowed to affect the "real dignity"
of male reason. Adam's failure is a failure of self-knowledge and a fall to the
outwardness of "attraction:"
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee,
And for thee, whose perfection farr excelld
Hers in all real dignitie: Adornd
She was indeed, and lovely to attract
Thy Love not thy Subjection, and her Gifts
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Were such as under Goverment well seemd,
Unseemly to bear rule, which was thy part
And person, hadst thou known thyself aright.
(PL.10.150-56)
In Samson Agonistes Dalila is associated with outward display and a
dangerous captivating power. Samson laments of Dalila that "She sought to make
me Traitor to my self ... I With blandisht parlies, feminine assaults, /
Tongue-batteries" (SA.402-4). The figure of Samson's blindness, on the other
hand, is employed by Milton to express an entirely inward vision and non-specular
comportment. Consequently, critics who attempt to locate the misogyny of
SamsonAgonistes in Samson's fallen utterances alone have to overlook the general
description of Dalila which, when considered within the schema of values the
tragedy implies, represents her as an example of bodily-directed womanhood. The
character of Dalila is fallen in a way that Satan is not. Dalila possesses a
dangerously captivating quality which resides in her bodily charm.
Diane McColley answers criticisms thatMilton's women are narcissistic and
self-directed by seeing the "Narcissus" episode of Eve's self-captivation in Paradise
Lost as an ethical trial which Eve significantly overcomes. It is telling, however,
that Milton chooses such a trial for Eve and not Adam.21 Milton is not arguing
that women are embodied; on the contrary, he sees their telos as the image of
male reason. But there are qualities which are traditionally associated with
women: attractiveness, sensuality and vanity.22 Milton does nothing to destroy such
associations and his ontology rigourously testifies to the threat such qualities pose
to the soul.
French feminists such as Helene Cixous have argued that the dichotomies
which ground the discourse of reason have always worked against women.23 Luce
Irigaray also argues that a certain term in the dichotomy is seen as originary,
rational and foundational while the other term is seen as parasitic, disruptive and
secondary.24 According to both Cixous and Irigaray women have always been
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associated with the latter term of the dichotomy. For both writers any arguments
of "equality" will continue to devalue feminine "difference" simply because
arguments for equality still see the "male" characteristics as desirable. The
association of women with the irrational, darkness, the body and the sensible
should lead us to revalue these terms and not merely claim that women should (or
could) aspire to the rational, light, the soul and the intelligible. For Irigaray the
character of the concept of reason - its emphasis on non-contradiction, presence,
unity, visibility and deduction - links it essentially to the Western metaphors of
male sexuality. According to the Australian feminist philosopher Genevieve
Lloyd, the discourse of reason is historically defined within a dichotomous rhetoric
which devalues those qualities most commonly associated with women. For Lloyd,
philosophers can be guilty of gender bias even if they do not specifically mention
the inferiority of women simply by reinforcing the oppositions which have been
used to devalue femininity. Consequently it is an act of philosophical
self-deception to assume that by allowing women the possibility of rationality one
has done away with sexism; for concepts such as reason cannot be removed from
their semantic history. Genevieve Lloyd's claim that reason is not a
gender-neutral term is based upon an argument which places systems of ethics,
ontology and epistemology within a social and conceptual context. According to
Lloyd, while certain philosophers may have made no explicit statements excluding
women from the realm of reason, the notions they do employ, such as
transcendence, self-assertion, development and universalisability, are linked to a
whole system of oppositions which excludes the feminine. Within each
philosophical discourse the positive terms have tended to be linked with what is
traditionally associated with masculinity. Theoretically, a woman may be capable
of rational activity, but this would depend upon her movement towards male
ideals, whereas men would simply have to develop what were presumably their
already innate and dominant traits. For Lloyd and Irigaray ideals of reason have
helped constitute sexual difference; the notion that "Reason knows no sex" is a
form of philosophical bad faith.25 In overcoming prejudice it is not sufficient to
acknowledge that different cultures, genders or classes are "the same;" one needs
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to be aware that identity or equivalence should not be the condition for rights and
respect.
Milton does away with the medieval virgin Mary cult and the ideal of
woman as "other" and institutes a more modern form of gender bias.26 Woman
is not the idolised "other" but the inferior "same." By transposing the masculine
ideal of reason as a possibility for women and inscribing a hierarchical relationship
between women and men which is analogous to that between men and souls,
Milton associates womenwith a more embodied level of the hierarchy and thereby
subordinates the qualities he still traditionally associates with women.
Milton's theory of gender, therefore, reinforces the hierarchical ordering
of entities in the great chain of being. His argument for divorce also appeals to
an original condition of natural law which remains eternally valid. While granting
women the free will to ascend the scale of being, there is still a static hierarchical
ordering where women are subordinated to men, as they were in the natural and
harmonious hierarchy of Eden. With the emergent modern world-view of the
seventeenth century, against which Milton was reacting, women are subordinated
not on ontological or theological grounds - equalitarianism has superseded
hierarchy - but on the basis of property. Women are the corporeal chattels
Milton explicitly declares they should not be. When Blake examines the role of
women in society he therefore challenges both the Miltonic idea that woman is
ideally a reflection of the rational male and the modern notion that woman is an
item of property. Both these tropes - of reflection and ownership - are subverted
in Visions of the Daughters ofAlbion. (Oothoon is both a slave and the reflection
of masculinity.) Blake's main challenge to both Milton and modern theories of
gender is enabled by his theory of contraries. For Blake, law and value do not
precede and govern the meeting of opposites; what is valuable is generated by
contraries. Unlike Milton, who sees opposites as hierarchically ordered within a
static chain of being, Blake views contraries as dynamic and mutually productive
of each other. Blake's response to Milton's theory of contraries and the law
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Milton sees as antecedent to and governing those contraries will be the subject of
the next chapter.
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1 According to Lewalski great art transcends "those lesser categories of
human experience" such as race, class and gender. Consequently, we
cannot condemn Milton's "glorious and supremely right" vision of the
human condition on the basis that the categories it employs are outmoded.
Barbara Lewalski, "Milton on Women - Yet Once More," Milton Studies 6
(1974): 4-5. From a Marxist perspective which condemns Milton's
individualism David Aers and Bob Hodge come to a similar conclusion
regarding Milton's historical position and his "inevitable complicity with
orthodox sexist ideology": "His thought includes an immense, yet insecure
advance over the course of his life, but there are limits to how far even a
heroic individual can transcend his background and education, in thought
and practice." David Aers and Bob Hodge, "Rational Burning: Milton on
Sex and Marriage", Milton Studies 13 (1979): 29.
2 Wittreich argues that Milton's works are actually "feminist": "Milton was
not just an ally of feminists but their early sponsor" and "Milton's epic
prophecy is in part a woman's text - indeed, a lost feminist text." [Joseph
Wittreich, Feminist Milton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) ix-x.]
DiSalvo argues that despite the poet's manifest intention the materials he
adopts actually challenge his ostensible patriarchal views. This dual
perspective hinges upon the character of Satan: "At the heart of Milton's
epic lies a contradiction aesthetically reflected in the magnetism of his
Satan and the repulsiveness of his God." Paradise Lost yields a criticism
of its own dogma because "the democratic, anti-patriarchal, and irreligious
views which [Milton] assigned to the enemies of God ... eventually touch
a responsive chord in readers approaching the poem from a new social and
ideological perspective." [Jackie DiSalvo, War of the Titans 9 & 12.]
Stevie Davies also argues that the breadth of Milton's vision actually
presented a challenge to his ostensible misogyny. Because of Milton's
indebtedness to the hermetic tradition, the female principle is seen as
essential to the poet's own creative being as well as to the fecundity of the
universe. According to Davies this "heresy" is "flamboyantly at odds with
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Milton's professed aim to justify the patriarchal God whose theology is laid
out in Book III of Paradise Lost, with its respect for contract law and the
hierarchy of obedience. It contradicts Milton's own best and frequently
expressed anti-female principles." [Stevie Davies, The Idea of Woman in
Renaissance Literature: The Feminine Reclaimed, (Sussex: The Harvester
Press, 1986) 231.]
3 Gilbert quotes from Woolfs diary in order to argue that Milton excludes
the "feminine" aspects of experience: "[Milton] deals in horror and
immensity and squalor and sublimity but never in the passions of the
human heart." Virginia Woolf,^4 Writer's Diary (New York: Harcourt, 1954)
5; qtd. in Sandra Gilbert, "Patriarchal Poetry and Women Readers:
Reflection's on Milton's Bogey," PMLA 93 (1978): 369. Both Sandra
Gilbert and Christine Froula characterise Milton as a poet who dramatises
abstract and masculine concepts over passion and women's experience.
4 See Christine Froula, "Pechter's Spectre: Milton's Bogey Writ Small: or,
Why Is He Afraid of Virginia Woolf?," Critical Inquiry 11 (1984-5): 171-78.
5 Joseph Wittreich, Feminist Milton. There are several problems with both
sides of Wittreich's approach. To argue that Milton's early approving
female readership proves that Milton is not a sexist writer is a form of
essentialism. It denies that oppression can be internalised and that
repressive ideologies are also adopted by the oppressed. Because these
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argument here, as in Angel of Apocalypse, depends upon the notion of
vision and prophecy to argue that Milton somehow transcended his
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notion not only tends to be ahistorical, it also valorises those very concepts
many feminists have sought to challenge. For concepts of eschatology,
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other arguments. Because Milton is seen is a liberating poet his "vision"
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Christian. Edward Pechter's answer to Christine Froula also assumes that
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Canonical Economy" [Critical Inquiry 10 (1983-4): 321-47] is answered by
Edward Pechter's "When Pechter Reads Froula Pretending She's Eve
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Inquiry 11 (1984-5): 163-170.] which is answered by Froula asserting the
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in our own day." ["Pechter's Spectre: Milton's Bogey Writ Small: or, Why
Is He Afraid of Virginia Woolf?", Critical Inquiry 11 (1984-5): 171-78.]
7 The phrase is Northrop Frye's from Five Essays on Milton's Epics (1965;
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).
8 Sandra Gilbert also notes the use of reason in Milton and sees this as part
of Blake's feminist criticism of the earlier poet: "And that the Right
Reason of Paradise Lost did have such [misogynist] implications was
powerfully understood by William Blake, whose fallen Urizenic Milton
must reunite with his female emanation in order to cast off his fetters and
achieve imaginative wholeness." Gilbert, "Patriarchal Poetry," 374.
9 Northrop Frye, Five Essays on Milton's Epics, 65.
10 Commenting upon the theories of marriage and the family in Rousseau,
Locke and Hobbes Sara Ann Ketchum notes: "While classical liberal theory
attacked the assumption that the natural authority of lords over serfs and
of kings over subjects should be respected because it was natural and not
to be interfered with, they left the ideology of marriage more or less intact
in that respect." "Liberalism and Marriage Law," Feminism and Philosophy,
ed. Mary Wetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston and Jane English (1977;
Totowa: Rowmans and Allenheld, 1985) 265.
11 Ernest Sirluck, introduction, CPW.2.157
12 Arthur Barker, Milton and the Puritan Dilemma: 1641-1660 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1942) 111.
13 Ernest Sirluck, introduction, CPW.2.157
14 Here I would disagree with Sandra Gilbert who claims that Milton
continues the representation of women as "other:" "The story that Milton,
"the first of the masculinists," most notably tells is of course of women's
secondness, her otherness, and how that otherness leads inexorably to her
demonic anger, her sin, her fall, and her exclusion from that garden of the
gods which is also, for her, the garden of poetry." ["Patriarchal Poetry,"
370.] In fact, I would argue that the problem with Milton's texts for a
feminist reading lies in the fact that he sees women not so much as "other"
and excluded but as the same in kind while failing in degree.
15 According to Christine Froula such hierarchical relations reinforce a
process of authority which robs self-evidence of its validity and confers
truth upon only transcendent sources: "Eve's relation to Adam as mirror
and shadow is the paradigmatic relation which canonical authority institutes
between itself and its believers in converting them from the authority of
their own experience to a 'higher' authority." Froula, "When Eve Reads
Milton," 328-9. On this point see also Kathleen M. Swaim, "'Hee for God
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Only, Shee for God in Him': Structural Parallelism in Paradise Lost"
Milton Studies 9 (1976): 121-50.
16 For McColley the significance of Milton's achievement lies in his ability to
depict a prelapsarian marriage in contradistinction to the tradition of
Renaissance iconography which had no conception of unfallen woman. In
fact, Milton seeks to overcome the gender dualism by seeing neither term
in the dichotomy as antithetical: "The idea of Eve that Milton's age
inherited resulted from a dualistic habit of mind that he strove in all his
works to reform: the supposition that nature and spirit, body and soul,
passion and reason, and art and truth are inherently antithetical and that
woman, the primordial temptress, represents the dark and dangerous (or
rebellious and thrilling) side of each antithesis." Diane Kelsey McColley,
Milton's Eve (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983) 3. Lewalski also
argues that despite Eve's inferiority she was "sufficient to have stood" and
that the image of eve in Paradise Lost liberates women from a purely
domestic role and sees them as responsible, educated and rational.
Lewalski, "Milton on Women," 3.
17 "The man has the right to divorce his wife (or the wife the husband) if she
is a threat to his spiritual integrity, and she cannot be that without
representing something of what idolatry means to Milton." Frye, Five
Essays, 69.
18 I would therefore disagree with Joseph Wittreich's claim that Blake's
doctrine of contraries accords with that of Milton. Wittreich cites Reason
of Church Government as well as The Doctrine and Discipline ofDivorce as
Blake's source. Both these pamphlets (like Areopagitica) invoke the idea
of contraries in order to demonstrate a natural and logical progression of
the correct and superior term over its subordinate. Truth in its unity will
always emerge from a pair of contraries. Blake's doctrine may be inspired
by Milton's, but Milton's contraries are closer to what Blake calls
"negations." In fact, Milton advocates anything but a marriage of heaven
and hell. As the current divorce laws stood for Milton "one moment after
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those mighty syllables pronounc't which take upon them to joyn heaven
and hell unpardnably till death pardon" all the promised blessings of
marriage vanish. (CPW.2.600). Joseph Wittreich, "Blake's Philosophy of
Contraries: A New Source," English Language Notes, 4 (1966): 105-10.
19 Stephen Gosson, The School of Abuse: Contayning a pleasant invective
against Poets, Pipers, Players, Jesters and such like Caterpillars of a
Commonwealth, (London, 1579) sig. B7.
20 William Prynne, Histrio-mastix: The Players Scourge, or, Actors Tragedie
(London, 1633). According to Prynne "effeminacy is both an odious and
a condemning sinne" (Prynne 206) while it was characteristic for the
theatre to present "dishonest, effeminate, womanish gestures"(Prynne 188).
Stephen Orgel has studied this fear of effeminisation in "Nobody's Perfect:
or Why Did the Renaissance Stage Take Boys For Women," South Atlantic
Quarterly, 88 (1989): 7-29. According to Orgel "the deepest fear in
anti-theatrical tracts, far deeper than that fear that women will become
whores, is the fear of universal effeminization." Orgel 7.
21 McColley, Milton's Eve 75. Maureen Quilligan notes that Adam awakes
to look first at the sky while Eve sees a reflected sky and herself. Maureen
Quilligan, Milton's Spenser: The Politics of Reading (Ithaca, New York:
1983) 227-8.
22 Christine Froula also notes the ways in which Paradise Lost associates Eve
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patriarchal strategy of promoting the invisible lineage of the father over
visible maternal production. This also connects with the privileging of
abstract over sensual thought. For Froula the matriarchal origins of myth
are repressed in Paradise Lost so that the text harbours the "shadow of the
repressed mother." "When Eve Reads Milton" 330-4.
23 "And we perceive thai the 'victory' always amounts to the same thing: it is
hierarchized. The hierarchisation subjects the entire conceptual
organization to man. A male privilege, which can be seen in the
opposition by which it sustains itself, between activity and passivity."
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Isabelle de Courtivron (1980; Sussex: Harvester, 1985) 91.
24 "The same remarking itself - more or less - would thus produce the other,
whose function in the differentiation would be neglected, forgotten." Luce
Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1985) 21.
25 Genevieve Lloyd, Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western
Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1984).
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fall itself." Frye, Five Essays 66-7. According to Stevie Davies, there is still
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Arcades and Comus. Stevie Davies, The Idea of Woman 178.
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Chapter Four:
Milton, Blake and the Theory of Contraries.
In Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce Milton argues that incompatible
partners in marriage should not be forced to remain together. To support this
argument he invokes a notion of cosmological harmony defined through the
concept of contraries:
. . . there is indeed a twofold Seminary or stock in Nature, from whence
are deriv'd the issues of love and hatred distinctly flowing through the
whole masse of created things, and . . . Gods doing is ever to bring the
due likenesses and harmonies of his works together, except when out of
the two contraries met to their own destruction, he moulds a third
existence, and that... is error, or some evil Angel. (CPW.2.272)
Milton goes on to state that a refusal to act in accordance with either the
natural attraction for like to meet with like or the repulsion of contraries is
"against the fundamental law book of nature" (CPW.2.272). God wills harmony
and the meeting of contraries, not themselves evil, can only produce error. By
associating the natural repulsion of contraries with natural law Milton
harnesses a theory of physical opposition to an ethical theory. The exploitation
of this association is also adopted in Milton's earlier work. His first use of the
doctrine of contraries encompasses both a belief in the eternal character of
virtue and the natural necessity of contraries. In Reason of Church Government
Milton adopts the concept of contraries as part of an argument for the
toleration of sects:
For if there were no opposition where were the triall of an unfained
goodnesse and magnanimity? Vertue that wavers is not vertue, but vice
revolted from itselfe, and after a while returning. The actions of just
and pious men do not darken in their middle course; but Solomon tels
us they are as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the
perfet day. . . . the way of the wicked is as darknesse, they stumble at
they know not what. . . . For if we look but on the nature of elementall
and mixt things, we know they cannot suffer any change of one kind, or
quality into another without the struggle of contrarieties. (CPW.1.795)
While Milton's concept of virtue is Socratic - true virtue cannot waver or even
be relative to vice - "opposition" is essential to reveal and test the truly pious
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and just. Milton does not argue that vice is necessary for virtue to exist,
although the presence of vice strengthens and highlights, rather than threatens
and sullies, the truly virtuous soul. In the context of Reason of Church
Government the argument for opposition yields a justification for the existence
of sects so that in the realm of plural beliefs the power of truth will eventually,
and of its own accord, bear rule. But truth does not need error in order to be.
While Milton also here argues that contraries are essential for change, the
interaction of such ethical contraries should only yield this change: the error of
vice should pale before the truth of virtue. Milton, in fact, makes very little of
the meeting of virtue and vice in terms of any subsequent effect in terms of
qualitative change; the opposition is not one of interaction but of effacement.
Error should not be suppressed; its natural encounter with opposition will bring
about the ascendancy of truth. Truth, goodness and virtue are thus
self-sufficient terms. Epistemologically, where such ethical opposites are
concerned, contraries may be necessary but ontologically and ideally there is no
need for "contrarietie." Consequently, when Milton does refer to the notion of
contraries it is always to illustrate a logical point with a material argument as
the vehicle: in the case of Reason of Church Government "the nature of
elementall and mixt things." It is important to make this distinction, for while
Milton acknowledges natural contraries which produce qualitative change, he
elsewhere argues that matter, being God's creation, must be essentially good.1
The contraries of a natural opposition cannot be good and evil in themselves;
evil can only be produced from the forced meeting of unlike qualities - a
disruption of natural harmony. So the existence of natural opposites which are
necessary is not strictly analogous to ideal oppositions such as virtue and vice
where the former term is self-sufficient. Natural opposition can form part of
God's creative whole because qualities such as light and dark can exist in a
world without evil. But vice and virtue are not created as part of the natural
process of the world. In Areopagitica Milton claims that it is the knowledge of
good in this world which depends upon evil. It is for this epistemological
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reason that ethical contraries such as vice and virtue should be allowed to exist
and not because of the character of goodness:
Good and evill we know in the field of this World grow up together
almost inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involv'd and
interwoven with the knowledge of evill, and in so many cunning
resemblances hardly to be discern'd, that those confused seeds which
were imposed on Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort
asunder, were not more intermixt. It was from out the rinde of one
apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evill as two twins cleaving
together leapt forth into the World. And perhaps this is that doom that
Adam fell into of knowing good and evill, that is to say of knowing good
by evill. As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdome can there
be to choose, what continence to forbeare without the knowledge of
evill? (CPW.2.514)
The natural and necessary existence of physical contraries differs
significantly from ideal ethical opposites such as good and evil; material
contraries are defined relative to each other, need each other in order to exist
and produce temporal development of the physical world. Good, on the other
hand, did exist without evil, and although in the fallen world good is known
through evil, it is logically and ideally possible that good should be freely
chosen without the occurrence of evil. Milton's coupling of the argument of
natural attraction and repulsion with the existence of vice and virtue has an
explicative value only. Just as there is a natural harmony of the physical
universe which requires contraries for change, so there is a natural harmony of
the ideal realm which allows contraries for human freedom. But the natural
law of eternal justice is not reducible to the natural law of the material world
insofar as empirical contraries are symmetrical and ethically neutral (producing
evil only when forcibly coupled) while ethical opposites contain one primordial
and one derivative term. Contraries are necessary for change but the purpose
of change for Milton, at least in the ethical sphere, is the emergence of truth
and virtue - essentially uncontaminated entities.
The ascendence of natural philosophy in the eighteenth century
witnessed an entirely different emphasis on explanations of conflicting
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elements. The uniformity of matter replaced the hierarchy of essences.
Oppositions, therefore, were two aspects of the same underlying matter with no
intrinsic mode of behaviour or value; their identity was defined relationally. A
theory of natural law following upon this conception of the universe would be
concerned with a mechanistic and empirical interaction of elements. The
natural law of Hobbes, based on the principle of self-maintenance, is such a
mechanistic natural law. What is good or just is not dictated by an anterior
natural law which is God's command. Rather, concepts such as justice follow
from the interaction of elements in a system (or persons in society) in order to
achieve the continuation of each element. In Hobbes's examination of society,
the totality must be divided into its minimal units and then reconstructed upon
the principle of those units.
Despite the general shift in ideas towards empiricism the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were not unanimous in the manner
of reducing the interplay of elements to a uniform field of force. Emmanuel
Swedenborg's philosophy occupies a curious space between earlier theological
explanations of the universe and the emerging preoccupations of natural
science. Although Swedenborg reacted against the Cartesian philosophical
revolution in asserting the value of the classics he was also originally a scientist
who published studies in chemistry and geometry. His philosophical works
were coloured with his original scientific training and in his major work
published in 1772, Principia Rerum Naturalium, or New Attempts toward the
Philosophical Explanation of the Elementary World, he produces MA
Philosophical Argument concerning the First Simple" arguing for an original
natural and material point from which the world originated. His "explanations"
of the world are also highly mechanistic. But Swedenborg's mechanism is
"animated," shaped and dominated by a supernatural power. Swedenborg's
world-soul is not material although its dynamic qualities lend it the character of
a material force. Not only Swedenborg's scientific works but also his later
philosophical and prophetic writings are imbued with a sense of original matter
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endowed with anima. Swedenborg sees the world of particulars determined by
a governing form: "So heaven is a unity resulting from various parts in the most
perfect of all forms".2
Swedenborg is at once reacting against natural science's reduction of the
entire world to a uniform matter devoid of spirit while at the same time seeing
the world in the modern terms of particulars endowed with systemic coherence.
What distinguishes Swedenborg from thinkers like Newton and Descartes is the
highly theological cast of his theory of dynamic particulars. Heaven is a
collection of particulars but "God is order."3 Although God, for Swedenborg, is
not a purely material principle, he is neither ineffable nor invisible. In fact the
Divine is a human form: "heaven in its whole complex resembles one man."4
For Swedenborg it is absurd to think of God in any way other than as a
"human shape:"5
Those in heaven were amazed that men believe themselves intelligent,
who, in thinking of God, think of something invisible, that is,
incomprehensible under any form, and that they call those who think
differently, unintelligent and simple, when yet the reverse is the case.6
More significantly, Swedenborg also transports into his theological works
a theory of the attraction of like to like. In explaining the ordering system of
angels in heaven he writes that "Likeness causes them to be together" and goes
on to expand this into a general claim:
Like are drawn spontaneously as it were to like, for with their like they
are as if with their own and at home, but with others they are as if with
strangers and abroad.7
Like Milton and the writers of the Christian tradition, Swedenborg identifies
the animating principle with the spiritual being of God. Because of his
emphasis upon spirit, Swedenborg's theory of attraction can be extended to
include a visionary element which was no doubt important for Blake. As long
as one is drawn to the material world one likens to matter, in order to see
angels one must become spirit:
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Like sees like from being alike. Besides, as everyone knows, the bodily
organ of sight which is the eye is so gross as to be unable even to see,
except through magnifying glasses, the smaller things of nature; still less
then can it see the things that are above the sphere of nature as are all
things in the spiritual world. But these things may be seen by a man
when he is withdrawn from the sight of the body and the sight of his
spirit is opened.8
Swedenborg couples his theory of attraction and the vision of like by like with
a theory of repulsion:
For this reason, he who has no idea of heaven, that is, no idea of the
Divine from Whom heaven exists, cannot be raised to the first threshold
of heaven. As soon as he comes to it, a resistance and strong repulsion
is perceived.9
The theory of repulsion, in addition to the clear distinction Swedenborg wishes
to maintain between corporeality and spirituality, the inward and exterior
realms of experience and heaven and hell, indicates an essential dichotomy
between two orders of being. For example, certain animals on the earth
correspond to "evil affections" while others to "good affections".10 While
Swedenborg sees all things issuing from the first principle, he defines nature as
a meaningless exterior to spirit:
Angels are amazed when they hear that there are men who attribute all
things to nature and nothing to the Divine, and who also believe that
one's body, into which so many wonders of heaven are gathered, is a
product of nature. Still more are they amazed that the rational part of
man is believed to be from nature, when, if men but raise their minds a
little, they can see that such things are from the Divine and not from
nature, and that nature has been created simply for clothing the spiritual
and for presenting it in a corresponding from in the ultimate of order.11
In fact, Swedenborg, seeks to see the world as entirely natural and heaven as
purely spiritual: "for the things in heaven are spiritual and those in the world
natural".12 This widening of the dichotomy between spirit and world in
addition to the theory of repulsion of natural from heavenly being produces,
not the possibility of interaction between contraries, but, like Milton, an ideal
of the "natural" process of purification of principles:
As all things that are in accordance with Divine order correspond to
heaven, so all things contrary to Divine order correspond to hell. The
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things that correspond to heaven have relation to good and truth.
Those things that correspond to hell have relation to evil and falsity.13
Blake's doctrine of contraries in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is a
consequence of a critique of both Swedenborg and Milton's conception of
contraries. While Milton acknowledges the necessity for natural opposites in
the physical world, his ethical theory is based upon absolute ideas of justice,
good and virtue which are defined through reference to a transcendent ideal of
divinely ordained natural law. In his characterisation of Satan in Paradise Lost
and Paradise Regain'd Milton clearly establishes the parasitic nature of error
and vice and the central and self-sufficient character of virtue. Swedenborg's
emphasis upon the human form of divine being and the spiritual origin of the
universe take steps towards overcoming certain aspects of classical dualism.
However, his marked distinction between heaven and hell, good and evil and
their corresponding beings in the natural world as well as his impoverished
conception of the physical body become the target of Blake's rethinking of the
operation of physical contraries and their relation to ethics. In Milton Blake
laments the Swedenborgian orthodoxy which employed the concepts of heaven
and hell to divide human existence between "transgressors" and "warriors" and
explicitly connects this division to Platonic ethics:
O Swedenborg! strongest of men, the Samson shorn by the Churches!
Shewing the Transgressors in Hell, the proud Warriors in Heaven:
Heaven as a Punisher & Hell as One under Punishment:
With Laws from Plato & his Greeks to renew the Trojan Gods,
In Albion; & to deny the value of the Saviours blood.
(M, 22: 50-54, E: 117-18; K:506)14
Just prior to this comment on Swedenborg, Blake broadens his critique
of the accusatory power of dualist thinking by identifying a religion of "deceit"
and "new Jealousy" which he attributes to Milton's vestigial orthodoxy:
"Milton's religion is the cause" (M, 22 [24]: 40, E:117; K:506). The "deceit" and
"jealousy" of this religion recalls its divisive and double nature. Blake also
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invokes the enlightenment reaction to such dualist orthodoxy and sees it, too,
as bound up with a spirit of punishment:
Seeing the Churches at their Period in terror & despair:
Rahab created Voltaire; Tirzah created Rousseau;
Asserting the Self-righteousness against the Universal Saviour,
Mocking the Confessors & Martyrs, claiming Self-righteousness;
With cruel Virtue: making War upon the Lambs Redeemed;
To perpetuate War & Glory.
(M, 22 [24], 40-45, E:117; K:506)
Swedenborg, Milton and the Natural Religion of the enlightenment are united
by the "cruel Virtue" which sets up a transcendent ideal from which to punish
and divide any opposing human existence. Blake's repeated emphasis on
"self-righteousness" is highly significant given the crucial role of "selfhood" in
the classical doctrine of virtue. While Platonic and Miltonic ethics grounded
the concept of goodness in self-contemplation and the development of inward
virtue which directed itself towards transcendence, enlightenment ethics
stressed the ability of independent reason to arrive at its own ethical truths. In
either case the concept of the individual self is central. For Blake, such
individualist ethics only lead to self-righteousness and it is the power of
self-righteousness which denies the "value of the Saviours blood" (forgiveness of
others) and enables the division of existence into heaven and hell - the
punishing spirit of Swedenborg's contraries.
In his early work Blake lays a great deal of emphasis on the interaction
of contraries, seeing them as "necessary to Human existence" (MHH, 3, E:34,
K:149). Whereas Milton insists upon the self-sufficiency of goodness and
invokes physical contraries only at the level of illustrative example, Blake
rejects the concept of an ideal and transcendent goodness. Blake's concept of
opposition owes its materialism to the alchemical tradition of Paracelsus and
Boehme which emphasises the physical qualities of attraction and repulsion.
For Milton, physical contraries are ethically neutral and symmetrical while
ethical contraries contain one primary and one derivative term. Blake on the
other hand sees ideal oppositions such as "Love and Hate" as analogous to
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"Attraction and Repulsion" and sees the attribution of ethical oppositions to
these contraries as a legacy of religion:
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion,
Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence.
From these contraries spring what the religious call Good & Evil.
Good is the passive that obeys Reason[.] Evil is the active springing
from Energy.
Good is heaven. Evil is hell.
(MHH, 3: E:34; K:149)
In The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell Blake conducts an ethical inversion similar
to that of Satan's "Evil be thou my good" in Paradise Lost. By claiming that
"Good is the passive that obeys Reason" Blake ironically devalues the angelic
realm of heaven in favour of the energetic and interactive evil of hell.
Whereas Satan's inversion of good and evil is incoherent in Paradise Lost
because Milton has established a concept of transcendent and self-sufficient
goodness, Blake undertakes a more successful inversion precisely because he
rejects the metaphysical underpinning of Miltonic ethics. This is achieved
through an historical examination of the origin of virtue. Energy is seen as the
primary and rightly governing life force which concepts of goodness and virtue
have had to usurp because such concepts are weaker. "Those who restrain
desire, do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained; and the restrainer
or reason usurps its place & governs the unwilling" (MHH, 5, E:34; K:149).
But while Blake sees energy as primordial and goodness or reason as
secondary, he still sees reason as essential to the continuation of the energy
and therefore differs from Milton who saw his primary term as entirely
self-sufficient. Blake does not harbour Milton's distinction between ideal and
physical contraries; he sees the being of the world in its entirety (both
materially and ideally) as an opposition of forces:
Thus one portion of being, is the Prolific, the other, the
Devouring: to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in his chains,
but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence and fancies that the
whole.
But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the Devourer as
a sea recieved the excess of his delights.
(MHH, 16: E:40; K:155)
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Blake's work prior to the prophetic books therefore stresses the physical
interaction of contraries. Because of Blake's view of the history of ethical and
religious thought (where reason has enslaved its greater and threatening
opposite, energy) his early works witness the overthrow of Reason (Urizen) by
the energetic Ore. Blake's theory of contraries at this stage, though materialist,
does not attribute symmetry to oppositions; reason or passivity has had to
develop a history of its primacy in order to enslave its greater opponent.
Blake's programme is therefore corrective; energy must be given some
dominating power to overcome the long period of reason's reign.
Consequently, Blake stresses that reason must remain as the bound or
circumference of energy at the same time that he attacks reason's value and
doctrines. In theory Blake is only criticising the monopoly reason has
attempted to maintain over existence and not the faculty of reason per se.
However, it often appears that Blake lays more emphasis on the destruction of
reason's supremacy than the productive interaction of reason and energy which
would supposedly follow. At this stage Blake is arguing for a reassessment of
the imbalance between reason or goodness and energy or evil and assuming
that the worldly paradise will necessarily ensue from a greater release of
energy.
In the prophetic books, written after most Romantic writers became
disillusioned with the one release of energy they did witness (in the form of the
French Revolution), Blake departs from his physicalist and quantitative theory
of contraries. The liberation of energy needed some form other than its
interaction with its contrary. Blake's earlier negative definition of both good
and evil as necessary opposites defined dynamically on the model of attraction
and repulsion is thoroughly reformulated. Blake had already personified the
forces of reason and energy in the characters of Urizen and Ore. But his
introduction of the eternal man, or Albion, as a background against which to
enact the drama between these warring forces gives each quality its rightful
place in a thoroughly humanised topography. Milton had placed God and the
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eternal form of goodness as a transcendent point of reference for his
contraries. Now, Blake introduces an order and due harmony of contraries
which is neither the physical interaction of his earlier work nor the Miltonic
transcendent subordination of worldly evil to eternal good. Each quality, in
Blake's new schema, has its rightful place and function in the human form.
Contraries now are neither physical ivor metaphysical but human. In "Night
the Ninth" of The Four Zoas the "regenerate" Albion accords each faculty of
human existence its particular role and warns against the elevation of any
particular function into a transcendent form:
Luvah & Vala henceforth you are Servants obey & live
You shall forget your former state return O Love in peace
Into your place the place of seed not in the brain or heart
If Gods combine against Man Setting their Dominion above
The Human Form Divine.
(FZ.9. p. 126: 6-10, E:395; K:366)
The "Gods" Albion refers to are created when one of the states of the human
soul (for example, reason or "Urizen") is projected onto an external deity;
consequently Albion here warns against the future elevation of any one state.
But instead of warring contraries Albion envisages harmonious interaction
within the human form:
In Enmity & war first weakend then in stern repentence
They must renew their brightness & their disorganizd functions
Again reorganize till they resume the image of the human
Cooperating in the bliss of Man obeying his Will
Servants to the infinite & Eternal of the Human form
(FZ.9 p. 126: 13-17, E:395; K:366)
In addition to rethinking the structure of contraries, Blake adds the opposition
of male and female to his work and grants it primary importance. In fact, it is
Blake's introduction of the issue of gender into his theory of oppositions which
if it does not enable, at least coincides with, the humanisation of his doctrine of
contraries.
We have already seen that in Milton's work there is an implicit
distinction between ideal and physical contraries. Such ideal contraries ground
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a series of hierarchically ordered oppositions. Such oppositions - between
reason and the body, male and female, church and state, ecclesiastical and
temporal spheres - exist neither by mutual definition and interaction (as in the
case of physical contraries) nor by the self-sufficiency of a primary term and its
parasitic derivation (as in the ideal case). In Milton's hierarchical oppositions
the first term (reason, church, male, ecclesiastical) does not generate or
necessarily imply the second term; the second term has its own nature,
character and virtue. Nevertheless the second term, while different, should be
subordinate and directed to the values of the first term. Blake, on the other
hand, not only directly attacks the subordination of these oppositions - in the
case of reason and the body for example; he also repeatedly asserts the
spurious character of the distinction operating in the opposition. Not only is it
the case that "Man has no Body distinct from his Soul" (MHH, pl.4, E:34;
K:149), but the transcendence of the eternal ecclesiastical sphere is also
repudiated: "What is Above is Within, for every-thing in Eternity is translucent"
(J, 71: 6, E:225; K:709).
Blake clearly rejects the Miltonic conception of gender whereby the
feminine is the same as the masculine in kind and differs only in degree. The
centrality which Blake grants the concept of sexual difference is evidenced in
the culmination of Jerusalem where the union between the male (Albion) and
his female emanation (Jerusalem) is the condition for the possibility of
regaining human paradise. However, there is a double movement in Blake
where sexual difference is both a symbol and symptom of alienation as well as
the means for redemption. Throughout his prophetic books Blake sees the
division between male and female as a consequence of the fall from eternal
unity. In the opening of the first book of Milton Los attempts to give Urizen
definite form. As Urizen takes on a biological and limited body Los becomes
enslaved to the finitude of his creation: 'Terrified Los stood in the Abyss & his
immortal limbs / Grew deadly pale; he became what he beheld" (M, 3: 28-9,
E:97; K:483). As Los moves toward this fallen form sexual difference occurs:
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"he wept over it, he cherish'd it / In deadly sickening pain: till separated into a
Female pale" (M, 3: 32-3, E:97; K:483). After the emanation of the female
form there emerges "a Male Form howling in Jealousy" (M, 3: 36, E:97;
K:483). The "Jealousy" of this male form is important for the subtlety of
Blake's argument. When sexual difference is constituted through opposition
or conflict it is symptomatic of the general fall into disunity. Blake's alien
female emanations - Vala, Rahab and Tirzah - are external and threateningly
independent to their male counterparts.
However, it by no means follows that Blake supports the idea of a
primordial and eternal androgyny to which human existence should return.
Albion's emanation, Jerusalem, is a more benign female form because, though
different, she complements, fulfils and recognises male selfhood while
chastening the masculine will to autonomy and "self-righteousness." The total
denial of sexual difference can be as pernicious as the other extreme: the
elevation of gender distinctions into two totally independent and warring
opposites. In the prophetic books all qualities have their place in the eternal
"man" including masculinity and femininity. In this respect Blake's Albion is
"man" in the generic sense insofar as he represents humanity; but Blake
exploits the fact that he is specifically "man" insofar as he needs to reinclude
his female emanation. Humanity has been "man" because it has rejected its
integrated and original femininity (Jerusalem) and externalised and elevated an
independent and dominating female form (Vala). In The Book of Urizeti
Blake anticipates the emergence of the female form in Milton:
9. All Eternity shudderd at sight
Of the first female now separate
Pale as a cloud of snow
Waving before the face of Los
10. Wonder, awe, fear, astonishment,
Petrify the eternal myriads;
At the first female form now separate
They call'd her Pity, and fled
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(U, 18-19: 9-15 & 1, E:78; K:231)
The female form here embodies pity - a quality which Blake saw as valuable in
its place but also as a threatening element of the patronising and domineering
spirit of Christian charity.15 Significantly, this female form elicits wonder and
becomes capable of the idolisation we see later in Vala. Blake appears to still
retain some of the spirit in which Milton warned of the seductive power of
Eve's beauty. Los attempts to embrace the female but she controls and
dominates him through denial:
But Los saw the Female & pitied
He embrac'd her, she wept, she refus'd
In perverse and cruel delight
She fled from his arms, yet he followd
(U, 19: 10-13, E:79; K:231)
However, Blake's female figures are not threatening because of their bodily
charm but because of the general human process of externalising and idolising
what should really be seen as inward and human. Significantly, Blake is also
critical of the Miltonic idea of woman as man's own image; such an idea is
anathema to a poet who consistently criticises the selfish and paralysing
character of self-reflection. When woman serves merely as an external
reflection of male selfhood, solipsism as well as alienation occurs. Los does
not see an other self in a relationship of mutual recognition but his own
divided likeness:
Eternity shudder'd when they saw,
Man begetting his likeness,
On his own divided image.
(U, 19: 14-16, E:79; K:232)
In Visions of the Daughters of Albion Blake had already pointed out the
hypocrisy of this doctrine of the woman being a reflection of masculine glory.
After Oothoon has been raped by Bromion she internalises his punishing
doctrine and becomes self-condemnatory as she sees herself as an inadequate
reflection of Theotormon:
I call with holy voice! kings of the sounding air,
Rend away this defiled bosom that I may reflect.
The image of Theotormon on my pure frp(\£^rtr\f breast.
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The Eagles at her call descend & rend their bleeding prey;
Theotormon severely smiles, her soul reflects the smile;
(VDA, 2: 14-18, E:46; K:190)
But Oothoon does not remain reflectively subservient to Theotormon and
eventually points out the contradiction of Theotormon's self-righteous
accusations: "How can I be defild when I reflect thy image pure?" (VDA, 3: 16,
E:47; K:191).
Clearly, as well as repudiating the idolised and externalised "feminine"
Blake also rejects the conceptualisation of sexual difference along lines of
similarity and "reflection." In fact the loss of the particularity of sexual
difference is symptomatic and symbolic of a loss of identity in general. This is
evidenced in Blake's use of the term "hermaphroditic" in a highly peijorative
sense. In Milton Blake lists the cycle of churches and refers to them as "Giants
mighty Hermaphroditic" (M, 37[41]: 37, E:138; K:528). As Blake continues the
list and includes the central figures who have united religion with statehood he
emphasises the loss of sexual difference:
. . . these are the Female-Males
A Male within a Female hid as in an Ark & Curtains,
Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Paul, Constantine, Charlemaine
Luther, these seven are the Male-Females, the Dragon Forms
Religion hid in War, a Dragon red & hidden Harlot
(M, 37[41]: 39-43, E:138; K:528)
In this passage Blake unites the confusion of two sets of contraries. The
feminine form of Rahab is an adulterated "femininity;" it is the harlot of the
state church - the principle of femininity used to further a life-denying doctrine
of chastity and moral virtue. It is "male-female" because it is the feminine
harnessed to masculine power. The state church is male-female because it
exploits what Blake sees as the feminine arts of denial for the sake of a
deferred good; it is a "harlot" because it acts by temptation and refusal. The
Church claims spirituality and redemption but is actually a dominating and
materialist power. The confusion of sexual difference, therefore, is at the heart
of the fall of religion into statehood. The celebration of sexual difference
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would threaten the control of the state-church morality over its subjects.
Milton saw the division of Church and State to be a metaphysical issue of first
importance to the individual because it involved the important distinction
between this-worldly and other-worldly spheres of value. Blake, on the other
hand, saw the Church as responsible for instituting the distinction between the
temporal and spiritual spheres. Religion had devalued the delights of nature
and the body in order to control them. It had taken the concept of femininity
away from the realm of sexual enjoyment and converted the feminine into a
"harlot" virgin cult. Then the Church itself had adopted this new male-female's
enslaving arts.
There appears to be a contradiction between Blake's condemnation of
the confusion of sexual difference in the "Female-Male" of state religion and
his frequently expressed idea that gender differentiation occurs with the fall of
the self into disunity. However, the idea of a "fall" into sexual difference
refers, not to difference per se, but to the alienation of masculinity from
femininity - in seeing the feminine as thoroughly external to universalised
masculinity. So, in Milton, we are warned of the "female space" which would
set itself outside experience and limit the capacities of perception.
The nature of a Female Space is this: it shrinks the Organs
Of Life till they become Finite & Itself seems Infinite
(M, 10[11]: 6-7, E:104; K:490)
Here Blake uses the word "female" adjectivally to describe what is external to
experience. By recognising this we can see why Vala is united with the concept
of nature. For Blake both nature and the feminine are valuable when seen as
humanised and integrated with the imagination; but when either femininity or
nature is elevated above human experience (as in either the "nature" of science
or the femininity of virgin cults) they can limit and impoverish existence. Blake
unites his theory of gender with his general ontological claim that what appears
to condition and determine experience is merely experience alienated from
itself. Thus Blake's character Vala unites both external nature and external
femininity. In Milton Ololon calls the theorists of natural religion "feminine"
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because their critique of religion has relied upon the annihilation of the
particularity of existence; they have reduced the world to an alien, uniform
substance by denying difference. They are therefore no better than the
traditional Christians who have set up and worshipped an other-worldly and
alienated God, for the enlightenment God is nature (the "Newtonian
Phantasm"):
Are those who contemn Religion & seek to annihilate it
Become in their Femin[in]e portions the causes & promoters
Of these Religions, how is this thing? this Newtonian Phantasm
This Voltaire & Rousseau: this Hume & Gibbon & Bolingbroke
This Natural Religion! . . .
(M, 40[46]: 9-13, E:141; K:532)
For Blake sexual difference has a truly redemptive capacity. Because the
history of Western thought has been a history of individualism Blake sees the
extension of the individual to include alterity as the condition for the possibility
of renewal. Because the primary mode of alterity for Blake is sexual alterity
the union of masculine selfhood with its female emanation becomes the symbol
for the regaining of human plenitude. Insofar as Blake uses the concept of the
"feminine" as a metaphor for alienated otherness in general it is possible to
understand all his supposedly "misogynist" statements as actually grounded in
the historical observation that what we experience as the feminine is an
alienated and perverted construction of patriarchal culture. The "cruel delight,"
"female will" and chastity have their origin in a system of the projection of
certain qualities and doctrines onto the feminine. The retrieval of this
alienated feminine being lies not in eradicating sexual difference but in
transforming the opposition from one of mutual exclusion to mutual
recognition. Consequently, Blake seeks both to maintain the particular
integrity and value of the feminine and to unite both masculinity and femininity
within the eternal human form. The importance of the recognition of others
and otherness begins with the prophetic books. Before examining The Four
Zoas, Milton and Jerusalem it is necessary to see how Blake arrives at the
recognition of the need for the reinclusion of the feminine in the human form.
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The following chapter will therefore deal with Blake's poetry up to the
















Although Milton rejects the orthodox position of creation ex nihilo, the
position he does adopt sees the first matter from which the world was
created as deriving from God and therefore free from evil: "That matter
should have always existed independently of God is inconceivable. In
the first place, it is only a passive principle, dependent upon God and
subservient to him; and, in the second place, there is no inherent force
or efficacy in time or eternity, any more than there is in the concept of
number. But if matter did not exist from eternity, it is not very easy to
see where it originally came from. There remains only one solution,
especially if we allow ourselves to be guided by scripture, namely, that
all things came from God" (CPW.6.307). Milton thus firmly refuses the
Manichean position, where matter is equated with evil, and allows the
possibility of a concept of natural law based on a premise that the world
is naturally good.
Emmanuel Swedenborg, Heaven and Hell: From Things Heard and Seen,













William Blake, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed.
David V. Erdman, Rev. ed. (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1988);
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Blake: Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1957). All further references will be taken from the
Erdman edition and will appear abbreviated in the text. The initial of
the title will be followed by the plate, line and page numbers
successively. Page numbers for the Keynes edition will follow, prefixed
by "K."
15 See, for example, Milton where Los laments his act of pity which has
redistributed the division of labour against the natural talents of Satan
and Palamabron: "Mine is the fault! I should have remember'd that pity
divides the soul / And man, unmans" (M, 8: 19-20, E:102; K:488). If
pity is female, as is claimed in The Book of Urizen, then its "unmanning"
quality in Milton recalls the fear of feminine unmanning that we have
seen in Milton's divorce tracts and Paradise Lost. Blake differs from the
traditional account of the feminine ability to "unman" masculinity in
locating the effeminating power in sentiments - such as pity - and in the
elevated and idolised female goddess rather than in the female body.
Chapter Five:
From The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell to The Four Zoas
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It is evident from Blake's response to Milton's concept of contraries that
the main theoretical differences between the two poets stem from Blake's
refusal to admit an ideal or transcendent mode of being into his ontology.
Whereas Milton's contraries are governed, ideally, by some supra-mundane
order, Blake's contraries are intra-worldly. While Milton argues for an eternal
and static conception of value which could distinguish between and order
contraries, Blake argues that concepts such as virtue and morality are an effect
of contraries. However, in adopting this position towards Milton, Blake comes
perilously close to the purely relational definition of value of modern ideology.
Although Blake emphasises contraries and refuses to subsume the being of the
world beneath one uniform law ("One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression")
his oppositions are characterised by force (evil/energy) and its negation
(reason/limit). Blake's desire to both "open" the finite cosmology of Milton's
epics and overcome modern science's doubt and relativism is the motivating
force behind his development towards the prophetic books. Blake's most
fundamental pair of contraries is, in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, the
opposition between reason and energy, with energy being Blake's primary
value. By the time Blake writes his prophetic books his most important
contraries are the masculine and feminine. This shift, from a materialist
opposition, to an inter-human opposition is fundamental to Blake's critique of
modern science and ideology as well as traditional concepts of selfhood.
Blake's attack upon modern "subjectivity" is intertwined with his theory of
contraries. In Blake's work prior to the prophetic books the reasoning self
must be overcome by form-annihilating energy. Later, when the emphasis in
Blake's theory of contraries shifts to gender, selfhood is overcome through the
interaction of masculinity and femininity. Blake's central redemptive image of
the retrieval of the female emanation is his answer to both Milton's other¬
worldly rational soul and the "subject" of modern science and Cartesian
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epistemology.
A scientific revolution is inaugurated by Descartes's turn to the subject
as the basis for both truth and method. Despite the fact that Descartes
admitted God into his system, God for Descartes was a convenient
afterthought, added to overcome the difficulties of his final position. As Peter
Schouls has noted, Descartes inaugurates the enlightenment with his
revolutionary conception of human being as the ground for truth:
At least in practice Descartes' revolution in the sciences was
accompanied by a revolt against the traditional Christian view of the
place of man. For Descartes, man has the first word and the last in the
matter of determining what is and what is not to be accepted as truth.1
Concomitantly, there is a rejection of the traditional or hierarchical conceptions
of value. Such a revolution instantiates what Dumont refers to as the modern
ideology of Homo oeconomicus where system rather than the innate character
of entities becomes the ground-rule for all disciplines. The relevance of such
an historical shift for the work of William Blake obviously lies in the poet's
rejection of given systems with his emphasis on minute particulars. But despite
the fact that Blake frequently mentions two primary Cartesian terms - the
vortex and the method of doubt - his named opponent is Newton. Unlike
Descartes who wanted to place scientific system on a rational footing Newton's
doctrine premised itself on the primacy of experience. Donald Ault suggests
that although Blake was obviously aware of Cartesian philosophy he chose
Newton to attack because Descartes was no longer a threat to imagination by
Blake's time and had indeed been surpassed by Newton.2 Nevertheless both
Descartes and Newton were united in their desire for systematic thinking and
their attempt to unite the laws of celestial and terrestrial gravitation.
Newton's concept of absolute motion overturned the Aristotelian world-
picture in which each entity had its own mode of movement and earthly and
celestial bodies moved according to their particular mode of being. Descartes's
rationalism had commenced the reduction of the world to homogeneous
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extension; all knowledge was to be sought through the axiomatic rules of
method applied to a world of uniform res externa. The particular character of
entities along with the concept of ontological hierarchy was replaced by the
search for correct methodology. Newton, like Descartes, saw the need for
systematic and uniform laws for the study of nature but gained those rules from
an inductive empiricism rather than Cartesian rationalism. Newtonian science
introduced the concept of absolute motion, along with absolute time and space.
Absolute space was not the relative position between two things but a universal
"container" in which things were positioned. If, for Aristotle, earthly things fell
to earth because earth was their proper place of dwelling, for Newton the laws
of gravity explained a uniform motion for all things in an arena of absolute
space where all positions were equal. Similarly, absolute time was not the lived
time of human experience nor the clock time to which human experience was
ordered but a temporal version of Newton's spatial "container." In such a
picture the distinction Milton makes between the time of angels, fallen human
temporality and the atemporal realm of God's eternal creation has no place.3
When Blake was writing, the Kantian "Copernican revolution" which identified
time and space as transcendental and a priori conditions for experience had yet
to make its mark in English thought. According to Kant, time and space
ordered a reality which in itself, or noumenally, was neither temporal nor
spatial: 'Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of
ourselves and our inner states."4 The prevailing world view for Blake,
however, pictured the individual as a thinking substance contained within an
external spatial and temporal network. Blake's characters Los and
Enitharmon, in charge of time and space respectively, become of central
importance in Blake's prophetic books; their feuding and division are
intertwined with the fall of Albion and their union is essential to redemption.
Significantly Los, Blake's agent of temporality, is of primary importance.
Although Kant identified both time and space as in some sense subjective, time
was the internal and space the external condition of perception. Unlike Kant,
Blake never postulated a noumenal world outside of the categories of human
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perception. In response to the prevailing Newtonian view of time and space as
containers it is not surprising, therefore, that we encounter Blake's recurring
image of the sea of time and space which washes around the figure of
fallen Albion. If, for Blake, time and space were external "containers" for
worldly entities then they would be outside the inner life of the imagination
and therefore alienated. The individualism which follows from the Newtonian
conception of the universe is, as Blake saw, one in which the subject is limited
to whatever aspects of the world can be disclosed to the senses. The
traditional transcendence-in-immanence of the human soul which enabled the
individual to contemplate and aspire to a higher mode of being is now
removed and all knowledge of God is to be inferred from the order of nature.
The concept of individualism in general is usually associated with the
modern world view - with Cartesian philosophy, the novel, liberal ethics and
capitalist societies. In fact, when the ascending power of individualism became
apparent in the eighteenth century it was met with a chorus of denunciation
identifying it as a threat to traditional values.5 Louis Dumont's study of
individualism, however, differentiates a pre-modern individualism (in the form
of Homo hierarchicus) from the modern ideology of equalitarian individualism
(or Homo oeconomicus). This earlier form of individualism bears as its
hallmark an orientation towards transcendence; the subject is individuated by
its personal relationship to a non-worldly being. As we have seen, Milton's
prose and poetry are informed by such a Christian individualism which is not
only different from, but radically antithetical to, the modern individualism of
Descartes and Locke. Like Milton, Blake also challenges the modern ideology
of Locke, Newton and Bacon. By invoking Bacon and Newton Blake recalls
the specifically scientific premises of modern ideology which Heidegger has
identified as fundamental to modern subjectivism. However, unlike Milton,
Blake's answer to this empirical individualism of the eighteenth century does
not re-assert traditional Christian individualism. In fact, Blake examines both
the traditional Christian and modern forms of individualism and formulates an
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ontological position which at times appears to hover or vacillate between the
two but which actually challenges the philosophical premises of the western
tradition. Unlike the historians of ideas who mark a radical discontinuity
between "closed" non-individualistic feudal societies and "open" individualistic
capitalist societies, Blake locates both closure and the demonic "selfhood" in
the worlds of "Bacon, Newton and Locke" as well as Milton.
Blake's critique of Platonic/Christian individualism occurs in Milton; it is
at this point that Blake discovers the importance of a form of individualism
while he rejects both the traditional and modern alternatives. Prior to writing
Milton, Blake's approach to individualism is entirely critical and his attitude
towards selfhood is purely negative, attacking both modern and Christian forms
of individualism. However, in Milton Blake overcomes the dichotomy
operating between in-worldly and other-worldly individualism with his concept
of Imagination. While traditional individualism presupposes a distinction
between the soul and body, modern individualism eradicates the transcendence
of the soul to arrive at a purely mundane concept of selfhood. Blake's early
work is characterised by a vigilant attack upon the notion of a transcendent
soul distinct from the body as well as a rejection of the empiricist individual
enclosed within sense perception. He therefore attacks both modern and
Christian strands of individualism. Blake's eventual humanism, overcomes the
Hobson's choice between the Christian self seen as other-worldly and the
material in-worldly individual of modern ideology.
In All Religions are One Blake denies the subordination of the body as
an inferior ontological substance and claims that the body is an extension of
the imagination: "the body or outward form of Man is derived from the Poetic
Genius" (ARO, E:l; K:98). In There is No Natural Religion the idea that the
body limits human experience is also rejected by Blake's assertion that the
empiricist's touchstone, experience, should not be defined as merely experience
of the senses: "Mans perceptions are not bounded by the organs of perception"
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(NNR [b], E:2; K:97). For Blake, any limiting of the possibilities of human
knowledge leads to "Nobodaddy" figures of a mysterious, external and
unknowable deity; for once the human self is seen as fallen, finite and natural,
the transcendent and infinite aspects of experience need to be attributed to a
non-human deity. Consequently, Blake not only rejects the classic Platonic
argument that "Man has two real existing principles Viz: a Body & a Soul"
(MHH, 4: E:34; K:149), he also denies the empiricist's reduction of human
being to the natural body. Blake's arguments against selfhood are directed
against both the pre-modern concept of a contemplative, individual and other¬
worldly soul and the Cartesian notion of the self as res cogitans or thinking
substance, a self which is the remainder or "tag end" of the world after all the
world is doubted.6 Blake's arguments regarding selfhood are therefore
intimately connected with his doctrine of contraries, his desire to overcome the
traditional dichotomies upon which both Platonic and empiricist philosophies
are based.
In The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, where the doctrine of contraries is
first formulated, Blake, unlike Milton before him, sees contraries not merely as
epistemologically essential for moral knowledge but as "necessary to Human
existence" (MHH, 3: E:34; K:149). The contraries Blake lists - "Attraction and
Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate" - are both ideal and physical
with both ideality and materiality being opposed in one pair: "Reason and
Energy." The ethical opposition of good and evil then springs from these
contraries. However, Blake himself does not attribute goodness or evil to
either property; this is done by "the religious" who identify passivity with
goodness. While The Marriage of Heaven and Hell implies a valorisation of
energy, activity and the "evil" term of the contrary, the role of reason as the
circumference of energy as well as the devourer who preys on the prolific are
acknowledged as necessary terms: "But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific
unless the Devourer as a sea recieved the excess of his delights" (MHH, 16:
E:40; K:155). The importance of the limiting or devouring part of the contrary
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becomes more important in Blake's later work which tempers his earlier
emphasis on "evil" qualities. Blake here rejects the Miltonic idea that
contraries should be allowed to interact until the good term naturally triumphs
over the evil. In fact the putative essential goodness or evil of the terms is
attributed to an act of domination when reason usurped desire and called itself
"good." This act of subordination Blake associates with "religion" which is an
endeavour to reconcile contraries (MHH, 16: E:40; K:155). Whereas Milton
sees evil as parasitic and goodness as self-sufficient, the 'Voice of the devil"
claims that desire is the foundation upon which reason builds: "This is shewn in
the Gospel, where [Christ] prays to the Father to send the comforter or Desire
that Reason may have Ideas to build on" (MHH, 5: E:35; K:150).
In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell "The Voice of the Devil" seems, in
part at least, to articulate Blake's own opinions.7 But if this is so, why has
Blake attributed both this section and "The Proverbs of Hell" to a voice other
than his own? In Blake's early work - from An Island in the Moon to The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell - his mode is satirical. As Northrop Frye points
out, the original context of the earliest Songs of Innocence is An Island in the
Moon and their satirical dimension should therefore not be forgotten.8 What
makes the Songs satirical is their use of voice. As Harold Bloom notes, these
are songs of, not about, innocence and experience and the limits of both states
of the human soul can only be identified by reading the poems with a certain
attention to irony.9 David Erdman has also drawn attention to the differing
levels of irony at work in the Songs: "The problem of detecting the degrees of
irony in the songs is related to the problem of detecting the degrees of lack of
insight in the characters."10 Innocence, like Beulah, is an enclosed, benign,
child-like and naive, though beautiful, state of existence. The speaker of
Innocence believes in a loving, fatherly God and a universe built on charity
and pity: "but God ever nigh, / Appeard like his father in white" ("The Little
Boy Found"); "He'd have God for his father & never want joy" ("The Chimney
Sweeper"); "And round the tent of God like lambs we joy" ("The Little Black
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Boy"); "Where Mercy, Love & Pity dwell, / There God is dwelling too" ("The
Divine Image"). The speaker of Experience, on the other hand, is self-
directed, imprisoned in his body, fearful and believes in a distant and
mysterious God: "What immortal hand or eye, / Dare frame thy fearful
symmetry?" ("The Tyger"); "Thou Mother of my Mortal part. / With cruelty
didst mould my Heart" ('To Tirzah"); "God & his Priest & King / Who make
up a heaven of our misery" ("The Chimney Sweeper"). Although Blake
originally issued Songs of Innocence alone and only later incorporated Songs of
Experience, the moral platitude which completes "Holy Thursday," ("Then
cherish pity, lest you drive an angel from your door") indicates an irony which
would already imply the more cynical state of experience. Alan Richardson
has recently noted the presence of both innocence and experience in the Songs
of Innocence and has linked this to Blake's subversion of the moral program of
eighteenth-century children's verse as secularised catechism:
Blake's child-narrators speak in a double register, at once innocent and
experienced, putting the subject positions of both child and adult into a
dialogical relation that critically undermines the catechistic relation.11
The fact that Blake transferred some of the original Songs of Innocence to the
Songs of Experience also indicates the mutual dependence and implication of
the two states. While each state harbours a degree of truth the real insight of
Songs of Innocence and of Experience is not expressed in the persona of any of
the speakers but is implied in the very action of their juxtaposition. G.E.
Bentley Jr. has argued that Blake's use of the definite article in his title -
"Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul" - implies that there is
no other state, such as organised innocence, being advocated but that human
existence constantly moves back and forth between innocence and experience.12
However, if the songs show the two contrary states of the human soul, we do
not have to assume that Innocence and Experience exhaust the possibilities for
human experience, particularly if we consider that Blake's position may be
satirical, for there may be a possibility for human life beyond Innocence and
Experience which is not a state.
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Blake's notion of Imagination relies upon distinguishing between states
and the individuals who occupy those states. Blake locates Imagination beyond
states: "The Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself' (M,
32[35]: 33, E:132; K:522). While both Milton and Jerusalem clearly seek to
represent and explore the imagination and the concept of self which is not a
state, Blake's earlier work relies more on the satirical rejection of any state of
selfhood than on the formulation of the imaginative self. Consequently, in the
Songs we are presented with Innocence and Experience as states which are
both incomplete, while in the Marriage of Heaven and Hell, the critical voice
belongs to the devil who expresses the doctrine of "Energy" as opposed to
Reason. Blake, in the Songs, relies on the reaction of contrary states while in
The Marriage he is concerned with retrieving the contraries to conventional
philosophical premises. The "Memorable Fancy" sections are similarly parodic
with the character of Blake acting as the contrary to the angel. The emphasis
is on reacting against rule-based authority: "no virtue can exist without breaking
these ten commandments" (MHH, 21: E:43; K: 158) and on the value of a
constantly changing opinion rather than a state of selfhood: "The man who
never alters his opinion is like standing water, & breeds reptiles of the mind"
(MHH, 20: E:42; K:156). The main value promulgated by The Marriage is the
constant and irreconcilable interaction of contraries rather than a state which
would reconcile or overcome opposition: "These two classes of men are always
upon earth, & they should be enemies; whoever tries to reconcile them seeks
to destroy existence" (MHH,16-17: E:40; K:155). In The Marriage the phrase,
"For this history has been adopted by both parties" (MHH, 5: E:34; K:) refers
to Paradise Lost where each party (the devil's "energy" or the Messiah's
"reason") asserts that the other term is secondary or parasitic. Blake, on the
other hand, suggests the inter-dependence of goodness and evil. The myths of
an originary reason which is weakened by the fall into evil or the opposite
account adopted by the contrary party of the devil are tales of power used to
efface the necessary existence of both terms. The emphasis on contraries in
the early work is continued in Thel and Tiriel where, once again, we are shown
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the limits of Thel's state of Innocence and Tiriel's accusing and despairing
Experience. Both Thel and Tiriel are trapped within their selves. The only
"positive" statements in Thel refer to a doctrine of self-abnegation: "every thing
that lives, / Lives not alone, nor for itself' (Thel, 3: 26-7, E:5; K:129). Blake's
position defends the interaction of contraries so that neither the guarded,
enclosed state of innocence nor the despairing, condemning state of experience
exhaust the possibilities of human experience; but what existence lies beyond
those states or what the result of the fruitful interaction of contraries would
yield is not fully explored by Blake at this stage.
While Blake continues to assert the value of "mental" rather than
"corporeal war" throughout his later work along with the resulting value of
giving up selfhood, he also manages to retrieve a concept of humanism which is
neither the fallen and limited self of Experience which derived from Bacon,
Locke and Newton nor the Innocent self which abnegates its being and force
before the presence of a transcendent God. Blake's doctrine of contraries at
first provides a concept of human existence which is purely reactive. As a
result, the self Blake advocates in the Songs is implied ironically rather than
embodied in any particular persona, while the Marriage asserts the value of
opposition. In There is No Natural Religion the poetic character is identified
with the function of change and expansion rather than with the "form" which is
to become so important in the prophetic books:
If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic character, the Philosophic &
Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all things & stand still,
unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again
(NNR[b], E:3; K:97)
Furthermore, there is less emphasis upon eternity and divinity than in the later
works and a greater insistence upon the immanence of God: "All deities reside
in the human breast" (MHH, 11: E:38; K:153); "God only Acts & Is, in existing
beings or Men" (MHH, 16, E:40; K:155). The vehement reaction against the
traditional notion of the soul clearly rejects Milton's other-worldly
individualism. In addition, Blake identifies God with an elevated, yet still
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human, perception of the world: "He who sees the Infinite in all things sees
God" (NNR[b], E:3; K:98).
Accordingly, Blake's use of the "voice of the devil" as the force of
energy and reaction is not met again in his later prophecies. In fact, Satan
becomes the "accuser" with his usurping and destructive character being
treated critically. Prior to Milton, however, Blake's works tend to operate on
an opposition between law-giving characters like Tiriel and Urizen and
rebellious and destructive characters like Satan, Fuzon and Ore.
Blake's Tiriel and Urizen figures are characterizations of Milton's God
with their emphasis on justice, retribution, transcendence, law and reason. They
also, however, resemble the God of the modern world-view - God as divine
watchmaker, artisan, first cause, an empty ontological presupposition. Blake's
genius lies in seeing the continuity between the Miltonic and modern
conceptions of God. What unites the two definitions of God is the ontological
dualism which both Milton and the empiricists presuppose. For Milton the
natural world is informed, sustained and given meaning by a transcendent God.
Any value attributed to the natural world derives from its being a creation of
God. Human being occupies a liminal position between natural and
supernatural being with its telos being the redemption of what has been
corrupted through the fall. The proper direction of the self is inward but
towards transcendence. The God of the modern world on the other hand plays
less of a role in constituting the meaning and the value of the universe. In fact,
God's existence is proved from the being of the world. As Newton states in
the "General Scholium" to the Principia: "This most beautiful system of the
sun, planets, and comets could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of
an intelligent and powerful Being."13 In 1727 Thomson clearly saw that Newton
"from Motion's simple laws, / Could trace the secret hand of Providence, /
Wide-working from this universal frame."14 God is a logical condition which
can be inferred from the examination of nature. While Milton sees the soul as
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transcendence-in-immanence and nature and human being as soulless if not
directed to an other-worldly being, the deist allows the world and humanity to
remain mundane. However, both Milton and the deist see human being as
finite, limited and as part of the world. While Milton's ethic directs the self to
an other-worldly God, the deist directs the self to the world. Both "parties"
therefore produce a mysterious, alienated and dominating universe. Milton's
exteriority is God; the deist's is nature.
Blake specifically identifies the traditional conception of God with a
"closed" universe as opposed to a world which is a collection of particulars:
Then was the serpent temple form'd, image of infinite
Shut up in finite revolutions, and man became an Angel;
Heaven a mighty circle turning; God a tyrant crown'd.
{Europe, 10: 21-3, E:63; K:241)
This passage from Europe makes the connection between organised religion
("serpent temple"), the closure of the universe ("Shut up in finite revolutions"),
human obedience to transcendence ("and man became an Angel") and the law¬
giving, kingly character of God ("a tyrant crowned"). When Blake's God-
figures are rule-giving, punishing and enclosed in contemplation they are
Miltonic; when they are seated in the void or chaos and threateningly absent
they are modern. Thus Fuzon's description of Urizen concentrates less on his
rule-bearing and ordering function than on emptiness and absence:
Shall we worship this Demon of smoke,
Said Fuzon, this abstract non-entity
This cloudy God seated on waters
Now seen, now obscur'd; King of sorrow?
{Ahania, 2: 10-13, E:84; K:249)
Fuzon still refers to Urizen as a king thereby recalling the pre-modern image
of God as law-giver alongside the modern idea of an absent God who creates a
self-ruling universe. In fact, Urizen frequently combines both sets of
characteristics and Blake is able to intertwine modern and pre-modern
concepts of deity precisely because he sees them united by one characteristic:
exteriority. Although Milton had argued that obedience to God is not a
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question of obeying rules but simply recognising the compelling character of
God's goodness and acting according to the soul's innate capacity for divine
harmony, Blake still characterises Milton's God as rule-bearing. For Blake, any
criterion of goodness which excludes the essential human qualities of desire,
energy and action - so-called "evils" - is still external. If "Good and Evil are
Qualities in Every Man" and truth is entirely human - "There is not a Truth but
it has also a Man" - then any ethics premised upon a transcendent notion of
goodness which would purify and elevate human being is rule-giving whatever
claims it cares to make for the logical necessity of its rules (VLJ, E:563;
K:615). Milton was able to depict Satan's rebellion as ethically illogical
precisely because he had premised his narrative upon a transcendent and
irrefutable value. Satan himself repeated those premises in setting himself up
as an alternative ruler in Pandemonium just as Blake's characters in The Four
Zoas repeatedly claim victory and grant themselves the title of God. In this
sense the Satan of Paradise Lost was of the Godly party without knowing it.
Milton's premises were those of a "closed" ontological order in which the
concept of good was hierarchically situated above all other values and could
therefore not be challenged. While modern science supposedly "opened" the
universe by examining particulars rather than transcendent forms and by
imagining a God who did not ordain a specific form of government or grant a
divine right of kings it still retained God as an airy absence. It still saw natural
laws - now scientific rather than theological - as external and governing human
behaviour. In fact the "opening" of the universe from circling heavens to a void
or boundless chaos created a more alienating form of exteriority. The
"Newtonian voids" are a product of the closure of the mind within absolute
space and time. In Milton Blake describes the being of finite humanity as man
within chaos:
There Chaos dwells & ancient Night & Og & Anak old:
For every human heart has gates of brass & bars of adamant,
Which few dare unbar because dread Og & Anak guard the gates
Terrific! and each mortal brain is walld and moated round
Within ... (M, 20[22]: 33-37, E:114; K:502)
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Blake then goes on to assert that such a chaotic view of the world is predicated
upon an humanity too enclosed to see the form of the universe. The "open"
universe only appears as "Newtonian Voids" to the natural man who is unable
to discern the form of the stars:
For the Chaotic Voids outside of the Stars are measured by
The Stars, which are the boundaries of Kingdoms, Provinces
And Empires of Chaos invisible to the Vegetable Man
(M, 37[41]: 47-9, E:138; K:528)
The doctrine of empiricism which confines human experience to sense
perception is behind Blake's recurring motif of the limiting finitude of the
natural man: "when the five senses whelm'd / In deluge o'er the earth-born
man; then turn'd the fluxile eyes / Into two stationary orbs, concentrating all
things, f. . . and petrify'd against the infinite" (Europe, 10: 10-15, E:63; K:241).
Blake's criticisms of both the Newtonian and Miltonic world-views are
also formulated as attacks on the concept of law. For what unites classical and
modern conceptions of God and nature is the search for a unifying, unchanging
order beneath apparent change.75 Ore's most significant action in America is
to "stamp" Urizen's "stony law ... to dust" (America, 8: 5, E:54; K:198) thus
destroying the natural or divine "law" behind changing reality.
As we have seen, one of the most important distinctions for both
ancient and Miltonic ethics was the distinction between acting virtuously for
reasons of gain or prudence and acting virtuously in accord with the internal
moral law. Blake asserts that such a distinction is spurious and, once again, the
result of an historical act of domination by organised religion. For any moral
law, even putative "eternal laws" are actually prudent positive laws claiming
transcendent value:
And their children wept, & built
Tombs in the desolate places,
And form'd laws of prudence, and call'd them
The eternal laws of God
(Urizen, 28: 4-7, E:83; K:236)
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Just as Blake in Visions of the Daughters of Albion concentrates on the
way the word "harlot" is used by figures such as Bromion to enslave women, so
here the word "eternal" is used to universalise particular acts of human law¬
making. In Europe Enitharmon deceitfully proclaims that "an Eternal life
awaits . . .j In an allegorical abode where existence hath never come" (Europe,
5: 6-7, E:62; K:240). The concept of an eternal form of the good in Platonic
philosophy is the archetype for all subsequent ethical theories which postulate
a transcendent telos for all human action and a suspension of engagement in
this world. Eternity is one of the persistent features of any characterisation of
a transcendent source of value. Milton's faith in reason also called for the
subordination of the will and passions to reason's internal and eternal laws.
Blake significantly tempers the concept of eternity with involvement in
temporality. Not only is Los, the eternal prophet, in charge of time, but one of
the proverbs of hell asserts: "Eternity is in love with the productions of time"
(MHH, 7: 10, E:36; K:151).
Blake's dual attack upon both Milton and Enlightenment world-views is
carried out in The Book of Urizen where the continuity between pre-modern
and modern thought is identified as the valorisation of selfhood. The values of
Platonic thought - contemplation, attention to inward transcendence, the self-
sufficiency of reason - are embodied in the figure of Urizen who is "Self-
closd," "A self-contemplating shadow," and "consum'd / Inwards, into a deep
world within" (Urizen, 3-4: E:70-72; K:222-224). The Book of Urizen is
commonly identified as a parody of the Book of Genesis. Blake's emphasis
upon self-enclosedness, contemplation and solitude also parodies the accretion
of Platonic and neo-Platonic thought to the biblical account. Urizen's creation
ends with nature "self balanc'd" and the final description of Urizen's world is
as "the pendulous earth" (Urizen, 28: 21, E:83; K:237). Such diction recalls the
Miltonic emphasis upon earth's balancing in Paradise Lost}6 The Miltonic
imagery of the self-balanced earth reinforced the sense of the world's internal
order, its closure, its harmony and its spiritual centrality in the divine schema.
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Blake, on the other hand, interprets the self-balanced earth negatively seeing
the free-standing globe awash a sea of chaos: "And the salt ocean rolled
englob'd" (Urizen, 28: 23, E:83; K: 237). To see the world as balanced is to
see it within something else, something which is external to human experience.
Thus the older Miltonic cosmology passes over easily into the empiricism which
the Book of Urizen also describes. The net of religion eventually causes
human life to be "bound down / To earth by their narrowing perceptions"
(Urizen, 25: 46-7, E:83; K:236). While Urizen refers to the Old Testament
God of self-contemplating creation as "That solitary one in Immensity" (Urizen,
3: 43, E:71; K:223) the consequences of empiricism are no less solipsistic:
For the ears of the inhabitants,
Were wither'd, & deafen'd, & cold
And their eyes could not discern,
Their brethren of other cities.
(Urizen, 28: 15-18, E:83; K:236)
Urizen's power, the first line of The Book of Urizen tells us, is "assum'd."
Blake clearly identifies the myth of a self-enclosed, self-contemplating, solitary
and external deity with the assumption of power, and concomitantly, the loss of
agency of Urizen's subjects. Such a Urizenic world is clearly "closed" insofar as
the tyrant-God's creative powers and laws are external to the pendulous globe.
The modern aspect of the Urizenic world - its "voidness unfathomable" - may
"open" the world cosmologically but it equally "closes" the embodied, empirical
natural man within the sea of external time and space and its mathematical
laws of weight and measure. Both conceptions of the universe are linked by
Blake to an external "Nobodaddy" God figure.
In his later work Blake is able to depict a God "who is the intellectual
fountain of Humanity" (J, 91: 10, E:251; K:738) and who is an embodiment of
the human spirit of forgiveness. His work prior to Milton concentrates upon
parodying traditional and enlightenment conceptions of God and freeing
human experience from those conceptions. The character of Ore in Blake's
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earlier works consequently has a negative function in destroying such God-like
figures. As early as The Marriage of Heaven and Hell Blake is working upon a
doctrine of excess, wrath and the breaking of limits: "The tygers of wrath are
wiser than the horses of instruction / . . . You never know what is enough
unless you know what is more than enough" (MHH, 9: 44-6, E:37; K:152);
"One thought, fills immensity" (MHH, 8: 36, E:36; K:151). In Visions of the
Daughters ofAlbion Oothoon demands the joys of openness while rejecting the
closure of her "infinite brain into a narrow circle" (VDA, 2: 32, E:47; K:191):
Infancy, fearless, lustful, happy! nestling for delight
In laps of pleasure; Innocence! honest, open, seeking
The vigorous joys of morning light; open to virgin bliss.
(VDA, 6: 4-6, E:49; K:193)
Because Blake at this stage is more concerned with destroying the bounds to
liberty, Oothoon's liberated state is not a feminine form of self but an
overcoming of the male selfhood which brands women as harlots. As a result
Oothoon's main concern is with producing a plurality of female objects of
desire for Theotormon:
But silken nets and traps of adamant will Oothoon spread,
And catch for thee girls of mild silver, or of furious gold;
I'll lie beside thee on a bank & view their wanton play
In lovely copulation bliss on bliss with Theotormon:
(VDA, 7: 23-6, E:50; K: 194-95)
Such is Blake's insistence on the necessity for breaking the rules of chastity and
morality that the "Preludium" to America depicts the rape of the "shadowy
daughter of Urthona." Prior to being raped the "shadowy" female lacks both
voice and identity; when she is seized by Ore her resistance is objectified into
her womb by the use of "It joy'd":
The hairy shoulders rend the links, free are the wrists of fire;
Round the terrific loins he siez'd the panting struggling womb;
It joy'd: she put aside her clouds & smiled her first-born smile;
(America, 2: 2-4, E:52; K:196)
It is Blake's insistence on the value of excess and the destruction of bounds to
the creative imagination which in his earlier works often implies a valorisation
of violence. It is this aspect of Blake which influenced W.B. Yeats who used
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the rape of Leda as a metaphor for creative visitation and D.H. Lawrence who
depicted the rape of the slave-girl by the slave-boy as the opening of desire in
his novella "The Man Who Died."
Continuing the imagery of liberating destruction in America, the plagues
sent by Albion's angel to subdue America redound upon the aggressor:
The red fires rag'd! the plagues recoilci! then rolld they back with fury
On Albion's Angels; then the Pestilence began in streaks of red
Across the limbs of Albion's Guardian
(America, 14-15: 20 &1-2, E:56; K:202)
The rest of America continues with the "fires of Ore" consuming the "law-built
heaven" (America, 16: 19 & 21, E:58; K:203) so that the images which
conclude, generate and sustain America are of destruction and reversal.
Although in The French Revolution a distinction is made by Orleans between
fires of growth and fires of consuming (FR, 10: 179, E:294; K:142), the forces
of enlightenment summoned by Fayette still violently expel the religious:
Like a flame of fire he stood before dark ranks, and before expecting
captains
On pestilent vapours around him flow frequent spectres of religious men
weeping
In winds driven out of the abbeys, their naked souls shiver in keen open
air,
Driven out by the fiery cloud of Voltaire, and thund'rous rocks of
Rousseau
They dash like foam against the ridges of the army, uttering a faint
feeble cry.
(FR, 14: 273-77, E:298; K:146)
In Europe Blake begins to add the concept of form to the desire for the
destruction of the bounds of energy. The figure of the "Shadowy female"
appears at the beginning of Europe-, she is the mother nature of modern
science, shadowy because she is outside human imagination, unendowed with
the identity of any particular entity, a formless realm of uniform matter. When
she emerges from Ore's breast to address Ore's mother, Enitharmon, she
demands that Ore's fires remain unbounded: "Stamp not with solid form this
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vig'rous progeny of fires" (Europe, 2: 8, E:61; K:238). It is the stamping of
form which enables the shadowy female's flames to leave her: "And thou dost
stamp them with a signet, then they roam abroad" {Europe, 2: 10, E:61; K:238).
Although the imagery of "stamping" with a signet recalls the Visions of the
Daughters of Albion's trope of slavery and can hardly be considered positive
for Blake he is here beginning to work towards a critique of the formlessness
of the modern view of the natural world. Enitharmon's "stamping" here is an
ambiguous liberation and alienation from nature. When the Shadowy female
calls to Enitharmon - "And who shall bind the infinite with an eternal band? /
To compass it with swaddling bands? and who shall cherish it / With milk and
honey?" {Europe, 2: 13-15, E:61; K:239) - she anticipates Enitharmon's role
from The Four Zoas onwards as a weaver of forms. For the imagery of binding
and enclosing, which is later associated with the Daughters of Beulah, becomes
important as a stage on the way to four-fold vision. Such a binding is necessary
to overcome chaotic formlessness. In Europe, however, Blake is still anxious
about the binding of Ore. Enitharmon's act of binding the fires of Ore is
attributed to a female will of domination which interiorises the patriarchal
attitude to female desire:
Now comes the night of Enitharmon's joy!
Who shall I call? Who shall I send?
That Woman, lovely Woman! may have dominion?
Arise O Rintrah thee I call! & Palamabron thee!
Go! tell the human race that Womans love is Sin!
That an Eternal life awaits the worms of sixty winters
In an allegorical abode wher existence hath never come:
Forbid all Joy, & from her childhood shall the little female
Spread nets in every secret path.
{Europe, 5: 1-9, E:62; K:240)
The "nets" the little female spreads in every path are a consequence of the
binding of desire. The doctrine of chastity which Theotormon has used to
enslave Oothoon is taken up and used by the female will to deny desire. By
forbidding joy, Enitharmon claims power over her sons. The domination of the
female will is predicated upon the proclamation that "Womans Love is Sin."
Enitharmon's dream is the eighteen hundred years of human history preceding
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Blake's birth. In this dream Ore is characteristically burning through oppressive
Europe and destroying law: "The Guardian of the secret codes forsook his
ancient mansion, / Driven out by the flames of Ore" (Europe, 12: 15-16, E:64;
K:242). Enitharmon, on the other hand, is rejoicing at her success in having
bound her children: "Enitharmon laugh'd in her sleep to see (O womans
triumph) / Every house a den, every man bound" (Europe, 12: 25-6, E:64;
K243). Europe reaches the approach of revolution when the sons depart from
Enitharmon's binding influence and the gate of the East opens. The vision of
Ore appears amidst imagery of fires, wrathful tigers and lions. Although Blake
has introduced the idea of a binding and forming of the prolific fires the
emphasis is still upon the removal of limits and the destruction of laws.
In The Song of Los the fallen world is depicted as enslaved to Urizen's
laws - laws which Blake explicitly connects with Mosaic law ("Moses beheld
upon Mount Sinai forms of dark delusion") and Platonism ("Palamabron gave
an abstract Law: / To Pythagoras Socrates & Plato" SL, 3: 17-19, E:67;
K:245-46). But Urizen's fallen world is also subject to the natural laws of
physical contraries: "Lo these Human form'd spirits in smiling hipocrisy. War /
Against one another; so let them War on; slaves to the eternal Elements" (SL,
3: 13-14, E:67; K245). Blake here connects the physical natural laws of the
scientists with the Christian natural law as divine decree as well as the natural
law of ancient metaphysics. The children of Los and Enitharmon are bound
equally by law and nature. Blake characteristically intertwines his description of
law with the empiricist doctrine of sense experience:
Thus the terrible race of Los & Enitharmon gave
Laws & Religions to the sons of Har binding them more
And more to Earth: closing and restraining:
Till a Philosophy of Five Senses was complete
Urizen wept & gave it into the hands of Newton & Locke
(SL, 4: 13-17, E:68; K:246)
The laws of Urizen naturally lead to binding the sons more to earth; the
modern concept of an external law-ruled nature is simply another version of
the pre-modern notion of a law-giving Nobodaddy. Ore's role in The Song of
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Los is to melt Urizen's books of brass and gold - an image of Christian natural
law. But the other aspect to which human experience is enslaved - the five
senses or "the warring elements" - is neither overcome nor mentioned again.
Blake consistently rejects both the concept of a transcendent law-giving deity
and the idea of a chaotic external natural world but his images of revolution
deal with destroying the former and not constructing an alternative to the
latter. Apocalyptic imagery concludes The Song of Los but Blake here, as
earlier, is still presenting only a destruction of the old forms of kingship with
"Ore raging in European darkness" (SL, 7: 26, E:69; K:248).
In The Book of Urizen Blake combines aspects of both Milton's and
Newton's God in the figure of Urizen. Like Milton's self-sufficient and
contemplative God Urizen is "solitary," "Self-closd," a "vacuum" and a "self-
contemplating shadow." Like the empty ontological premise which is natural
theology's modern God he is an "abominable void," "unseen," "unknown" and
"Obscure." Urizen's laws are both the virtues of classical ethics ("Laws of
peace, of love, of unity . . . ") and the laws of modern science ("one weight, one
measure"):
Laws of peace, of love, of unity:
Of pity compassion, forgiveness.
Let each chuse one habitation:
His ancient infinite mansion:
One command, one joy, one desire,
One curse, one weight, one measure
One King, one God, one Law.
(Urizen, 4: 34-40, E:72; K:224)
In The Book of Urizen Blake begins to explore the problem of overcoming the
formlessness of Urizen who is "Unorganiz'd, rent from Eternity" (Urizen, 6: 8,
E:74; K:226). Significantly, Ore is replaced by Los who takes the "formless
unmeasureable death" which is Urizen as a clod of clay and binds it with rivets
(Urizen, 7: 9, E:74; K:226). This event anticipates Milton's moulding of Urizen
into a human form in Milton. But here Urizen remains outside time: "Ages on
ages roll'd over him!" and continues to be "obscurd more & more / In dark
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secresy" (Urizen, 10: 1&12-13, E:75; K:227). Los's response is to give Urizen
form and incorporate temporality into the chaotic "Sulphureous fluid:"
The Eternal Prophet heavd the dark bellows,
And turn'd restless the tongs; and the hammer
Incessant beat; forging chains new & new
Numb'ring with links, hours, days & years
(Urizen, 10: 15-18, E:75; K:227)
Los's response to Urizen's appearance as "Disorganiz'd, rent from Eternity" is
to mould Urizen and his world into time. If we take the conventional (and
Miltonic17) conception of eternity as atemporal then an attempt to bring Urizen
back to eternity by constructing him within time seems paradoxical as does
Los's title as "eternal" prophet if he is, similarly, identified with time. Only if
we accept Blake's highly idiosyncratic idea of eternity as organised human time
do Los's efforts make sense. Los strives to give Urizen a body but time
continues to pass over and leave Urizen in a "state:" "And a first Age passed
over, / And a state of dismal woe" (Urizen, 10: 42-3, E:75; K:228). Blake is
beginning to formulate his distinction between the divine body which gives form
and life and the external body of the natural man. In The Book of Urizen the
body Los forms is still frightening, detached, material and other. Los's attempt
fails because the body he gives Urizen is a biological body constructed of veins,
sinews, bones and blood - the body dissected by science. Los himself is rent
from Eternity as he becomes what he beholds:
All the myriads of Eternity:
All the wisdom & joy of life:
Roll like a sea around him,
Except what his little orbs
Of sight by degrees unfold.
(Urizen, 13: 28-32, E:77; K:230)
Los realises, when he encounters the "voidness unfathomable" of Urizen, that a
process of embodiment and forming is necessary. However, Los fails to weld
Urizen to eternity because he gives him the body of empiricist philosophy - a
"horrible form" within time and the infinite chaos and not a body which
incorporates time and infinity. Los has failed to differentiate the uniform
expanse of Newtonian space. Los and Urizen still feel time pass over them
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and are isolated within an external time and space:
Ages on ages rolld over them
Cut off from life & light frozen
Into horrible forms of deformity
Los suffer'd his fires to decay
Then he look'd back with anxious desire
But the space undivided by existence
Struck horror into his soul.
(Urizen, 13: 41-7, E:77; K:230)
In The Book of Los Blake again defends a doctrine of excess. What
Harold Bloom refers to as "the four prime Blakean sins of Covet, Envy, Wrath,
and Wantoness"18 are glutted to the point of transforming into their contraries:
4: But covet was poured full:
Envy fed with fat of lambs:
Wrath with lions gore:
Wantoness lulld to sleep
With the virgins lute,
Or sated with her love
5: Till Covet broke his locks & bars,
And slept with open doors:
Envy sung at the rich mans feast:
Wrath was follow'd up and down
By a little ewe lamb
And Wantoness on his own true love
Begot a giant race:
(BL, 3: 14-26, E:90-91; K:256)
The Book of Los continues with Blake's typical progress of fires of "destruction
& plagues" (BL, 3: 30, E:91; K:256) but the fires are not only destructive; they
are "Intelligent, organiz'd" countering formlessness as Los continues "Into
vacuum: into non-entity" (BL, 3: 29 & 37-8, E:91; K:256). These flames are
"Flames of desire" as well as flames of wrath; they are Los's weapons against
the "darkness and shadowy obscurity." They still recall the hellish fires of
Paradise Lost: "But no light from the fires all was / Darkness" (BL, 3-4: 49-1,
E:91; K:257) and are therefore associated with the rebelling Satan. Though
organised, the fires are still working by opposition; these furious and hellish
fires bereft of light are therefore defeated as Los becomes bound by "fiery
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spheres" and the flames are obscured: "heat was not; for bound up / Into fiery
spheres from his fury / The gigantic flames trembled and hid" (BL, 4: 1-3, E:91;
K:257). The fires then liken to the unchanging substance of natural science:
"Coldness, darkness, obstruction, a Solid / Without fluctuation" (BL, 4: 4-5,
E:91; K:257). The fires of fury have become as confining as matter while Los's
previously expanding senses have become enclosed:
And the separated fires froze in
A vast solid without fluctuation,
Bound in his expanding clear senses
(BL, 4: 8-10, E:91; K:257)
Eternity becomes ossified and external to Los as time passes over the
immobilised prophet:
The immortal stood frozen amidst
The vast rock of eternity; times
And times; a night of vast durance:
Impatient, stifled, stiffend, hardend.
(BL, 4: 11-14, E:92; K:257)
Los's response to this situation is to rent7 the rock of eternity, the "vast solid"
which recalls the Newtonian concept of absolute time and space. But this total
destruction of all limits precipitates Los's fall through the void which recalls
Satan's fall in Paradise Lost. Blake is moving away from his use of Satan as a
valuable counter to the angelic opinions of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell
and concentrating more on the fallenness of Satanic rebellion. The allusion to
both heat without light and Satan's indefinite fall suggest the hellish and absurd
aspects of Satan's character rather than the energetic and wrathful "voice of
the devil." Blake's developing reservations about the resulting void of an
Orcian annihilation of boundaries become clear in The Book of Los. Not only
does he put forward the possibility of "organiz'd" and intelligent flames of
desire he also declares: 'Truth has bounds. Error none" (BL, 4: 30, E:92;
K:258). When Los approaches the end of his fall he becomes embodied into
"finite inflexible organs" and "contemplative thoughts first- ar[i]se;" he is
thereafter referred to as "the falling Mind" (BL, 4: 40 & 49, E:92; K:258). Los
becomes "Mind" because the formation of "finite, inflexible, organs" is the
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precondition for the dualism which disrupts the integrity of the imaginative self
and necessitates an independent principle of "mind." Los's disembodied "Mind"
responds to the fall by "Organizing itself' and attempting to create some form
of resistance in the void: "till the Vacuum / Became element, pliant to rise"
(BL, 4: 50-1, E:92; K:258). The description of Los's body which follows is that
of a biological and material body - a "Fibrous form" constructed from various
functioning parts (BL, 5: 1, E:93; K:259). The emphasis upon the necessity for
imaginative form and integrated embodiment continues with the first
appearance of light from the fires. At this point Los discerns Urizen as "a
Form of impregnable strength" (BL, 5: 19, E:94; K:259). Los responds by
taking the fires of light on his anvil and re-forming Urizen - again anticipating
Milton's moulding of Urizen in Milton. Los's efforts entail the expulsion of
the chaotic sea of the external void: "the Deeps fled Away in redounding
smoke" (BL, 5: 43-4, E:94; K:260). But this could be just where Los fails; for
he expels rather than incorporates the voidness:
But no light, for the Deep fled away
On all sides, and left an unform'd
Dark vacuity; here Urizen lay
(BL, 5: 48-50, E:94; K:260) '
Los thus merely produces a finite and enclosed embodiment of Urizen. Los
then binds Urizen to the "glowing illusion" of the "self-balanc'd" sun. By doing
so Urizen becomes the God in the sky of an ordered and centred cosmos; what
results is "a Human Illusion / In darkness and deeps clouds involvd" (BL, 5:
56-7, E:94; K:260). Los has given Urizen a "Form" although it is not a purely
imaginative form but a form based on the empirical body. This natural form is
then made transcendent when Los binds Urizen to the sun, thus creating a
formed centre amidst "Dark vacuity." Los repeats here the process described
in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell whereby a natural object is endowed with
an imaginative form; this form is then hypostasised into a governing deity and
seen as anterior to human creation. Blake makes it clear that such a forgetting
of the immanence of deity arises with the formation of "system:"
The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods or Geniuses,
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calling them by the names and adorning them with the properties of
woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations, and whatever their
enlarged & numerous senses could percieve.
And particularly they studied the genius of each city & country,
placing it under its mental deity.
Till a system was formed, which some took advantage of &
enslav'd the vulgar by attempting to realize or abstract the mental
deities from their objects: thus began Priesthood.
Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales.
And at length they pronounced that the Gods had orderd such
things.
Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast.
(MHH, 11: E:38; K:153)
Like Milton, Blake associates idolatry with political enslavement; but,
unlike Milton, Blake does not aim to stress the transcendent and eternal aspect
of God's being but rather God's immanence and the "poetic" character of
Christianity. In The Book of Los, Los's attempts to "form" Urizen and thus
make the external, alienated God of reason a poetic form fails because God is
still both an elevated form of the material body and a God of mystery in "deep
clouds." The efforts of Los and Ore to do away with all structures of
transcendence result either in a formless and violent rejection of all boundaries
(by Ore) or the return of the repressed types of transcendence in the figures
which Los re-forms.
It is the issue of form which works itself out in Blake's later work. In
rejecting the Platonic strain of Milton which sought a transcendent form of the
virtues, Blake encounters the ethical relativism of the formless Newtonian void.
Blake therefore sets himself the task of defining a concept of form which
retrieves the character and particularity of the pre-modern world without the
eternal and static essences which underpinned that traditional ontology.
Blake's eventual use of the term "form" rejects both the Miltonic conception of
a transcendent realm of the essences and the formlessness of modern science's
world of matter.
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Chapter Six:
The Four Zoos, Milton and Jerusalem
The emerging modern individualism which denies transcendence and
defines its value economically is challenged by Milton's Platonic doctrine of the
soul. Like Plato, Milton defines the virtues with regard to their transcendent
and eternal form. For Milton, each individual possesses a soul capable of
reason and contemplation which enables knowledge of the forms. Blake's
response to Milton recognises and rejects the philosophical tradition of
transcendent forms which informed the earlier poet's doctrine of individualism.
Because Blake, like Milton, disagrees with the materialistic presuppositions of
modern ideology he also needs some concept of form with which to challenge
modern relativism. Where Blake differs most substantially from Milton is in
refusing to make the forms transcendent.
In his book The Neoplatonism of William Blake G.M. Harper draws
attention to the importance of the concept of "form" in Blake's work as
evidence of Blake's debt to Plato. According to Harper, Blake went through a
twenty year period of Platonism from 1784 to 1804. Harper deduces this
Platonism from references made by Blake to "the immense flood of Grecian
light & glory which is coming on Europe"1 and from the influence of Thomas
Taylor, the eighteenth-century Platonist. Harper goes on to claim that Blake
became disillusioned with Grecian art after 1804 but still retained Platonic
metaphysical notions such as the concept of "Imaginative form." Blake's
supposed departure from this "Grecian period" occured with his visit to the
Truchsessian gallery in 1804:
Suddenly, on the day after visiting the Truchsessian Gallery of pictures, I
was again enlightened with the light I enjoyed in my youth, and which
has for exactly twenty years been closed from me as by a door and by
window-shutters.
(Letter to William Hayley 23 October 1804, E:756; K:852)
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S. Foster Damon has also noted a Platonic strain in Blake's symbolism:
Plato had long since been thoroughly assimilated into Blake's symbolic
system. The Book of Urizen is steeped in the Timaeus, as we have seen;
and naturally The Four Zoas did not escape.2
While Harper and Damon are correct in identifying Platonic imagery in
Blake's work, Blake's appropriation of both discourse and symbolism is highly
idiosyncratic. Harper's claim that "Blake's concept of a transcendent reason in
man places him squarely in the stream of Platonic thought and idealism"3 is at
odds with Blake's insistent repudiation of such transcendence; it is Harper's
argument about this aspect of Blake's neo-Platonism which this chapter will
challenge.4 Just as Blake takes terms from modern science and mechanics -
such as vortex, vapour, attraction and repulsion, void, and the imagery of the
machine - only to critically subvert those discourses, so his use of Platonic
discourse and imagery actually contradicts the basic tenets of Platonism.
Blake's use of form is a typical instance of his inversion of Platonic meaning.
For Plato, the form of an entity is its supra-mundane essence; a form is
unchanging, immaterial, anterior to worldly human existence and radically
opposed to the actual thing of which it is a form.
As early as 1788 Blake had articulated a concept of form which was
immanent. By doing so, he not only redefined the Platonic notion of form, he
also challenged the modern view that the identity of entities lay in the
quantitative arrangement of some uniform substance. In All Religions are One
Blake stresses the "genius" of all things - using genius in its original sense of
indwelling spirit - and claims that this genius determines form: "the forms of
all things are derived from their Genius" (ARO, E:l; K:98). Here, Blake is
closer to the pre-modern ontology whereby each thing has its own essence and
character. Where he differs from this tradition is in his denial of the
transcendence of form. The concept of the "human form" gains increasing
importance in Blake's later work. The significance of Blake's use of "form" in
this sense is that it provides a notion of form transcendent to individual
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experience while insistently stressing that "form" is immanent to human
experience in general. Furthermore, Blake's definition of form always reflected
his involvement with the visual arts. Because Blake used the production of art
as the primary analogy for all experience, form was never anterior to
experience but was constituted by the imagination. In his annotations to The
Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds Blake makes this point clearly: "All Forms are
Perfect in the Poets Mind, but these are not Abstracted nor Compounded from
Nature but are from Imagination" (E:648; K:459). Whereas the tradition of
Platonic metaphysics saw Reason as the correct faculty for apprehending forms,
Blake located the capacity for perceiving forms in the Imagination:
This is my Opinion but Forms must be apprehended by Sense or the
Eye of Imagination
Man is All Imagination God is man & exists in us & we in him
What Jesus came to Remove was the Heathen or Platonic Philosophy
which blinds the Eye of Imagination The Real Man
(Annotations to Berkeley's Siris, E:664; K:775)
What is at issue here is more than simply the shift of a capacity from
one faculty to another. Blake assigns the forms to the creative rather than
receptive aspect of human existence. In doing so the character of forms
changes. They are constituted and dwell within a faculty of human being which
is not only the primary faculty ("Man is All Imagination") but a faculty which
Blake identifies with divinity. In Milton Blake describes the imagination as "the
Divine Body of the Lord Jesus" (M, 3: 4, E:96; K:482). But whereas divinity
had traditionally been transcendent, Blake's imagination is thoroughly human.
Consequently, Blake is locating the apprehension of forms in an immanent,
though divine, faculty of human being; the forms are no longer other-worldly.
Furthermore, by involving sense in the perception of forms Blake sets himself
against the Platonic denigration of sense experience. Blake's "Sense," however,
is not the sense of the natural or biological body; that is, it is not the sense of a
body conceived as an independent and material thing. It is the "Sense or the
Eye of the Imagination." Blake is able to establish a notion of sense
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perception which is not empiricist by redefining the status of the body. Blake's
conception of the spiritual body overcomes the dichotomy between the soul
and the body because the faculty of Imagination perceives and constitutes a
"human form divine" which is the spiritual body. The body is therefore already
involved with the imagination or creative faculty and can participate in the
world of "forms." The Platonic distinction, then, between the realm of the
forms and the realm of the material world becomes untenable, for the correctly
perceived world is already "formed." In answer to Berkeley's definition of the
Platonic soul Blake responds: "The Natural Body is an Obstruction to the Soul
or Spiritual Body" (E:664; K:775). The sense which apprehends the forms is
the sense of the spiritual body not the body limited by natural science.
Blake's doctrine of forms is also connected with both his ontology and
his aesthetics. Blake insistently asserts the particular identity of things in
response to modern science's drive to uniformity which he sees as the denial of
form. Accordingly, in his fine art, he stresses the importance of bounding lines
which will emphasise particularity and difference; and in doing so he values
"form" above "tints:" "In a work of Art it is not fine tints that are required but
Fine Forms, fine Tints without, are loathsom Fine Tints without Fine Forms
are always the Subterfuge of the Blockhead" (Public Address, E:571; K:591). In
"Night the Seventh" of The Four Zoas Los begins the process of universal
redemption by giving form to Urizen's chaos. In doing so he uses line:
And first he drew a line upon the walls of shining heaven
And Enitharmon tincturd it with beams of blushing love
It remaind permanent a lovely form inspird divinely human
Dividing into just proportions Los unwearied labourd
The immortal lines upon the heavens with sighs of love
(FZ, p.98[90]: 35-39, E:371; K:332)
So while we can admit that Platonic terms such as "form" were
important to Blake it is clear that they are not employed in the sprit of
Platonic philosophy. As Harper demonstrates, it is evident that Blake was fully
acquainted with neo-Platonic imagery and metaphysics. However, it is
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questionable whether Blake went through a "Grecian Period" in which he
adopted the philosophy of Plato. Blake's work did change direction around
1804 (although this shift in his thought is anticipated in The Four Zoas).
Rather than being Platonic, Blake's work prior to Milton proclaims the
repudiation of transcendence and the destruction of limits, laws and "selfhood."
This "revolutionary" period of Blake's work eventually encounters problems
with the valorisation of "negative" freedom (that is, freedom defined as the
negation of all limits). The disillusionment with revolutionary fervour began,
for most Romantics, around 1795.5 According to M.H. Abrams, great
Romantic poetry began with the acknowledgement of the failure and barbarism
of the French Revolution:
The visionary poems of the earlier 1790s and Shelley's earlier
prophecies show imaginative audacity and invention, but they are not, it
must be confessed, very good poems. The great Romantic poems were
written not in the mood of revolutionary exaltation but in the later
mood of revolutionary disillusionment or despair.6
Abram's argument that the Romantics became concerned with "a
spiritual and moral revolution" rather than political change cannot be applied
to Blake's later prophecies. Commenting on the image of the bard shattering
his harp which concludes America, David Erdman writes: "But Blake did not
shatter, he merely hid, his heroic trumpet. He still wrote in utter
condemnation of Britain's war. He still prophesied a revolutionary millenium
for England."7 In "fear of the shadow of Pitt's Inquisition,"8 however, Blake
expressed his thoughts in allegories. Blake did question his earlier faith in the
powers of mass revolutionary action. As Erdman notes "Ore chained to the
rock is not the human fire of 1776 or 1789 but an 'iron hand' which, having
'crushd the Tyrants head' has become 'a Tyrant in his stead.'"9 But what is
entailed in Blake's revision of Ore is not a rejection of the possibility and value
of revolution. In order to overcome the "Grey Monk" cycle whereby the agent
of transformation becomes what he beholds, Blake added the demand that
revolution be directed towards some spiritual form and ethical content other
than the mere destruction of opposition. Unlike the other Romantics, Blake
204
did not turn "inward" and despair of social and political solutions to alienation
but he did see a "spiritual revolution" as a necessary precondition for wordly
action. Sloss and Wallis long ago recognised Blake's "progress from the
anarchic revolutionary doctrine of the Lambeth books to a not less
revolutionary Christianity."10 Although Blake is still critical of the concept of
"selfhood," he formulates a doctrine of humanism which rejects both Platonic
and modern individualism. The concept of "form" is integral to Blake's
response to both his earlier work and the violence and compromise of the
French Revolution.
The opening of The Four Zoas still emphasises the necessity for conflict
but Blake now stresses the intellectual character of this battle. His quotation
from Ephesians explicitly rejects a war "against flesh and blood" and the call is
directed towards "Intellectual Battle" (FZ, p3: 3, E:300; K:264). Introducing
the notion of an integrated and unified humanity, Blake invokes the concept of
Universal Brotherhood:
Four Mighty Ones are in every Man;
a Perfect Unity
Cannot Exist, but from the Universal
Brotherhood of Eden
The Universal Man. To Whom be
Glory Evermore Amen
[What] are the Natures of those Living Creatures the Heavenly Father
only
[Knoweth] no Individual [Knoweth nor] Can know in all Eternity
(FZ p.3: 4-9, E:300-301; K:264)n
Here Blake explicitly declares that individual integration can occur only with
the integration of others; "Universal Brotherhood" is the condition for spiritual
unity. This "unity" or "Eden" is Albion, the universal man, the form to which
revolutionary activity should be directed. By praising Albion with the words
'To Whom be / Glory Evermore Amen" Blake situates the universal man in
the position of God. The "Living Creatures" referred to are the "zoas" or the
faculties of human experience. No individual can know the nature of these
creatures. The knowledge of that aspect must transcend individual perception.
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Therefore, the introduction of Albion provides an object of value and a form
towards which action should strive; Albion in this sense provides a form of
transcendence. But while this immortal structure of human existence cannot
be reduced to the understanding of any particular individual, Albion is the
transcendent form, not of a supra-human deity, but of the aggregate and
collective of human life in its unity or "Universal Brotherhood." Blake's Albion
transcends individual experience but he is still human while existing eternally.
Similarly, the knowledge and existence of the zoas lies at the level of eternity,
just as Blake's "mighty forms" exist in eternity. In Blake's earlier revolutionary
poetry he had sought to break down forms and limits to human experience, to
"open" societies which had been "closed" and limited by their subjection to
transcendent forms of God or reason. In his later work Blake is still
demanding the eradication of any transcendence which is external to humanity.
However, he is adopting traditionally transcendent concepts (such as "form"
and "eternity") and placing them within human though not individual,
experience. As Ronald Grimes has noted, Blake's concept of eternity is
neither atemporal nor transcendent: "For Blake, eternity is not sheer
chronological sequence without beginning or end, because he does not hesitate
to speak of the beginning or end of eternity. He can do so because he
identifies eternity with the world of imagination."12 As Blake started to etch
the first plates of Milton in 1804 - the year which Harper identified as the
beginning of a period of Platonism - this prophecy is perhaps the best place to
examine Blake's sense of renewed vision.
Throughout the eighteenth century Milton was frequently aligned with
classical thought, and in particular with Plato. In The Spectator Addison
explicitly linked Milton's God with Plato's deity. Commenting on Book Seven
of Paradise Lost he wrote: "The Golden compasses, in the above-mentioned
Passage appear a very natural Instrument in the hand of him, whom Plato
somewhere calls the Divine Geometrician."13 In The Laocoon Blake protested
against such a conception of God and saw it as thoroughly Platonic: "The
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Gods of Greece & Egypt were Mathematical Diagrams See Plato's Works"
(E:274; K:776). In The Tatler of June 1709 a letter regarding a man's love for
a woman who was a "Platonne" complained: 'To hear her talk Seraphicks, and
run over Norris and Moor, and Milton, and the whole set of intellectual Triflers,
torments me heartily."14 Here, Milton is aligned not only with Platonism but
with Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, and John Norris, one of More's
disciples. Much later in the eighteenth century Blake's friend William Hayley
wrote in his life of Milton:
[Milton] wisely attached himself to those prime examples of literary
perfection, the Greeks; among the poets he particularly delighted in
Euripedes and Homer; his favourites in prose seem to have been Plato
and Demosthenes; the first peculiarly fit to give richness, purity, and
lustre to the fancy; the second, to invigorate the understanding, and
inspire the fervid energy of public virtue.15
Hayley also referred to "Plato, a writer whom Milton passionately admired, and
to whom he bore, I think, in many points, a very striking resemblance."" Here,
also, Hayley describes Milton and Plato as "visionaries of public virtue."
Hayley also demonstrated Milton's Platonism from an early letter to Charles
Diodati in which Milton writes of his desire for immortality: "He shews himself,
in this letter, most passionately attached to the Platonic philosophy."17
According to Hayley, it was the doctrine of virtue which united Milton with
Plato: "he [Milton] panted for immortality, and for the superior rewards of a
laborious life, devoted to piety and virtue."18 Hayley dismisses Dr. Johnson's
criticisms of Milton's self-interest by asserting that Milton's concept of virtue
was truly Socratic: "no man appears to have imbibed the principes of Socratic
wisdom more deeply than our poet; his regard and attachment to them is
fervently expressed, even in his juvenile letters."19 According to Hayley,
Milton's sonnet to Cyriac Skinner "taught the familiar and useful doctrine of
the Attic philosopher" while Of Education was "the best proof that his ideas of
moral discipline were perfectly in union with those of Socrates."20
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It is not surprising, therefore, that after moving to Felpham in 1800
under Hayley's patronage Blake composed the preface to Milton where he
condemns Milton's debt to the classics:
The Stolen and Perverted Writings of Homer & Ovid: of Plato &
Cicero, which all Men ought to contemn: are set up by artifice against
the Sublime of the Bible, but when the New Age is at leisure to
Pronounce; all will be set right: & those Grand Works of the more
ancient & consciously & professedly Inspired Men, will hold their
proper rank, & the Daughters of Memory shall become the Daughters
of Inspiration. Shakspeare & Milton were both curbd by the general
malady & infection from the silly Greek & Latin slaves of the Sword.
Rouze up O Young Men of the New Age! set your foreheads against
the ignorant Hirelings! For we have Hirelings in the Camp, the Court,
& the University: who would if they could, for ever depress Mental &
prolong Corporeal War. . ..
(M,l[ij: E:95; K:480)
In this preface Blake recalls Milton's Reason of Church Government where the
earlier poet had similarly called for inspiration rather than memory. Here,
Blake uses Milton's Platonism as a weapon against itself. Just as Milton had
argued that no external law could be valid without being grounded in internal
reason, so Blake criticises Milton for following the "artifice" of Greek and Latin
philosophy. Whereas Milton had seen reason as the foundational faculty which
preceded all law, Blake sees Milton's reason as a legacy of the Platonic
tradition. Blake's primary faculty, on the other hand, is imagination: "We do
not want either Greek or Roman Models if we are but just & true to our
Imaginations, those Worlds of Eternity in which we shall live for ever; in Jesus
our Lord" (M, 1: E:95; K:480). In this preface Blake is not simply elevating
one body of texts (the Hebraic) over another (Greek and Latin); he is claiming
that the classical tradition is a collection of texts (or "artifice") whereas the
Bible is actually a model of the Imagination. Blake rejects the eighteenth-
century opinion that the tradition of sublimity ran from Homer to Virgil to
Milton.21 The Bible is sublime because it is inspired, whereas the classics are
secondary and parasitic upon the imagination. While Milton had already made
a similar point in Paradise Regain'd ("Greece from us these Arts deriv'd" PR. 4.
338) Blake's argument here accuses Milton of retaining too much of these
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"derivative" arts. Given that the narrative impetus of Milton is organised
around the earlier poet's renunciation of "selfhood" and that Blake invokes
Platonism in the preface it is clear that Blake connected Milton's individualism
with his Platonism.
As early as The Song of Los Blake had associated Platonism with
transcendent law: "Palamabron gave an abstract Law: / To Pythagoras
Socrates & Plato" (SL, 3: 18-19, E:67; K:246). In Milton Blake critici2£S
Swedenborg's Platonism because, in its emphasis upon transcendent good, it is
responsible for the division of believers into the elect and the damned and
hence denies the forgiveness of Christ: "Swedenborg . . . With Laws from Plato
& his Greeks ... to deny the value of the Saviours blood" (M, 22[24]: 50-54,
E: 117-18; K:506). The preface to Milton associates Platonic philosophy with
corporeal rather than intellectual war. This is because Platonic philosophy
provides an eternal and transcendent conception of the good (thus denying the
war of conceptual contraries) and uses this fixed conception to condemn others.
Blake therefore associates the Greek and Latin tradition with the ruling power
of both the State Church and the enlightenment:
Titus! Constantine! Charlemaine!
O Voltaire! Rousseau! Gibbon! Vain
Your Grecian Mocks & Roman Sword
Against this image of his Lord!
(J, 52: 21-24, E:202; K:683)
Against the accusatory self-righteousness of the Greek and Roman tradition
Blake would set "this image" of forgiveness in the divine vision. Looking back
on an age of violence (a violence which infiltrated his own early work) Blake
insisted that it was the legacy of ancient tradition which produced the wars
which dogged western civilisation. In On Homer's Poetry Blake refuses to see
barbarism as entering the stage in the dark ages; the rot had set in well before
that: "The Classics, it is the Classics! & not Goths nor Monks, that Desolate
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Europe with Wars" (E:270; K:778). In On Virgil Blake reiterates his
assessment of ancient Greece and Rome again seeing the classics as parasitic:
Rome & Greece swept Art into their maw & destroyed it a Warlike
State never can produce Art. It will Rob and Plunder & accumulate
into one place, & Translate & Copy & Buy & Sell & Criticise, but not
Make.
(E:270; K:778)
Blake's criticisms of the classical tradition are also concerned with the
concept of virtue. Hence, in The Laocoon Socrates is the saviour of the
counter-religion which is Greek ethics: "If Morality was Christianity Socrates
was the Saviour" (E:275; K:775). In his annotations to Bishop Watson Blake
set the forgiveness of Christianity against the morality of the ancients: "The
Gospel is Forgiveness of Sins & has No Moral Precepts these belong to Plato
& Seneca & Nero" (E:619; K:395). Because the Socratic tradition of ethics
stressed the self-sufficiency and transcendence of virtue Blake saw this
"morality" as an alienation of good from the immanence of the Christian
imagination. Consequently, he was highly critical of the concept of virtue.
"Christ came not to call the Virtuous," he declares again in his annotations to
Watson's Apology for the Bible (E:619; K:395). The Imagination, which is the
constituting faculty of human existence, is at odds with the Platonic concept of
virtue. Blake agrees with Milton in seeing virtue as intertwined with
transcendent reason and so rejects the rational ethics of Plato in favour of the
Imagination of the bible: "Christ addresses himself to the Man not to his
Reason Plato did not bring Life & Immortality to Light Jesus only did this"
(Annotations to Berkeley, E:664; K:774). Consequently, Blake's rejection of an
ethics based on virtue is carried out in the spirit of Socratic ethics which aimed
to provide internal reasons for the justification of goodness. Blake sees the
transcendent aspects of virtue as alienating and judgmental and hence as
warlike:
The Whole Bible is filld with Imaginations & Visions from End to End
& not with Moral virtues that is the baseness of Plato & the Greeks &
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all Warriors The Moral Virtues are continual Accusers of Sin &
promote Eternal Wars & Domineering over others
(Annotations to Berkeley, E:664; K:774)
Such attacks upon the concept of virtue are not the product of ethical
relativism although this is what the "openness" advocated by Blake's earlier
works might suggest. Like Milton, Blake would reject the Thrasymachan (and
modern/Machiavellian) claim that justice is the advantage of the powerful.
While exposing the way certain ethical terms have been used for political
purposes, Blake does recognise some value independent of the corrupted
moral discourse which has sustained oppressive societies. Hence the values of
pity, forgiveness and love become important in Blake's prophecies. Blake
targets the uniting feature of modern and Platonic metaphysics and ethics - its
individualism - and sees this feature as the precondition for the violent,
accusing, unforgiving and punishing nature of society. Blake's criticism of
individualism (both in modern ideology and traditional ethics and theology) is
clearly articulated in Milton - an epic which unites the themes of selfhood,
form, transcendence - and attempts to ground ethics on a non-individualist
basis.
In addition to Hayley's insistence on Milton's Platonism late
seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century responses to Milton frequently mentioned
the poet's sublimimity and set him alongside the ancient epic writers. This
alignment with the ancients elevated Milton into a realm of eternal truth while
many of the tributes to the poet pictured Milton in an other-worldy realm,
outside the vicissitudes of history and politics. A seventeenth-century poem
quoted in Todd's Life of Milton refers to the poet's heavenly knowledge set
over against the ephemerality of his present:
How couia'st thou hope to please this tinsel race!
Though blind, yet, with the penetrating eye
Of intellectual light, thou dost survey
The labyrinth perplex'd of Heaven's decrees22
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In addition to interpreting Milton's blindness as a sign of the other-worldy
nature of his prophetic vision commentators repeatedly saw Milton situated
above the world as the following tribute of 1689 demonstrates:
Tiresias like, he mounted up on high,
And scorn'd the filth of dull mortality;
Convers'd with gods, and grac'd their royal line,
All ecstasie, all ra^re, all divine!23
In 1694 Addison repeated the motif of the poet existing above the world in
eternity and added the image of Milton as a mighty figure in eternity:
But Milton next, with high and haughty stalks,
Unfetter'd in majestic numbers walks;
No vulgar heroe can his muse engage;
Nor earth's wide scene confine his hallow'd rage
See! see! he upward springs, and tow'ring high
Spurns the dull province of mortality24
Thus elevated, Milton's poetry concerned itself not with this world but with
supra-human truths. An early eighteenth century tribute insists upon Milton's
"immortality" and locates the poet among the angels:
Whose elevated, more than human voice
Is tun'd to Angels' ears, is tun'd too high
For any theme but immortality25
Later, Cowper also associated Milton with the angels: "Milton, whose genius
had angelic wings, / And fed on manna."26 Akenside set Milton apart from the
world as an opponent of sophistry and, typically, saw his poetry as celestial:
How Milton scorn'd the sophist vain,
Who durst approach his hallow'd strain
With unwash'd hands and life profane.27
Samuel Bishop's poem on genius saw Milton as typifying the eternal grandeur
of the intellect and, again, placed Milton above worldly finitude:
Genius! . . .
O'er Time it triumphs, winged with native force;
Nor Past, nor Future, circumscribe its course
Mark how it leads a MILTON's mental eye
Thro' the vast glories of primeval sky;28
Blake would have been aware of at least one poetical tribute to Milton which
expressed these themes of the poet's other-worldliness, his residence in eternity
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and the sacredness of his verse. Hayley's An Essay on Epic Poetry also
depicted Milton in eternity dwelling with angels:
Apart, and on a sacred hill retir'd
Beyond all mortal inspiration fir'd,
The mighty MILTON sits - an host around
Of list'ning Angels guard the holy ground;
Amaz'd they see a human form aspire
To grasp with daring hand a Seraph's lyre,
Inly irradiate with celestial beams,
Attempt those high, those soul-subduing themes29
It is not surprising, then, that when Blake comes to write his epic response to
Milton he brings the poet down from eternity and into Blake's own garden and
body. In doing so he challenges over a century of commentary which placed
Milton's poetry outside time and worldly locale. Not only does Milton enter
Blake's body but he enters his foot - the part of the body furthest from the
mind and closest to the earth:
But Milton entering my Foot; I saw in the nether
Regions of the Imagination; also all men on Earth,
And all in Heaven, saw in the nether regions of the Imagination
In Ulro beneath Beulah, the vast breach of Miltons descent.
But I knew not that it was Milton, for man cannot know
What passes in his members till periods of Space & Time
Reveal the secrets of Eternity: for more extensive
Than any other earthly things, are mans earthly lineaments
(M, 21[23]: 4-11, E:115; K:503)
This passage at once asserts the integral role of the body - Milton must
descend to an earthly body in order to achieve redemption - and the limits of
the body: "man cannot know / What passes in his members." But it is only the
individual body's perceptions which are confined; for there are eternal "earthly
lineaments" transcendent to particular bodies: "far more extensive / Than any
other earthly things, are mans earthly lineaments." Blake cannot know that
Milton has entered his body because his body is not a finite thing which can be
exhaustively known in a single perception. In this sense the body is
transcendent - insofar as it precedes and makes possible perception. But
unlike Milton's concept of transcendence (which was other-wordly) this
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transcendent body is human. The individual is incapable of perceiving the
body in its entirety but the body exists and can be known at the level of
eternity. For Blake, eternity is not supra-human but only supra-individual.
The eternal character of the "human form divine" is of central importance to
Blake's ethics. Hence, Blake's epic is performed against the backdrop of the
body of the sleeping Albion. Blake depicts "humanity" with the figure of an
eternal individual. In doing so, he offers a form of humanism; the subject
of his epic and its site is human being. Unlike Wordsworth's humanist epic
The Prelude, though, Blake's epic takes as its subject not the particular
individual poet and his mental life but an eternal man and the poet's role in
restoring that man. Albion is eternal not because he exists outside and
independent of human life but because he is a form of every individual. When
Blake introduces the human body into epic he does not give it a Platonic form
or make it transcendent in the traditional sense. Rather, Blake stresses that
actual human being and all natural life is already eternal and infinite. It is
Milton's embodiment not his existence in eternity which will awaken Albion:
Now Albions sleeping Humanity began to turn upon his Couch;
Feeling the electric flame of Miltons awful precipitate descent.
Seest thou the little winged fly, smaller than a grain of sand?
It has a heart like thee; a brain open to heaven & hell,
Withinside wondrous & expansive; its gates are not clos'd,
I hope thine are not: hence it clothes itself in rich array;
Hence thou art cloth'd with human beauty O thou mortal man.
Seek not thy heavenly father then beyond the skies:
There Chaos dwells & ancient Night . . .
(M, 20[22]: 25-33, E:114; K:502)
After Albion is roused by the descent of Milton, Blake reiterates the potential
for even the minutest aspects of creation to reveal heaven and hell. Similarly,
if the bodies "gates are not clos'd" it too will disclose eternity. The fallen or
vegetable body is the body of the empiricists: a body which can be perceived
and analysed as a material thing. Blake rejects this biological body which is
the province of Tirzah and natural religion:
To Natural Religion! to Tirzah the Daughter of Rahab the Holy!
She ties the knot of nervous fibres, into a white brain!
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She ties the knot of bloody veins, into a red hot heart!
(M, 19 [21]: 54-56, E:113; K:501)
Blake's body, on the other hand, is a form; it is inextricably intertwined with
the imagination. Blake stresses the embodiment of the imagination in order to
counter the Platonic/Miltonic tradition of the other-worldly character of genius
but he also stresses the imaginative character of the body in order to disavow
the physicalism of the empiricists. The vegetable body is finite and excluded
from eternity: "These are the Visions of Eternity . . . / But we see only as it
were the hem of their garments / When with our vegetable eyes we view these
wond'rous Visions" (M, 26[28]:10-12, E:123; K:512). Although Blake
emphasises the importance of eternity and the immortality of the imagination
the passage to Golgonooza can only be reached by the redemption of the
mortal body which can be neither mortified nor subordinated. The body of
natural science, the vegetable polypus, must be overcome in order to achieve
vision:
For Golgonooza cannot be seen till having passd the Polypus
It is viewed on all sides round by a Four-fold Vision
Or till you become Mortal and Vegetable in Sexuality
Then you behold its mighty Spires & Domes of ivory & gold
(M, 35 [39]: 22-25, E:135; K:525)
Consequently, within the same plate of Milton Blake speaks of both deliverance
from the body and the glory of the body. The first reference, to deliverance,
employs the neo-Platonic imagery of the descent of souls to the body through
the south and north gates:
The Souls descending to the Body, wail on the right hand
Of Los; & those deliverd from the Body, on the left hand
(M, 26[28]: 16-17, E:123; K:512)
But Blake goes on to state that these souls are "With neither lineament nor
form but like to watry clouds." However, after they are clothed, fed and
housed (given material and bodily needs) they become generated bodies with
"inward form:"
And every Generated Body in its inward form,
Is a garden of delight & a building of magnificence,
Built by the Sons of Los in Bowlahoola & Allamanda
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And the herbs & flowers & furniture & beds & chambers
Continually woven in the Looms of Enitharmons Daughters
In bright Cathedrons golden Dome with care & love & tears
(M, 26[28]: 35-39, E:123; K:512)
The inward form of the generated body is built by Los's sons; it is a product of
time and imagination. The dwelling of the body is provided by space -
Enitharmon's daughters - and human feeling ("care & love & tears"). Similarly,
the form which Milton creates for Urizen is an artistic sculptural form of clay,
a product of human invention; it therefore differs from the attempts of Los in
Blake's earlier work to give Urizen the body of natural science:
Silent they met, and silent strove among the streams, of Arnon
Even to Mahanaim, when with the cold hand Urizen stoop'd down
And took up water from the icy river Jordan: pouring on
To Milton's brain the icy fluid from his broad cold palm.
But Milton took of the red clay of Succoth, moulding it with care
Between his palms: and filling up the furrows of many years
Beginning at the feet of Urizen, and on the bones
Creating new flesh on the Demon cold, and building him,
As with new clay a Human form in the Valley of Beth Peor
M, 19[21]: 6-14, E:112; K:500)
Urizen's act of "baptism" uses formless water whereas Milton picks up
malleable clay. By pouring icy fluid on Milton's brain Urizen hopes to numb
Milton's own mental powers; reason therefore paralyses or freezes the
individual imagination. This episode of Milton provides an allegory for Blake's
response to his precursor poet. By giving Urizen a clay form, Milton is
embodying reason, giving it a Human form. He is also bringing Urizen into
present time: "filling up the furrows of many years." He is providing it with
limits and circumscribing it such that he can now walk around it: "as the
sculptor silent stands before / His forming image; he walks round it patient
labouring" (M, 20[22]: 8-9, E:114; K:502).
In his invocation to Milton Blake again adopts a discourse of the body,
Milton's invocation to Book Three of Paradise Lost summoned eternal and
primordial light to "Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers /
Irradiate" (PL.3.52-53). Blake calls to the Daughters of Beulah who are
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associated with "soft sexual delusions" and describes the physical course of
inspiration:
. . . Come into my hand
By your mild power; descending down the Nerves of my right arm
From out the Portals of my Brain, where by your ministry
The Eternal Great Humanity Divine. Planted his Paradise
(M, 2: 5-8, E:96; K:481)
Although Blake describes the bodily nature of this visitation he also describes a
"paradise within." At the same time that Blake is answering Milton's spiritual
invocation by including the body, he is also spiritualising the body with the
visitation of the "Eternal Great Humanity Divine." Once again, this reinforces
Blake's particular non-individualist humanism. Without the immanence of this
divine form Blake is still the self of nerves and brain and incapable of vision.
Later the poet laments:
O how can I with my gross tongue that cleaveth to the dust,
Tell of the Four-fold Man, in starry numbers fitly orderd
Or how can I with my cold hand of clay! But thou O Lord
Do with me as thou wilt! for I am nothing, and vanity.
(M, 20 [22]: 15-18, E:114; K:502)
It is only by participating in Eternal humanity that vision can be attained. By
endowing the body with the status of "form" it becomes a symbol of human
imagination and not an individual thing. Consequently both Milton's
other-worldly individualism and modern limited physical individualism preclude
access to four-fold vision. Milton's individualism directs itself towards a
spurious transcendent deity while modern individualism is enclosed within the
empirical limits of the self. Both selfhood and other-worldly transcendence are
the targets of Blake's criticisms in Milton.
In the "Bard's Song" of Milton Satan attempts to exchange his role of
labour with Palamabron. Los challenges Satan's request with the doctrine that
"Every Mans Wisdom is peculiar to his own Individuality" (M, 4: 8, E:98;
K:483). Satan's belief that individuals are interchangeable and have no
specific character is in accord with the modern ideology of the self as tabula
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rasa.30 Blake lamented the doctrine of equalitarianism in a letter to George
Cumberland in 1827:
I know too well that a great majority of Englishmen are fond of The
Indefinite which they Measure by Newtons Doctrine of the Fluxions of
an Atom. A Thing that does not Exist. . . . since the French Revolution
Englishmen are all Intermeasurable One by Another Certainly a happy
state of Agreement to which I for One do not Agree.
(Letter to George Cumberland, 12 April 1827, E:783; K:878)
"The "Bard's Song" forms a moral fable to contest this doctrine of
"intermeasurability." In replying to Satan Los asks: "Art thou not Newtons
Pantocrator weaving the Woof of Locke / To Mortals thy Mills seem every
thing & the Harrow of Shaddai / A scheme of Human conduct invisible &
incomprehensible" (M, 4 :11-14, E:98; K:483). Satan's "Mills seem every
thing" to mortals because being a son of Locke Satan presents the natural
world as a mechanism and denies any spirit beyond that mechanism.31 In
Paradise Lost Satan had typified all the qualities of modern individualism. In
Blake's earlier The Marriage of Heaven and Hell Milton's Satan was hailed as
the destroyer of the pre-modern individualism which was based on the division
between the soul and the body. In Milton, however Blake uses the figure of
Satan to conduct a criticism of modern individualism. Satan is now the
spectre of Ore, the alienated and darker double of fiery destruction and
unbounded energy. At the end of the first book of Milton Blake associates
Satan with opacity, the substance which is the lowest limit of human existence.
Satan is responsible for the fall of the vegetable body into sleep and so Blake
describes him using the discourse of empiricism32:
But in the Optic vegetative Nerves Sleep was transformed
To Death in old time by Satan the father of Sin & Death
And Satan is the Spectre of Ore & Ore is the generate Luvah
But in the Nerves of the Nostrils, Accident being formed
Into Substance & Principle, by the cruelties of Demonstration
It became Opake & Indefinite; but the Divine Saviour,
Formed it into a Solid by Los's Mathematic power.
He named the Opake Satan: he named the Solid Adam
(M, 29[31]: 32-39, E:127-28; K:517)
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Significantly, Adam is the solid formed by Christ and is therefore ready for
redemption. The opacity of Satan on the other hand suggests, not forming, but
the obstruction of vision. In Jerusalem Blake celebrates the overcoming of the
discourse of empiricism by "Divine Mercy": "And Length Bredth Highth again
Obey the Divine Vision Hallelujah" (J, 32 [36]: 56, E:179; K:664).M Milton's
Satan in Paradise Lost challenges God's divinity with the values of radical
individualism; Blake's Satan goes a step further and claims that he is God. But
the God Satan claims to be also asserts the doctrines of Miltonic individualism.
Just as Urizen had been an amalgam of Miltonic and Newtonian conceptions
of God in the Lambeth prophecies, so Satan becomes a hybrid form of
Miltonic theology and modern individualism. Satan defending himself before
the Assembly is a punishing tyrant deity; he asserts the concepts of both moral
law and the inviolability of the inner self:
For Satan flaming with Rintrahs fury hidden beneath his own mildness
Accus'd Palamabron before the Assembly of ingratitude! of malice:
He created Seven deadly Sins drawing out his infernal scroll,
Of Moral laws and cruel punishments upon the clouds of Jehovah
To pervert the Divine voice in its entrance to the earth
With thunder of war & trumpets sound, with armies of disease
Punishments & deaths musterd & number'd; Saying I am God alone
There is no other! let all obey my principles of moral individuality
I have brought them from the uppermost innermost recesses
Of my Eternal Mind, transgressors I will rend off for ever,
As now I rend this accursed Family from my covering.
Thus Satan rag'd amidst the Assembly! and his bosom grew
Opake against the Divine Vision: the paved terraces of
His bosom inwards shone with fires, but the stones becoming opake!
Hid from sight, in an extreme blackness and darkness,
And there a World of deeper Ulro was open'd, in the midst
Of the Asssembly. In Satans bosom a vast unfathomable Abyss.
(M, 9: 19-35, E:103; K:489-90)
This inward sphere of "moral individuality" ("uppermost innermost recesses") is
Satanic opacity, an obstacle to divine vision and a predisposition to
self-righteousness. Satan's claim to be God alone here is anathema to Blake
for whom deity was in all humans. Satan's assertion of unique divinity recalls
Milton's God. Blake implies, therefore, that Milton's God is not so far from
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Milton's Satan and that it is the tenets of individualism which unite them.
Consequently when Blake has Milton descend from eternity it is his Satanic
"selfhood" which must be acknowledged and annihilated:
And Milton said, I go to Eternal Death! The Nations still
Follow after the detestable Gods of Priam; in pomp
Of warlike selfhood, contradicting and blaspheming.
When will the Resurrection come; to deliver the sleeping body
From corruptibility: O when Lord Jesus wilt thou come?
Tarry no longer; for my soul dies at the gates of death.
I will arise and look forth for the morning of the grave.
I will go down to the sepulcher to see if morning breaks!
I will go down to self annihilation and eternal death,
Lest the Last Judgment come & find me unannihilate
And I be siez'd & giv'n into the hands of my own Selfhood
The Lamb of God is seen thro' mists & shadows, hov'ring
Over the sepulchers in clouds of Jehovah & winds of Elohim
A disk of blood, distant; & heav'ns & earth's roll dark between
What do I here before the Judgment? without my Emanation?
With the daughters of memory, & not with the daughters of
inspiration[?]
I in my selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil One!
(M, 14[15]:, 14-30, E:108; K:495-96)
The overcoming of selfhood is related to the destruction of state religion.
When Milton laments that despite his labours the nations still follow the
warlike "detestable gods" and then sees that he must give up his "selfhood" he
reveals the ways in which individualism has underpinned institutionalised
religion. While Milton had insisted on the distinction between the individual
Christian spirit and the state Church, Blake sees the two as part of a general
doctrine of law. Milton fears that he may be seized by his own selfhood; this is
because the selfhood is Satanic and accusatory. Like the state, the self
constructs abstract laws to enslave itself and others.
Against this doctrine of law Blake posits the recovery of the emanation
or alienated feminine portion of the self. In Milton, Milton's emanation is also
his three wives and daughters; the poet's retrieval of his emanation is therefore
also an act of unification with others. Whereas individualism concentrates on
the submission to law, Blake has Milton view the distant image of the lamb of
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God, a symbol of forgiveness. Throughout Milton Blake makes clear that
self-righteousness is the negation of Christ's spirit of forgiveness, "Asserting the
Self-righteousness against the Universal Saviour" (M, 22[24]: 42, E:117; K:506).
After Milton's acknowledgement of self-annihilation he takes up his
hermaphroditic shadow. This is Milton's divided form, the victim of his dualist
denial of the interaction of sexual difference: "Then on the verge of Beulah he
beheld his own Shadow; / A mournful form double; hermaphroditic: male &
female / In one wonderful body" (M, 14[15]: 36-38, E:108; K:496). Blake then
indicates that this becomes Milton's unified and immortal self: "for when he
enterd into his Shadow: Himself: / His real and immortal Self: was as appeard
to those / Who dwell in immortality" (M, 15[17]: 10-12, E:109; K:496). Milton
realises that he can only retrieve his emanation through the annihilation of
selfhood (M, 17[19]: 2-3, E:110; K:498). In keeping with his descent from
eternity the poet must also recognise his humanity: "also Milton knew; they and
/ Himself was Human" (M, 17[19]: 5-6, E:110; K:498). As Milton passes
through Beulah to Ulro he is still "in conflict with Female forms" (M, 17[19]: 7,
E:110; K:498) because he has still not given up selfhood and achieved unity
with his emanation. He is still directed towards moral law: "his body was the
Rock Sinai" (M, 17[19]: 14, E:110; K:498). When Milton eventually encounters
Satan, his spectre, in the Second Book he again associates him with law, state
religion and self-righteousness:
Satan! my Spectre! I know my power thee to annihilate
And be a greater in thy place, & be thy Tabernacle
A covering for thee to do thy will, till one greater comes
And smites me as I smote thee & becomes my covering.
Such are the Laws of thy false Heavns! but Laws of Eternity
Are not such: know thou: I come to Self Annihilation
Such are the Laws of Eternity that each shall mutually
Annihilate himself for others good, as I for thee[.]
Thy purpose & the purpose of thy Priests & of thy Churches
Is to impress on men the fear of death; to teach
Trembling & fear, terror, constriction; abject selfishnes
Mine is to teach Men to despise death & to go on
In fearless majesty annihilating Self, laughing to scorn
Thy Laws & terrors, shaking down thy Synagogues as webs
I come to discover before Heavn & Hell the Self righteousness
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In all its Hypocritic turpitude, opening to every eye
These wonders of Satans holiness shewing to the Earth
The Idol Virtues of the Natural Heart, & Satans Seat
Explore in all its Selfish Natural Virtue & put off
In Self annihilation all that is not of God alone:
To put off Self & all I have ever & ever Amen
(M, 38[43]: 29-49, E:139; K:529-30)
In thus uniting the spectre with law and idolatry Blake continues his analysis
(begun in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell) of the tendency for human beings
to create idols and enslave themselves to their own idols. In Milton, Blake
indicates that it is not just external gods who have been thus created but the
selfs spectre. The spectre is the lawful, reasoning part of the self set up as a
"tabernacle." Milton acknowledges that the spectre can make Milton become a
"covering cherub." If Milton tackles the spectre on the spectre's own aggressive
terms Milton himself will become the inverted "tabernacle" of the spectre. To
be a "greater" in the spectre's place is merely to continue the self-willing
individualism of domination which Milton must annihilate. Rather than
challenge the spectre in his terms of false law, Milton must annihilate law with
the truly eternal law of mutual recognition. Rather than antagonism with the
spectre "each shall mutually / Annihilate himself for others good." Milton then
attributes his earlier valorisation of transcendent reason and virtue to Satan;
virtue is criticised as "Idol Virtues" and "Selfish Natural Virtue." Virtue has,
like the deities in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, started as human creation
and become the selfs law. Blake is using "selfish" here in a strict sense; the
virtues are selfish because they ground an ethics immanent to the self rather
than "others good." And for Blake "good" has become, not the evil energy of
his early works, but the overcoming of selfhood through recognition of the
intersubjective "human form." Satan responds to Milton's desire to annihilate
selfhood by behaving like Milton's God; he asserts his will and invokes the
Miltonic image of justice:
Satan heard! Coming in a cloud, with trumpets & flaming fire
Saying I am God the judge of all, the living & the dead
Fall therefore down & worship me. submit thy supreme
Dictate, to my eternal Will & to my dictate bow
I hold the Balances of Right & Just .
(M, 38[43]: 50-54, E: 139-40; K:530)
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In Blake's earlier work Ore destroys the willful and accusing selfhood of
Urizen without affirming any other form of self. In fact, Blake's early work, in
general, denies the value of any concept of self. In Milton Blake makes the
distinction between the Satanic spectre selfhood which is fixed, individual and
rational and the spirit which is dynamic and imaginative. In Songs of Innocence
and of Experience Blake defines two contrary states of the soul, while showing
the inadequacy of either state. The spectre negates the fruitful interaction of
either state; it obstructs the imagination which is not a state but existence itself.
In Milton Blake lays less emphasis on the contrary states than on their site of
exchange - imagination - which can only be freed with the annihilation of the
spectre:
There is a Negation, & there is a Contrary
The Negation must be destroyd to redeem the Contraries
The Negation is the Spectre; the Reasoning Power in Man
This is a false Body: an Incrustation over my Immortal
Spirit; a Selfhood, which must be put off & annihilated alway
To cleanse the Face of my Spirit by Self-examination
(M, 40[46]: 32-37, E:142; K:533)
The "Immortal / Spirit" differs from the selfhood in that it is not individual.
The spirit which Blake proclaims in Milton is the spirit of humanity. In
opposition to the formlessness which ensues after Ore's destructive rages, the
spirit of humanity has a forming function. After Milton has turned his back on
the "Heavens builded on cruelty" the seven angels instruct him in the possibility
of a human form which is not Satan's individualism but is based on
"brotherhood." The angels themselves insist that they are not individuals but
supra-individual states:
We are not Individuals but States: Combinations of Individuals
We were Angels of the Divine Presence: & were Druids in Annandale
Compelld to combine into Form by Satan, the Spectre of Albion,
Who made himself a God &, destroyed the Human Form Divine.
But the Divine Humanity & Mercy gave us a Human Form
Because we were combind in Freedom & holy
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Brotherhood
(M, 32[35]: 10-16, E:131; K:521)
The angels go on to affirm the primacy of imagination. Not a state, the
imagination is the spirit of humanity which is eternal and is therefore set
against the alienated abstractions of reason and memory:
The Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself
Affection or Love becomes a State, when divided from Imagination
The Memory is a State always, & the Reason is a State
Created to be Annihilated & a new Ratio Created
Whatever can be Created can be Annihilated Forms cannot
The Oak is cut down by the Ax, the Lamb falls by the Knife
But their Forms Eternal Exist, For-ever. Amen Halle[l]ujah
(M, 32[35]: 32-36, E:132; K:522)
Although the use of "form" here sounds Platonic, because eternal, Blake
locates these eternal forms not in an other-worldly sphere but in the
imagination. When these forms are detached from the imagination or
interpreted Platonically they become states. The imagination is the
transcendent ground for all being, although because of imagination's human
character it is transcendent only to individuals. In Jerusalem the primordiality
of imagination is repeatedly stressed: "For All Things Exist in the Human
Imagination" (J, 69: 25, E:223; K:707). Satanic "inwardness" is regarded by
Blake as "opacity" because it obstructs divine vision and grounds
self-righteousness. However, another figure of the inward sphere is the
imagination, where what appears transcendent and eternal is made human.
This type of inwardness is human, not individual; it is not self-enclosed like the
Urizenic inwardness of the Lambeth prophecies. It expands to include heaven,
earth and humanity. Unlike Satanic opacity this inwardness is translucent:
What is Above is Within, for every-thing in Eternity is translucent:
The Circumference is Within: Without, is formed the Selfish Center
And the Circumference still expands going forward to Eternity.
And the Center has Eternal States! these States we now explore.
For all are Men in Eternity. Rivers Mountains Cities Villages,
All are Human & when you enter into their Bosoms you walk
In Heavens & Earths; as in your own Bosom you bear your Heaven
And Earth, and all you behold, tho it appears Without it is Within
In your Imagination of which this World of Mortality is but a Shadow.
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(J, 71: 6-19, E:225; K:709)
Not only is imagination the ground and condition of all existence; it is also
Christ or the lamb of God. At the beginning of Milton the "Divine Vision" is
identified with the "Living Form" of the "Human Imagination / Which is the
Divine Body of the Lord Jesus" (M, 3: 3-4, E:96; K:482). For Blake the
imagination is Jesus and the "Divine Humanity;" the figure of Christ unites
humanity with the eternal spirit of inspiration. Later in Milton the Bard
reiterates the identification between humanity, the imagination and divinity:
"According to the inspiration of the Poetic Genius / Who is the eternal
all-protecting Divine Humanity / To whom be Glory & Power & Dominion
Evermore Amen" (M, 14[15]: 1-3, E:108; K:495). The consequence of this
coupling of imagination with the divine humanity of Christ is that religion and
faith no longer manifest themselves in the worship of external deities but in the
active creation and exercise of the imagination. To Milton's static and rational
theology Blake opposes a dynamic and ethical aesthetics. In the 'To the
Christians" section of Jerusalem Blake declares that true religion entails the
flourishing of human creativity: "I know of no other Christianity and of no
other Gospel than the liberty both of body & mind to exercise the Divine Arts
of Imagination" (J, 77, E:231; K:716-17). The imagination is the eternal ground
against which all natural being is secondary: "Imagination the real & eternal
World of which this Vegetable Universe is but a faint shadow & in which we
shall live in our Eternal or Imaginative Bodies, when these Vegetable Mortal
Bodies are no more" (J, 77: E:231; K:717). Although the Imagination is
eternal it creates a temporal world. In Jerusalem Blake describes this
constitutive function of the imagination. The "Visionary forms dramatic" which
are human precede and condition all individual existence:
In new Expanses, creating exemplars of Memory and of Intellect
Creating Space, Creating Time according to the wonders Divine
Of Human Imagination, throughout all the Three Regions immense
Of Childhood, Manhood & Old Age[;] & the all tremendous
unfathomable Non Ens
Of Death was seen in regenerations terrific or complacent varying
According to the subject of discourse & every Word & Every Character
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Was Human according to the Expansion or Contraction, the
Translucence or
Opakeness of Nervous fibres such was the variation of Time & Space
Which vary according as the Organs of Perception vary & they walked
To & fro in Eternity as One Man reflecting each in each & clearly seen
And seeing according to fitnes & order. .. .
(J, 98: 30-40, E:258; K:746)
Like Kant, and only slightly later historically, Blake realised that is was absurd
to consider such profoundly human experiences as time and space as existing
independently of human life. For a thing to be temporal it had to be
experienced in succession by an experiencing being, through the regions of
past, present and future (or "Childhood, Manhood & Old Age"). The world
would be a Urizenic chaos if it were not for the forming and space-creating
faculty of the human imagination. In all this Blake, like Kant, can be
considered as a transcendental idealist. He sees experience as the condition for
the possibility of the world. However, this is not individual experience but
human experience in general. Where Blake differs from Kant, and he does so
significantly, is in the rejection of any noumenal world, prior to the
phenomenal world we create. Locke, a philosO pher whose work Blake knew,
also made a distinction between the phenomenal world and the actual world:
"We are then quite out of the way, when we think, that Things contain within
themselves the Qualities, that appear to us in them."34 The "unfathomable Non
Ens," as Blake refers to this noumenal or actual world, must be regenerated
into human meaning. Originally "Man anciently containd in his mighty limbs all
things in Heaven & Earth" (J, 27: E:171; K:649). The present fallen condition
is a consequence of forgetting that all being is originally human. Hence,
Jerusalem ends by reiterating the necessity for "humanising" all aspects of being.
All being is humanised, brought into the sphere of temporality and made
immanent to human life:
All Human Forms identified even Tree Metal Earth & Stone, all
Human Forms identified, living going forth & returning wearied
Into the Planetary lives of Years Months Days & Hours reposing
And then Awaking into his Bosom in the Life of Immortality.
(J, 99: 1-4, E:258; K:747)
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The imagination is not only the primary faculty; it is the primary ground
of existence itself; to speak of existence beyond the imagination is to invent
fictitious entities to which the imagination can become enslaved. The
traditional idea of God or the empiricist's concept of substance are such
entities. Where Blake's transcendental idealism also differs significantly from
that of Kant is over the issue of individualism and other persons. For Kant,
the self on its own can gain access to the structure and laws of transcendental
subjectivity; Kantian ethics is grounded on the possibility of the individual
realising his or her own individual duty to obey moral law. For Blake, on the
other hand, the individualism of moral virtue must be overcome by the
recognition of the importance of others. In order to gauge the significance of
Blake's rejection of individualism it is useful to consider his intersubjective
ethics in relation to the valorisation of solitude by Milton and the later
Romantics.
The importance of solitude in traditional ethics stems from the Platonic
reverence for contemplation which enables the apprehension of forms.
Milton's Christian individualism reinforces the necessity of solitude, for God's
transcendence is revealed only through the intense self-reflection of the
isolated and contemplative subject. In Comus the elder brother lectures on the
value of solitude for the self-sufficiency of virtue:
Vertue could see to do what vertue would
By her own radiant light, though Sun and Moon
Were in the flat Sea sunk. And Wisdoms self
Oft seeks to sweet retired Solitude,
Where with her best nurse Contemplation
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings
That in the various bussle of resort
Were all to-ruffl'd, and sometimes impair'd.
(COM. 372-379)
In Paradise Regained Milton describes Christ in contemplative solitude:
One day forth walkd forth alone, the Spirit leading
And his deep thoughts, the better to converse
With solitude, till farr from track of men,
Thought following thought, and step by step led on,
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(PR.1.189-192)
Christ's solitude is again referred to in Paradise Regain'd as he spends his forty
days in the desert.
And he still on was led, but with such thoughts
Accompanied of things past and to come
Lodg'd in his brest, as well might recommend
Such Solitude before choicest Society.
(PR.1.299-302)
Milton is not just emphasising that Christ is alone; he is asserting that the
powers of reflection are heightened and that the self is most inclined to direct
itself towards spiritual thought when removed from society. Adam and Eve are
described as existing in "blissful solitude" in Eden (PL.3.69). In the invocation
to Book Seven of Paradise Lost Milton proclaims that contemplative solitude is
only solitude from other persons; such solitude enables the company of the
holy muse: "And solitude; yet not alone, while thou / Visitst my slumbers
Nightly" (PL.7.28-29).
Wordsworth continued the Miltonic regard for solitude, particularly in
The Prelude, where solitude is frequently seen as a precondition for poetic
inspiration. In Book Seven Wordsworth finds persons in the city "Each fondly
reared on his own pedestal;" such atomised anonymity leads to "the strife of
singularity" (P.7.577). Whereas the city is the occasion for the captivation of
the self within its own prison, the solitary's turn to Nature, for Wordsworth, is a
renovating turn away from others. When the poet begins The Prelude he
departs from London where he has been "captive" in "a house of bondage."
The public self is, in this sense "unnatural" insofar as the self, subjugated to the
uncreative routine of "many a weary day", becomes its own "burden:"
That burthen of my own unnatural self,
The heavy weight of many a weary day
Not mine, and such as were not made for me.35
(P.l.21-23)
The poet fears that absorption in the quotidian world precludes reflection and
displaces individuals from their actual selfhood. This actual selfhood is
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ethically distinguished from the mundane social self: "When from our better
selves we have too long / Been parted by the hurrying world" (P.4.354-55).
More importantly for Wordsworth, it is the paradoxical nature of the social self
that physical proximity is coupled with spiritual isolation:
Above all, one thought
Baffled my understanding: how men lived
Even next-door neighbours, as we say, yet still
Strangers, not knowing each the other's name. (P.7.115)
The city promulgates the privation of identity and an atrophy of sensibility. In
London, the "monstrous ant-hill on the plain / Of a too busy world," humanity
is reified as an "endless stream of men and moving things!" (P.7.149-51) - men
and things seeming little different from each other (and by continguity
associated with the ants of an ant-hill). For the reflecting poet this later, in
solitude, becomes a scene "With wonder heightened" but what he actually
describes is a "deafening din" with no identity: "Face after face; the string of
dazzling wares, / Shop after shop" (P.7.153-58). It is the "deafening din" and
the absence of nature which impoverishes the urban self and fails to satisfy the
aesthetic and ethical conditions which are the necessary requirements for true
and moral selfhood:
Love cannot be; nor does it thrive with ease
Among the close and overcrowded haunts
Of cities, where the human heart is sick,
And the eye feeds it not, and cannot feed.
(P. 13.202-05)
The city trivialises and reduces the existence of individuals to a meaningless
throng. It is the atomisation of the self in city life which leads to a loss of true
identity. In the plethora of meaningless differences the self becomes subjected
to the weight of labour and is alienated from any identity which could be
achieved in the "ennobling Harmony" of nature. The city's "sons" become
. ..reduced
To one identity, by differences
That have no law, no meaning, and no end -
Oppression, under which even the highest minds
Must labour, whence the strongest are not free. (P.7.726-30)
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When the poet retreats from the city, the solitude achieved becomes the
condition for an encounter with transcendence: "In solitude, such intercourse
was mine" (P. 1.422). For Wordsworth, solitude is never an absolute value; if it
results in a sense of detachment the poet is wary: "And I was taught to feel,
perhaps too much / The self-sufficing power of Solitude" (P.2.77). But when
the poet departs from Cambridge to pace the fields, the state of solitude acts
as a catalyst for self-reflection. The mind returns to itself in order to emerge
from the captivation of the busy throng of college life, "the injurious sway of
place / Or circumstance" (P.3.102-03). However, rather than finding the self in
its individual particularity the reflecting mind sees not itself but "A higher
language" (P.3.100). Cambridge becomes for the young poet a realm of
meaningless particularity - "place and circumstance" - while the outlying fields
become the site for self-reflection which leads to a communion with the world.
The surrounds take on a mythological meaning which transcends the life of the
individual poet. The "earth and sky" become semantically laden with the
"trace" of that which precedes the poet. It is the historical transcendence
which he encounters in solitude which draws him out of himself:
As if awakened, summoned roused, constrained,
I looked for universal things; perused
The common countenance of earth and sky:
Earth, nowhere unembellished by some trace
Of that first Paradise whence man was driven.
(P.3.105-09)
Solitude is the occasion for revealing the "community with highest truth"
(P.3.123) and is therefore both the ascendance and surpassing of the self. The
self is both realised in "independent solaces" (P.3.101) and united with the
transcendence which links the self to eternity, the thoughts themselves
becoming "visitings":
Or turning the mind in upon herself,
Pored, watched, expected, listened, spread my thoughts
And spread them with a wider creeping; felt
Incumbencies more awful, visitings
Of the Upholder of the tranquil soul,
(P.3.113-17)
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In Europe, when Enitharmon awakes from her dream (which is the
eighteen hundred years of history between Christ and Blake's birth), she
declares that "the night of holy shadows / And human solitude is past!" (E, 13:
18-19, E:65; K:243). This, and Blake's continued emphasis on mutual
recognition and the importance of others is evidence of Blake's profound
disagreement with the individualist ethics of "solitude." In Milton Blake refers
to Jerusalem as a "building of human souls" (M, 6: 19, E:100; K:485). The
significance of this figure lies in Blake's rejection of the Miltonic (and later
Romantic) belief in the power of the solitary self to gain personal salvation.
Jerusalem, the agent of redemption is not an individual but an aggregate of
souls, a symbol of intersubjectivity. Satan, on the other hand, is a very
different type of building, a non-human construction: "I also stood in Satans
bosom & beheld its desolations! / A ruind Man: a ruind building of God not
made with hands" (M, 38[43]: 15-16, E:139; K:529). Although the doctrine of
forgiveness and the importance of others is amplified in Jerusalem, The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell had already declared that "The most sublime act
is to set another before you" (MHH, 7: 17, E:36; K:151). The seven angels in
Milton affirm the possibility of being "combind in Freedom & holy /
Brotherhood" (M, 32[35]: 15-16, E.T31; K:521). It is in Jerusalem, however,
that Blake defines the communal or intersubjective character of all experience.
Again using the figure of the building Blake refers to Babylon as a building of
human suffering. While Wordsworth sees the city itself as the site for human
destruction and alienation Blake insists that we have simply built the wrong
sort of city. The city of Babylon is constructed upon moral law:
0 Human Imagination O Divine Body I have Crucified
1 have turned my back upon thee into the Wastes of Moral Law:
There Babylon is builded in the Waste, founded in Human desolation.
But Albion is cast forth to the Potter his Children to the Builders
To build Babylon because they have forsaken Jerusalem
The Walls of Babylon are Souls of Men: her Gates the Groans
Of Nations: her Towers are the Miseries of once happy Families.
(J, 24: 23-32, E:169; K:647)
231
Jerusalem, on the other hand, is a city built, not on moral law, but on
the mutual recognition of other persons, on intersubjectivity: "Mutual each
within others bosom in Visions of Regeneration; / Jerusalem coverd the
Atlantic Mountains & the Erythrean" (J, 24: 45-46, E:170; K:648). Insofar as
Jerusalem emphasises the need to rehumanise being, Blake can be considered a
humanist. The Christian aspect of Blake's work, however, adds a further
dimension. Although Blake is unwilling to accept an external and non-human
deity the Christian strain in his work imparts a quality of transcendence. While
all nature is dependent upon human experience, human experience itself is
grounded upon the "Eternal Vision." This transcendence is figured by Blake
with images such as imagination, eternity, Albion and Christ. But this ground
of humanity is actually humanity in its collectivity which then produces a divine
form greater than itself. When Christ is described in Jerusalem he is seen as
encompassing humanity:
Displaying the Eternal Vision! the Divine Similitude!
In loves and tears of brothers, sisters, sons, fathers, and friends
Which if Man ceases to behold, he ceases to exist:
(J, 34[38], 11-13, E:180; K:664)
The only true form, then, in the Platonic sense is the form of humanity; for this
only can be transcendent: "the Divine / Humanity, who is the Only General and
Universal Form" (J, 38[43]: 19-20, E:185; K:672). In Milton's hierarchical
cosmos all human endeavour directed itself towards the transcendence of God
and divine law. Blake rejects any attention towards an external God or divine
law seeing this as an abnegation of human agency. Hence Los, in Jerusalem,
demands that the zoas or "howling victims of Law" renounce their calls to God
and take up the human form:
Then Los grew furious raging: Why stand we here trembling around
Calling on God for help; and not ourselves in whom God dwells
Stretching a hand to save the falling Man: are we not Four
Beholding Albion upon the Precipice ready to fall into Non-Entity:
Seeing these Heavens & Hells conglobing in the Void. Heavens over
Hells
Brooding in holy hypocritic lust, drinking the cries of pain
From howling victims of Law: building Heavens Twenty-seven-fold.
Swelld & bloated General Forms, repugnant to the Divine-
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Humanity, who is the Only General and Universal Form
To which all Lineaments tend & seek with love & sympathy
All broad & general principles belong to benevolence
Who protects minute particulars, every one in their own identity.
(J, 38[43]:12-23, E:184-85; K:672)
This retrieval of transcendent humanity is enabled by "benevolence."
Furthermore, unlike the modern philosophers for whom the rejection of
transcendence produced an equalitarian world, a sphere of undifferentiated
matter or substance, Los asserts that the renewal of the human form will
reinforce individual identity: "Who protects minute particulars, every one in
their own identity." Consequently, Blake's references to God, the traditional
form of transcendence, reinforce the sense that God arises from relations
between persons. Los proclaims that the lamb of God is born with forgiveness:
""O point of mutual forgiveness between Enemies! / Birthplace of the Lamb of
God incomprehensible!" (J, 7: 66-67, E.T50; K:626). The idea of an external
God is concomitant with the concept of external and punishing law; once God
is internalised then "the Worship of God, is honouring his gifts in other men."
Such a doctrine has for Blake the added advantage of challenging Locke's
tabula rasa. If all human beings harbour a God within, then they are not the
mere recipients of sense data but creative and divine beings of genius. Blake
rejects any conception of the isolated individual because he sees personal
identity as grounded on the form of humanity. Nevertheless, the divinity of
human life heightens individual identity. Not only does Los declare that "the
Worship of God, is honouring his gifts / In other men: & loving the greatest
men best, each according / To his Genius: which is the Holy Ghost in Man" (J,
91: 7-9, E:251; K:738); he also describes Christ as an aggregate of individuals:
"But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars: & every / Particular is a
Man; a Divine member of the Divine Jesus" (J, 91: 29-30, E:251; K:738).
Blake's eternal man, his image of the human form, has a uniting function which
is also redemptive: "for the Eternal Man / Walketh among us, calling us his
Brothers & his Friends: / Forbidding us that Veil which Satan puts between
Eve & Adam" (J, 55: 9-11, E:204; K:686).
233
Blake therefore rejects Milton's concept of a transcendent God which
precedes and informs all human life and grants individual essences to entities;
at the same time he refuses the modern levelling of the world into uniform
matter. He decentres the neo-Platonic/Miltonic universe by placing God not at
the zenith of a chain of being but within each human life. Ethics is a matter of
"setting another before you"; there is no central transcendence to which all
human attention should be directed. Consequently Blake frequently employs
images of centres opening towards vision: "Wonder siezd all in Eternity! to
behold the Divine Vision, open / The Center into an Expanse, & the Center
rolled out into an Expanse" (J, 57: 17-18, E:207; K:689). Eno's ameliatory
function in The Four Zoas involves opening out centres to reveal eternity: "She
also took an atom of space & opend its center / Into Infinitude" (FZ.l. p.9: 12,
E:305; K:270). In Milton the fall of the zoas is depicted as a fall into the
centre: "All fell towards the Center sinking downward in dire Ruin" (M, 34[38j:
39, E:134; K:524). But the rejection of transcendence, while decentring, does
not for Blake mean an "economic" or systematised ontology. Each entity has
its own particular identity, not because it is bestowed by God, but because the
world is human, and hence formed and created in minute particularity: "every
Class is determinate / But not by Natural but by Spiritual power alone" (M,
26[28]: 39-40, E:124; K:512).
Blake recognised the economic temperament of his day and inveighed
against it, recognising its denial of individual quality:
Commerce Cannot endure Individual Merit its insatiable Maw must be
fed by What all can do Equally well at least it is so in England as I have
found to my Cost these Forty Years
Commerce is so far from being beneficial to Arts or to Empire
that it is destructive of both as all their History shews for the above
Reason of Individual Merit being its Great hatred.
(PA, p.57, E:573-74; K:593-94)
In The Four Zoas the fallen universe is described as a world where market
value triumphs: "The Horse is of more value than the Man" (FZ, p.15, 1,
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E:309; K:275). Blake on the other hand constantly insists on the intrinsic
character of entities. This is because his conception of nature is grounded upon
the imagination. Blake, unlike "Bacon, Newton & Locke," relies upon a notion
of eternal imagination which endows each entity with its particular essence. In
the Satanic world "every thing is fixd Opake without Internal light" (M, 10[11]:
20, E:104; K:491). Because Satan, as a competitive modern individual, sees his
own identity as excluding the will of others and because he assumes the form
of a law-giving deity "making to himself Laws from his own identity" his world
loses character; it becomes the chaos over which he must rule tyrannically (M,
11[12], 10, E:104; K:491). The fall of the Eternal Man in The Four Zoas is
accordingly described as a loss of definition: "The Mans exteriors are become
indefinite" (FZ.l. p.22: 40; K:279). In "Night the Second" Albion gives up his
power to Urizen, "the great Work master" (recalling Milton's great
Work-Maister [PL.3.696]) whose fallen universe is an abyss of "Non Existence,"
"Voidness" and "indefinite space" (FZ.2. p.24: 1-5, E:314; K:280). Once power
has been handed to the centred Nobodaddy or reasoning God, form is lost and
chaos ensues. In an unfallen world, however, authority is decentred and "Every
thing in Eternity shines by its own Internal light" (M, 10 [11]: 16, E:104; K:491).
Blake repeats this idea in Jerusalem:
In Great Eternity, every particular Form gives forth or Emanates
Its own peculiar Light, & the Form is the Divine Vision
And the Light is his Garment This is Jerusalem in every Man
(J, 54: 1-3, E:203; K:684)
Jerusalem or the Divine Vision (or whatever term Blake uses for
transcendence) is what determines form and identity; without the divine vision,
or the spiritual power which individuates, the world is alien and limited.
Although there is an anti-idealist strain in The Marriage of Heaven and
Hell revealed in Blake's rejection of the conventional conceptions of soul,
reason and heaven, at this early stage Blake still imagines an apocalyptic
overcoming of the natural world where "the whole creation will be consumed."
But Blake makes it clear that such a transformation involves altering vision
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through a retrieval of the body and not rejecting the natural world itself: "the
whole creation will be consumed, and appear infinite, and holy whereas it now
appears finite & corrupt" (MHH, 14: E:39; K:154). The corrupt vegetable
world is a consequence of limited vision. In The Song of Los, Blake attributes
the Lockean ontology to the limiting of vision:
And all the vast of Nature shrunk
Before their shrunken eyes.
Thus the terrible race of Los & Enitharmon gave
Laws & Religions to the sons of Har binding them more
And more to Earth: closing and restraining:
Till a philosophy of Five Senses was complete
Urizen wept & gave it into the hands of Newton & Locke
(SL, 4: 11-17, E:68; K:246)
The images used to describe this alien natural world in Blake's later work - the
mundane shell, the concave earth - describe the closed and finite character of
nature. In The Four Zoas Blake refers to the fallen world as a "Circle of
Destiny;" recalling Milton's "self-balanced" world in Paradise Lost:
But on the tenth trembling morn the Circle of Destiny Complete
Round rolld the Sea Englobing in a watry Globe self balancd
(FZ.l. p.5: 24-25, E:302; K:266)
When nature is such an independent entity it becomes an "indefinite space;" it
is non-human and lifeless. Blake's image for this self-sufficient and
free-standing nature is the mundane shell:
The Mundane Shell, is a vast Concave Earth: an immense
Hardend shadow of all things upon our Vegetated Earth
Enlarg'd into dimension & deform'd into indefinite space,
In Twenty-seven Heavens and all their Hells; with Chaos
And Ancient Night; & Purgatory. It is a cavernous Earth
Of labyrinthine intricacy, twenty-seven folds of opakeness
(M, 17[19]: 21-26, E:110-ll; K:498)
When nature is seen imaginatively and when it is recognised that "every
Natural Effect has a Spiritual Cause" (M, 26[28]: 43, E:124; K:513) nature has
a redemptive function. The epistemological doubt which characterised the
seventeenth century is based on the premise of an independent and alien
world.36 I can only question my senses and their ability to know the world if I
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have already posited an independently existing world. This problem of doubt
has no relevance for Blake who identifies the phenomenal world with the world
per se:
I assert for My self that I do not behold the Outward Creation & that to
me it is hindrance & not Action it is As the Dirt upon my feet No part
of Me. What it will be Questiond When the Sun rises do you not see a
round Disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea O no no I see an
Innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying Holy Holy Holy is
the Lord God Almighty I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye
any more than I would question a Window concerning a Sight I look
thro it & not with it.
(VLJ, p.95, E:565-66; K:617)
In seeing the world through the physical eye Blake can redeem natural
imagery: the Sun becomes a host of angels. Consequently, despite his rejection
of nature's "cruel holiness" there is a pastoral element in Blake's work; this
reveals itself in the Songs of Innocence and the eventual renovation of Vala as
well as the lark and the thyme as symbols of Milton's redemption in Milton.
In Milton, Milton's moulding of Urizen in clay renews and subordinates
the faculty of reason to the imagination. Indeed, the epic in general is
concerned with overcoming alienated transcendence. Milton descends from
eternity, becomes embodied, encounters Urizen and in doing so enables a
retrieval of his female emanation. In The Four Zoas these themes are also
present but Vala, as a symbol of nature, provides a figure for the possible
renewal of the alienated physical world. In "Night the Fifth" Vala is described
as "the lovely form / That drew the body of Man from heaven into this dark
Abyss" (FZ.5. p. 59: 1-2, E:340; K:306). She is the alluring quality of nature
which can lead to a forgetting of the spiritual character of human existence.
While the introduction to Milton is concerned with overcoming Platonism, the
characters in The Four Zoas desperately fight against the naturalisation of the
self and the discourse of empiricism. After Albion has handed over power to
Urizen a world is built with "golden compasses, the quadrant & the rule &
balance" (FZ.2. p.24: 12, E:314; K:281). In response to Enion's jealousy of
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Tharmas's display of pity towards Jerusalem, Tharmas laments Enion's
dissection of his soul:
Why wilt thou Examine every little fibre of my soul
Spreading them out before the Sun like Stalks of flax to dry
The infant joy is beautiful but its anatomy
Horrible Ghast & Deadly nought shalt thou find in it
But Death Despair & Everlasting brooding Melancholy
Thou wilt go mad with horror if thou dost Examine thus
Every moment of my secret hours . . .
(FZ.l. p.4: 29-35, E:302; K:265)
Tharmas imagines Enion as a natural being: "Sometimes I think thou art a
flower expanding / Sometimes I think thou art fruit breaking from its bud"
(FZ.l. p.4: 41-42, E:302; K:265). He sees himself, however, as a scientific
entity: "I am like an atom / A Nothing left in darkness yet I am an identity"
(FZ.l. p.4: 43-44, E:302; K:265). The division between Tharmas and Enion
symbolises the division between man/science and woman/nature. Natural
feminine being separated from masculinity and viewed as independent becomes
Vala the cruel nature goddess. As soon as Enion has separated from Tharmas
she builds a tabernacle for Jerusalem while Tharmas encloses the world in a
"circle of destiny" - an enclosed and determined universe.
Vala is the emanation of Luvah/Orc and despite the fact that Blake no
longer believes in the redemptive power of Ore alone there is still the necessity
to temper the reign of reason/Urizen with the natural instincts or passions.
Although Vala in The Four Zoas represents a frightening and alien form of
nature, Blake still accords her a place in the original unity from which the
eternal man fell. Enitharmon narrates the "Song of Vala" in which she
describes how "Luvah and Vala woke & flew up from the Human Heart / Into
the Brain" (FZ.l. p.10: 11-12, E:305; K:271). Like nature, Vala herself is part
of the total unity of existence; it is only when elevated above the imagination
that she can become enslaving. Despite the reunion and wedding of Los and
Enitharmon the two are still hostile to each other, sitting "in discontent &
scorn" at their own wedding feast (FZ.l. p.16: 18, E:310; K:276). Part of the
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reason for their continued antagonism is indicated by the isolation of Luvah &
Vala: "But Luvah & Vala standing in the bloody sky / On high remaind alone
forsaken in fierce jealousy / They stood above the heavens forsaken desolate
suspended in blood / Descend they could not" (FZ.l. p.13, 4-7, E:308; K:274).
Without the integration of the natural or passionate level of human existence
no harmony is possible. Consequently, after depicting the forsaken Luvah and
Vala, Blake describes the shift in the world from a pastoral lanndscape to a
barren Newtonian void:
But purple night and crimson morning & golden day descending
Thro' the clear changing atmosphere display'd green fields among
The varying clouds, like paradises stretch'd in the expanse
With towns & villages and temples, tents sheep-folds and pastures
Where dwell the children of the elemental worlds in harmony.
Not long in harmony they dwell, their life is Drawn away
And wintry woes succeed; successive driven into the Void
(FZ.l. p.13: 11-17, E:308; K:274)
In "Night the Second" Blake describes the "Children of Man" refusing
vision and insisting on an economically conceived and mechanistic universe: "let
us buy & sell / Others arose & schools Erected forming Instruments / To
measure out the course of heaven" (FZ.2. p.28: 19-21, E:318; K:283).
Accordingly, the world of Urizen is formed mathematically and Luvah (or
passion) is expelled from the human form: "For measurd out in orderd spaces
the Sons of Urizen / With compasses divide the deep; they the strong scales
erect / That Luvah rent from the faint Heart of the Fallen Man / And weigh
the massy Cubes" (FZ.l pp.28-29: 31-32 & 1-2, E:318-19; K:283). Blake's
descriptions of Urizen's great building adopt the discourse of geometry which
atomises the world into a uniform aggregate of discrete entities: "Quadrangular
the building rose the heavens squared by a line. / Trigon & cubes divide the
elements in finite bonds" (FZ.2. p.30: 10-11, E:319; K:284). Blake then
describes the order of Urizen's universe again using the discourse of geometry;
not only Urizen's building but the movements of his sons and daughters have
become enslaved to "mathematic motion wondrous:"
239
Others triangular right angled course maintain, others obtuse
Acute Scalene, in simple paths, but others move
In intricate ways biquadrate. Trapeziums Rhombs Rhomboids
Parallelograms, triple & quadruple, polygonic
In their amazing vast subdued course in the vast deep
(FZ.2. p.33, 32-36, E:322; K:287)
The descriptions of Urizen's building draw attention to the process of labour
and the ways in which labour also reduces the individual's particularity into an
undifferentiated multitude: "Multitudes without number work incessant" (FZ.2.
p.30: 12, E:319; K:284). But despite the oppressive mathematical nature of
Urizen's architecture Blake insists on the building's beauty; for even in the
most perverted acts of creativity lies the possibility of redemption. At the same
time that the closure of Urizen's work is depicted its beauty and potential for
letting in light are also revealed:
But infinitely beautiful the wondrous work arose
In sorrow & care, a Golden World whose porches round the heavens
And pillard halls & rooms recievd the eternal wandering stars
A wondrous golden Building; many a window many a door
And many a division let in & out into the vast unknown
[Cubed] in [window square] immoveable, within its walls & cielings37
The heavens were closd and spirits mournd their bondage night and day
And the Divine Vision appeard in Luvahs robes of blood
(FZ.2. p.32: 7-14, E:321; K:286)
In Blake's earlier work Los's creation of a body for Urizen continually failed
because it was the body of natural science. In The Four Zoas Blake sees that
even the discourses of the sciences are still creative; we have only forgotten
their basis in the imagination and interpreted them as objective. In Milton
Blake includes science as one of the four eternal arts. In the fallen world the
arts other than science have been excluded; consequently science's portion of
existence has come to seem all:
But in Eternity the Four Arts: Poetry, Painting, Music,
And Architecture which is Science: are the Four Faces of Man.
Not so in Time & Space: there Three are shut out, and only
Science remains thro Mercy: & by means of Science, the Three
Become apparent in Time & Space, in the Three Professions
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Poetry in Religion: Music, Law: Painting, in Physic & Surgery:
That Man may live upon Earth till the time of his awaking,
And from these Three, Science derives every Occupation of Men.
(M, 27[29]: 55-62, E:125; K:514)
Consequently, Christ allows Urizen's scientific constructions. Total formlessness
- the formlessness a destruction of Urizen by Ore would create - would mean
annihilation: "For the Divine Lamb Even Jesus who is the Divine Vision /
Permitted all lest Man should fall into Eternal Death" (FZ. 2. p.33, 11-12,
E:321; K:287). In The Four Zoas it is the loss of limit and definition which
constitutes the fall. Los admits to Tharmas that "We have drunk up the
Eternal Man by our unbounded power" (FZ.4. p.48, 13, E:332; K:298).
Urizen's architecture is oppressive; the discourse of science binds man to the
earth but were it not for these basic and crude gestures towards form, human
existence would be cast into chaos. Urizen's fixed stars, the image of his closed
universe, are thus a mixed blessing: "Thus were the stars of heaven created like
a golden chain / To bind the Body of Man to heaven from falling into the
Abyss / Each took his station, & his course began with sorrow & care" (FZ.2.
p.33: 16-18, E:322; K:287). The reforming of Urizen in The Four Zoas is
therefore also coupled with the embrace of Urizen and his reincorporation into
the eternal man. Urizen is neither cast out nor destroyed; the image of
forgiveness as the condition for redemption is exemplified in the embrace and
retrieval of Urizen in "Night the Seventh:"
Startled was Los he found his Enemy Urizen now
In his hands, he wonderd that he felt love & not hate
His whole soul loved him he beheld him an infant
Lovely breathd from Enitharmon he trembled within himself
(FZ.7. p.98: 64-67, E:371; K:332)
Earlier in The Four Zoas, as Los once again attempts to give a body to Urizen,
repeating the image begun in The Book of Urizen, Blake adds a dimension to
explain Los's initial failure. As Los forms Urizen, Enitharmon is still separate.
Los's labours are the product of a vengeful and alienated masculinity in which
both Enitharmon and Urizen are solidified by iron. Los's self-division is
emphasised both by Enitharmon's cries and the presence of his spectre; his
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labour cannot therefore be redemptive for he has yet to redeem himself
through the embrace of Enitharmon and Urizen:
The lovely female howld & Urizen beneath deep groand
Deadly between the hammers beating grateful to the Ears
Of Los. absorbd in dire revenge he drank with joy the cries
Of Enitharmon & the groans of Urizen fuel for his wrath
And for his pity secret feeding on thoughts of cruelty
The Spectre wept at his dire labours when from Ladles huge
He pourd the molten iron round the limbs of Enitharmon
But when he pourd it round the bones of Urizen he laughd
(FZ.4. p.53: 10-17, E:335-36; K:302)
The fall of the eternal man is recounted by Ahania to Urizen where the
emergence of the spectre is followed by Albion turning "his back on Vala"
(FZ.3. p.41: 4, E:327; K:293). Los's attempts to reform Urizen indicate the
importance of reintegrating the faculty of reason to its correct place in the
human form. Similarly, the rejection and subsequent elevation of Vala also
contributes to the fall of Albion. After the eternal man has turned from Vala
both she and Luvah are displaced and fall into an alienated form of Nature.
The heart, the realm of the passions which should be a paradise, becomes a
serpent-form:
. . . Luvah & Vala
Went down the Human Heart where Paradise & its joys abounded
In jealous fears in fury & rage, & flames roll'd round their fervid feet
And the vast form of Nature like a Serpent play'd before them
And as they went in folding fires & thunders of the deep
Vala shrunk in like the dark sea that leaves its slimy banks
And from her bosom Luvah fell far as the east & west
And the vast form of Nature like a Serpent roll'd between.
(FZ.3. p.42:10-17, E:328; K:294)
Nature also has a renewing function in The Four Zoas but this is only when
nature is seen imaginatively. Tharmas, cursing Urizen and Luvah, calls his
sons to rebuild his universe and demands that corrupted human forms be
created from a nature reduced to its elements:
Weave soft delusive forms of Man above my watry world
Renew these ruind souls of Men thro Earth Sea Air & Fire
To waste in endless corruption, renew thou I will destroy
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(FZ.4. p.48, 6-8, E:332; K:298)
But Tharmas's declaration that he is God and that the universe is his only
causes him despair. Rather than reducing nature to his will he yearns for
humanity and a benovolent pastoral: "Is this to be A God far rather would I be
a Man / To know sweet Science & to do with simple companions / Sitting
beneath a tent & viewing sheepfolds & soft pasture" (FZ.4. p.51: 29-31, E:334;
K:301).
Vala can thus be seen to have a redemptive function in The Four Zoas;
she is the nature made alien and idolised who later becomes pastoral and
benign, thus prefiguring the pastoral/apocalyptic imagery of the harvest of
"Night the Ninth." In "Night the Seventh" Vala is described in a pastoral
context recalling an unfallen and integrated nature:
And she went forth & saw the forms of Life & of delight
Walking on Mountains or flying in the open expanse of heaven
She heard sweet voices in the winds & in the voices of the birds
That rose from waters for the waters were as the voice of Luvah
Not seen to her like waters or like this dark world of death
Tho all those fair perfections which men know only by name
In beautiful substantial forms appeard & served her
As food or drink or ornament or in delightful works
To build her bowers for the Elements brought forth abundantly
The living soul in glorious forms & every one came forth
Walking before her shadowy face & bowing at her feet
(FZ.7. p.94: 37-47, E:367; K:340)
Despite this taming of nature around Vala her counterpart, Ore, remains a
"howling Melancholy." Consequently Vala adjoins herself to Beulah, becoming
part of the benign and innocent pastoral state which becomes the site of the
"Eternal Promise:" "If ye will believe your B[r]other shall rise again" (FZ.7.
p.87[95]: 6, E:367 K:340). As soon as Vala has thus united with Beulah and
ceased to be a separate and idolised nature goddess, Los, enabled by pity and
Enitharmon, embraces his spectre: "Los embracd the Spectre first as a brother
/ Then as another Self; astonishd humanizing & in tears / In Self abasement"
(FZ.7. p87 [95]: 29-31, 367; K:328). If we accept this ordering of the text, then
the logic of the narrative suggests an overcoming of selfhood once nature is no
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longer a separate and tyrannising "female will." The Spectre reminds Los that
the individual is not the true or real self but that individuality is secondary and
parasitic upon a more general creating "life:" "For thou art but a form & organ
of life & of thyself / Art nothing being Created Continually by Mercy & Love
divine" (FZ.7. p.86[95]: 2-3, E:368; K:329). As Los's selfhood is decentred and
its finitude overcome, Blake employs the image of the opening gates: "Even I
already feel a World within / Opening its gates" (FZ.7. p. 86: 7-9, E:368 K:329).
And as Los embraces Enitharmon the image of the opening centre begins a
description of the new tripratite soul, no longer centred on reason (as in
Milton or Plato) but equally "threefold" and created by the imaginative labour
of Los:
But Enitharmon tremblng fled & hid beneath Urizens tree
But mingling together with his Spectre the Spectre of Urthona
Wondering beheld the Center opend by Divine Mercy inspired
He in his turn Gave Tasks to Los Enormous to destroy
That body he created but in vain for Los performd Wonders of labour
They Builded Golgonooza Los labouring builded pillars high
And Domes terrific in the nether heavens for beneath
Was opend new heavens & a new Earth beneath & within
Threefold within the brain within the heart within the loins
A Threefold Atmosphere Sublime continuous from Urthonas world
(FZ.7. p.87: 1-10, E:368; K:329)
Instead of picturing the different faculties of the self organised in a hierarchy
with only reason gaining access to transcendence, Blake describes each function
revealing a new heaven and earth. Three-fold vision is achieved by turning
"inward" or within. However, the context of The Four Zoas quite clearly
demonstrates that the heaven within must be preceded by "Self annihilation
back returning / To Life Eternal" (FZ.7 p.95[87]: 34-35, E:368; K:328).
Four-fold vision is the total unity achieved when the integrated three-fold self
merges with integrated others. Consequently, in Milton Blake describes
London (when it is renewed) as the city of art, as "Golgonooza the spiritual
Four-fold London eternal" (M, 6: 1, E:99; K:485). Blake repeats this figuring
of the city later in the first book of Milton: "the City of Golgonooza / Which is
the spiritual fourfold London, in the loins of Albion" (M, 20[22]: 39-40, E:114;
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K:502). Blake at once humanises the city by placing it in the loins of Albion at
the same time as he sees the city, not the individual, as the site for complete
vision. Furthermore the city, while being a renewed London, is still London -
Blake's own temporal city and not a lost or other-worldly realm. Blake's choice
of London as the spiritual four-fold city, and his inclusion of London's
topography in Jerusalem also exercises a performative function. By including
Blake's own locale in his prophecies he inscribes his own historical position into
the epic tradition. The suburbs of London and cities of Britain become, like
the cities of the Bible, a spiritual as well as geographic topography. The
invocation to Milton claims that we do not need classical models if we are but
just and true to our imaginations. Blake's use of London creates a new
imaginative model altering both the classic and Hebraic traditions.
While Vala represents nature and its renewal in The Four Zoas, she is
also important in the process of reunification because of her femininity.
Although she is the "female will" of The Four Zoas, the process of reintegrating
the feminine is central to the narrative of this and Blake's later prophecies.
The horror of the "Spectres of the Dead" in "Night the Seventh" is a
consequence of their being without their female counterparts thus precluding
their possibility of vision: "Each Male formd without a counterpart without a
concentering vision" (FZ.7. p.87: 30, E:369; K:330). Vala as a representation
of alienated female will and independent nature is joined by Jerusalem. The
emergence of Jerusalem occurs after Enitharmon has woven bodies for the
spectres; this process is described as "humanising" (FZ.8. p.101: 46, E:374;
K:344). It is only after the embodiment of the male spectrous self that the
retrieval of the female emanation can occur. Los and Enitharmon together
create a form for human life, "a Vast family wondrous in beauty & love" (FZ.8.
p.103: 37, E:376; K:345). Immediately after this Enitharmon names and
acknowledges Jerusalem:
And Enitharmon namd the Female Jerusa[le]m the holy
Wondring she saw the Lamb of God within Jerusalems Veil
The divine Vision seen within the inmost deep recess
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Of fair Jerusalems bosom in a gently beaming fire
Then sang the Sons of Eden round the Lamb of God & said
Glory Glory Glory to the holy Lamb of God
Who now beginneth to put off the dark Satanic body
Now we behold redemption Now we know that life Eternal
Depends alone upon the Universal hand & not in us
Is aught but death In individual weakness sorrow & pain
(FZ.8. p.104: 1-10, E:376; K:346)
With the appearance of Jerusalem, the body is no longer dark and Satanic, but
a created and imaginative body woven by Enitharmon.38 More importantly, the
atomisation of the individual self is overcome with the recognition of the
transcendence of the "Universal hand." Jerusalem, the agent of this moment of
redemption becomes the site against which a war of sexual difference is
conducted:
The war roard round Jerusalems Gates it took a hideous form
Seen in the aggregate a Vast Hermaphroditic form
Heavd like an Earthquake labring with convulsive groans
Intolerable at length an awful wonder burst
From the Hermaphroditic bosom Satan he was namd
Son of Perdition terrible his form dishumanizd monstrous
A male without a female counterpart a howling fiend
Fo[r]lorn of Eden & repugnant to the forms of life
Yet hiding the shadowy female Vala in an ark Curtains
(FZ.8. p. 104: 19-28, E:377; K:347)
Blake uses the figure of Satan elsewhere (for example, the Bard's Song of
Milton) to represent the impulse towards an annihilation of identity and
particularity. Here, Satan as an "Hermaphroditic form" is a figure of the
primary loss of difference - the difference of gender. He becomes the warlike
"female hid within male" by concealing Vala. He is protecting Vala's alienated
femininity which expresses itself in external nature and idolatry; hence the
hermaphroditic character of Satan is associated with a "dishumanizd" form.
But the mystery Vala encourages is overcome when the Lamb of God descends
through Jerusalem's gates (FZ.8. p.104: 30-35, E:378; K:347-48). Vala herself
is later redeemed in "Night the Ninth." As Albion awakes he gives Luvah and
Vala their rightful place in the human form (FZ.9. p.126: 5-10, E:395; K:366).
After this has been achieved Vala, united with Luvah, emerges from a pastoral
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landscape and acknowledges to Luvah the vegetative sleep which has consumed
her past:
Come forth O Vala from the grass & from the silent Dew
Rise from the dews of death for the Eternal Man is Risen
She rises among flowers & looks toward the Eastern clearness
She walks yea runs her feet are wingd on the tops of the bending grass
Her garments rejoice in the vocal wind & her hair glistens with dew
She answerd thus Whose voice is this in the voice of the nourishing air
In the spirit of the morning awaking the Soul from its grassy bed
Where dost thou dwell for it is thee I seek & but for thee
I must have slept Eternally nor have felt the dew of thy morning
(FZ.9. pp.126-27: 31-37 &1-2, E:395-96; K:367)
Following this image of Vala's resurrection, Vala conducts a dialogue with the
sun. She at first accuses the sun: "O be thou blotted out thou Sun that raisedst
me to trouble" (FZ.9. p.127: 20, E:396; K:368). But after being reproved by
the sun Vala begins an ode which praises the sun and natural harmony in
general:
Rise up O Sun most glorious minister & light of day
Flow on ye gentle airs & bear the voice of my rejoicing
Wave freshly clear waters flowing around the tender grass
And thou sweet smelling ground put forth thy life in fruits & flowers
Follow me O flocks & hear me sing my rapturous Song
I will cause my voice to be heard on the clouds that glitter in the sun
I will call & who shall answer me I will sing who shall reply
For from my pleasant hills behold the living living springs
Running among my green pastures delighting among my trees
I am not here alone my flocks you are my brethren
And you birds that sing & adorn the sky you are my sisters
(FZ.9. p.128: 4-14, E:397; K:368)
Vala, no longer a nature goddess, is now more like the Christian shepherd.
Her discourse is no longer that of individual will but of reciprocity, sisterhood
and brotherhood. Vala's overcoming of her own selfhood prefigures the
conclusion of "Night the Ninth" where the importance of the recognition of
others, rather than individualism, is procalimed by the Eternals:
In families we see our shadows born. & thence we know
That Man subsists by Brotherhood & Universal Love
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We fall on one anothers necks more closely we embrace
Not for ourselves but for the Eternal family we live
Man liveth not by Self alone but in his brothers face
Each shall behold the Eternal Father & love & joy abound
(FZ.9. p.133: 21-26, E:402; K:374)
The importance of gender to the fall lies in Blake's interpretation of the
fallen state as self-division. The emanation emerges before the separation of
the spectre. Antagonistic sexual opposition is the first stage towards
self-disintegration. The pathology of this type of sexual difference is made
clear by Urizen who likens Ahania to Vala, the archetype of female will, as he
casts her out:
Saying Art thou also become like Vala. thus I cast thee out
Shall the feminine indolent bliss, the indulgent self of weariness
The passive idle sleep the enormous night & darkness of Death
Set herself up to give her laws to the active masculine virtue
Thou little diminutive portion that darst be a counterpart
Thy passivity thy laws of obedience & insincerity
Are my abhorrence. Wherefore has thou taken that fair form
Whence is this power given to thee! once thou wast in my breast
A sluggish current of dim waters.
(FZ.3. p.43: 5-13, E:328-29; K:295)
Urizen's yearning for a past when Ahania was not a counterpart but a
"diminuitive portion" is similar to the Miltonic idea of hierarchical
subordination, where Ahania would be a necessary but inferior aspect of
Urizen's masculine self. S. Foster Damon has argued that Blake actually
reinforced the Miltonic advocation of gender hierarchy: "he believed
completely in the Miltonic ideal, that woman should submit to man, as man in
turn submits to God."39 In The Four Zoas, however, Blake demonstrates the
futility of this model of sexual difference; it is the self-enclosed and
domineering Urizen who demands subordination. Because Urizen perceives
himself as pure masculine activity, feminine passivity can only be a threat; even
in his supposedly unified past Ahania's passivity is likened to a "sluggish
current." Urizen cannot envision a sexual difference of equal contraries; he
even adopts a perverted form of the Miltonic trope of the feminine self as a
reflection of the masculine superior: "Reflecting all my indolence my weakness
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& my death" (FZ.3 p.43: 18, E:329; K:295). As we have seen, this metaphor of
reflection is subverted in Visions of the Daughters of Albion where Oothoon
challenges Theotormon's subordination with the rejoinder: "How can I be
defild when I reflect thy image pure?" (VDA, 3: 16, E:47: K:191). The
problem with Urizen's attitude towards sexual difference is the same as with his
attitude towards being in general. Reason must always totalise, define and
assimilate that which it examines. Urizen's assertion that Ahania is a
diminuitive portion of his existence is all part of his "self-closed" universe which
cannot acknowledge others or otherness. In his epics Blake's reintegration of
the femininity of Jerusalem which opens to divine vision symbolises both the
reintegration of the "other" part of the self as well as "others."
In the "Bard's Song" of Milton Blake offers a fable of female atonement
and in doing so subtly contradicts the Miltonic conception of women as
conducive to sin; he also challenges the idea of atonement as a form of divine
justice. As James Rieger has noted, the narrative of the Bard's Song is
concerned with the offering of the innocent to take on the sins of the guilty.
According to Rieger, Blake adopts this model in order to avoid becoming a
Satanic "accuser." In order to overcome the legalistic system of guilt and
punishment sin must be displaced: 'True wrath, pity, and love purge themselves
of their Satanic counterfeits by taking on the imputation of guilt that boggles
the legalistic understanding of the Sons of Albion."* Blake's doctrine of
self-effacement before others takes here the ethical turn of the attainment of
unwarranted forgiveness by an innocent for the guilty: "If the Guilty should be
condemn'd, he must be an Eternal Death / And one must die for another
throughout all Eternity" (M, 11[12]: 17-18. E:105; K:491). Consequently,
Leutha (a daughter of Beulah) offers "herself a Ransom for Satan, taking on
her, his Sin" (M, 11[12]: 30, E:105; K:492). In order to take on Satan's sin
Leutha recounts how she "sprang out of the breast of Satan" (M, 12[13]: 10,
E:105; K:492). This clearly recalls Milton's account of Sin springing from
Satan's head in Book Two of Paradise Lost. But Leutha, here, has taken on
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Satan's sin. When she announces that "I am the Author of this Sin" she is
offering herself to the Assembly, as an innocent, to take on Satan's guilt. The
entire fable she recounts is, then, less a story of the feminine origins of sin than
it is an account of the taking on of sin by the feminine. After Leutha has
recounted Satan's fall she recalls how Satan has expelled her from his "inmost
Palace of his nervous fine wrought Brain" in a self-righteous demand for purity:
Cloth'd in the Serpents folds, in selfish holiness demanding purity
Being most impure, self-condemn'd to eternal tears, he drove
Me from his inmost Brain & the doors clos'd with thunders sound
O Divine Vision who didst create the Female: to repose
The Sleepers of Beulah: pity the repentant Leutha
(M, 12[13]: 46-50, E:106; K:493)
The important point is not so much that Leutha is Innocent but that
Satan expels her in order to appear pure. Leutha is repentant while Satan
remains the accuser. Her offering of herself is a subtle prefiguring of the
theme of self-annihilation which both Milton and Blake will later undergo.
The renunciation of selfhood or individualism which forms an integral
part of Blake's prophecies is, however, not a mystical annihilation of the self
before an absolute transcendence.41 Blake rejects mystery as a political
weapon used to conceal the immediately apparent spirituality of human
existence: 'The good of the Land is before you for Mystery is no more" (FZ.9.
p. 134: 29, E:403; K:375). Once mystery is overcome, human enslavement to an
other-worldly realm of fulfilment will cease: "Then All the Slaves from every
Earth in the wide Universe / Sing a New Song drowning confusion in its happy
notes" (FZ.9. p.134: 30-31, E:403; K:375). Mark Schorer rejects the view that
Blake is a mystic by insisting on the poet's ethical vision: "his intuitions do not
have a religious but an ethical content, do not deal with man's relationship to
God but with man's realtionship to his total being and to other men."42 The
renewal of the Eternal Man is accompanied by Luvah's realisation that
conceptions of a transcendent and external deity are dehumanising. As soon as
Luvah recognises this fact he ceases to be an image of the suffering Christ:
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Attempting to be more than Man We become less said Luvah
As he arose from the bright feast drunk with the wine of ages
His crown of thorns fell from his head . . .
(FZ.9. p.135: 21-23, E:403; K:376)
The annihilation of selfhood in Blake's prophecies is not confined to
Milton and Blake's Eternals. Blake includes himself as a character in Milton
who is subsumed beneath the identity of Los. Blake's own experience of
visitation in Milton highlights the possibility for contemporary and not deferred
apocalypse. Like Wordsworth who asked of Paradise and the Elysian fields:
"why should they be / A history only of departed things?"43 Blake stresses that
redemption can occur here and now:
While Los heard indistinct with fear, what time I bound my sandals
On; to walk forward thro' Eternity, Los descended to me:
And Los behind me stood; a terible flaming Sun: just close
Behind my back; I turned round in terror, and behold.
Los stood in that fierce glowing fire; & he also stoop'd down
And bound my sandals on in Udan-Adan; trembling I stood
Exceedingly with fear & terror, atanding in the Vale
Of Lambeth: but he kissed me and wishd me health.
And I became One Man with him arising in my strength:
Twas too late now to recede. Los had enterd into my soul:
His terrors now possess'd me whole! I arose in fury & strength.
I am that Shadowy Prophet . . .
(M, 22[24]: 4-15, E:116-17; K:505)
Whereas Wordsworth's Excursion is "a review of his own mind"44 and other
individual minds, Blake's epic concentrates on the spiritual four-fold of
London and the annihilation of his own individuality into the "One Man." The
"I" of "I became One Man" shifts to "I arose in fury & strength" and becomes
the "I" of Los's "I am that Shadowy Prophet." Blake enacts the dissolution of
the lyric and Romantic "I " in this moment ofMilton where his "I" is subsumed
beneath the "I" of eternal imagination. While individuality, even the poet's
own, is sublated, the specificity of history is not obscured. Blake as Los
emphasises the importance of worldly existence and the here and now: "for not
one Moment / Of Time is lost, nor one Event of Space unpermanent / But all
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remain" (M, 22[24], 18-20, E:117; K:505). The world is not consumed in the
apocalypse but renewed. As Ronald Grimes has noted "The 'vegetable world,'
the world of time and space, is not left behind in a flight to the timeless but
becomes the foundation for a walk throught eternity."45 Similarly in The Four
Zoas each of the dead is resurrected "as he had livd before" bearing all the
marks of labour and suffering. The apocalypse neither annihilates nor justifies
the cruelty of human history:
And every one of the dead appears as he had livd before
And all the marks remain of the Slaves scourge & tyrants Crown
And of the Priests oergorged Abdomen & of the merchants thin
Sinewy deception & of the warriors ou[t]braving & thoughtlessness
In lineaments too extended & in bones too strait & long
They shew their wounds they accuse they sieze the oppressor howlings
began
(FZ.9. p.122-23: 40 & 1-5, E:392; K:363)
The doctrine of forgiveness which is emphasised to a greater extent in
Jerusalem is still significant in The Four Zoas which advocates a mutual
harmony of the four eternals rather than their continuing strife. But despite
Blake's renunciation of a punishing law the dead must still emerge with all
their marks and accuse their oppressor. This is done less in a spirit of revenge
than in a desire to recognise the multitudes of the city and their importance in
the spiritual London. The vengeful dead conduct a battle until they "see him
whom they have piercd." When they see this vision of Christ they cease being
warlike and "the Judge springs from his throne / Hiding his face in the dust
beneath the prisoners feet" (FZ.9. p.123: 20-25, E:392; K:364). Judgment ends,
forgiveness begins and eventually the plow of Urizen is taken up to begin the
harvest. Forgiveness for Blake does not mean forgetting the dead or
compensating for the world's injustice with an eventual atonement. The
harvest only begins when the dead have emerged, when the spectres have been
clothed and embodied and when the marks of suffering are acknowledged.
Renewal involves the cessation, not the effacement, of the history of war and
suffering.
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Blake's response to Milton, therefore, challenges the logical ethics of
justice and virtue with a doctrine of forgiveness and an aesthetic theory
reinforcing the importance of intersubjective imagination. For Milton and the
later Romantics, solitary reflection enabled the self to surpass its worldly limits
and gain transcendence. For Blake the individual self is the consequence of a
fall into disunity; only by annihilating the self and regaining the original
condition of brotherhood can the imagination be liberated. Against Milton's
hierarchisation of contraries Blake sets mutual integration; energy and its
bounding form. The mind and the body and masculinity and femininity are not
distinct modes of being in an ordered hierarchy but facets of a unified being
grounded in the imagination. Blake adopts the overarching figure of the divine
imagination, Christ or Albion in order to give a ground and form to the
formless void of modern ideology. The Aristotelian ontology, in which each
being has its own place in the cosmos because of its ontological mode, relies
upon a theory of natural law and is therefore anathema to Blake. But Blake
still rejects the equalitarianism of the Newtonian void and asserts the "minute
particulars" of each being. In order to achieve a differentiation of the void
without drawing upon a transcendent order or divine law, Blake places all















George Mills Harper, The NeoPlatonism of William Blake (Chapel:
University of California Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1961)
35. Harper quotes from Blake's letter to George Cumberland of July
1800 (E:706; K:797).
S. Foster Damon, William Blake: His Philosophy and Symbols
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958) 166.
Harper 57.
I would therefore agree with Harold Bloom who, writing about the first
chapter of Jerusalem, states: "Nothing can be further from Platonism
than this doctrine of the utter dependence of nature upon art for its
energies, as the ultimate forms are made by Los, the imaginative
principle in man, and do not exist apart from any man's creativity."
Blake's Apocalypse 385-86.
Erdman, Prophet 286.
M.H. Abrams, "English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age,"
Romanticism Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute, ed.




D.J. Sloss and J.P.R. Wallis, The Prophetic Writings of William Blake,
vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 192b) 143.
I have followed David Erdman in placing deleted, erased, written over
or replaced material in italics and square brackets.
Ronald L. Grimes, "Time and Space in Blake's Major Prophecies,"
Blake's Sublime Allegory: Essays on The Four Zoas Milton Jerusalem,
ed. Stuart Curran and Joseph Anthony Wittreich Jr. (Wisconsin:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1973) 65.
Joseph Addison, The Spectator [339, (Sat. Mar. 29, 1712)], ed. Donald
F. Bond, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) 258.
254
14 'To Isaac Bickerstaff Esq." [32, Thursday, June 23, 1709] The Tatler, ed.
Donald F. Bond, vol.1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 237.
15 William Hayley, The Life of Milton, 2nd ed. (1796); Facsimile
Reproduction, ed. Joseph Anthony Wittreich Jr. (Gainesville: Scholars'
Facsimiles and Reprints, 1970) 206.
16 Hayley, Life viii-ix.
17 Hayley, Life 26.
18 Hayley, Life 48-49.
19 Hayley, Life 56.
20 Hayley, Life 57 & 58.
21 See Arthur Barker, "And On His Crest Sat Horror: Eighteenth Century
Interpretations of Milton's Sublimity," University of Toronto Quarterly 11
(1941-2): 421-36.
22 F.C., " To Mr. John Milton, On . . . Paradise Lost," H.J. Todd ed., The
Poetical Works of John Milton with Notes of Various Authors, 3rd ed.,
vol. 1 (London, 1826) 199-200.
23 "A Propitiatory Sacrifice to the Ghost of John Milton ..." Todd,
Poetical Works ofJohn Milton 202.
24 Joseph Addison, "An Account of the Greatest English Poets, To Mr
Henry Sacheverell, April 3. 1694," The Poetical Works of the Right
Honourable Joseph Addison, Esq. (Edinburgh, 1773) 32.
25 W.S, "An Epistle to Mr. W , Fellow of This Coll. Cantab." qtd. in
John Walter Good, Studies in the Milton Tradition (Urbana: University
of Illinois, 191S) 60.
26 William Cowper, "The Task," Book 3, The Poetical Works of William
Cowper, ed. Charles Whitehead (London, 1857) 301.
27 Mark Akenside, 'To Thomas Edwards, Esq. On the Late Edition of
Mr. Pope's Works," The Poetical Works of Mark Akenside, Charles
Cowden Clarke ed. (London, 1880) 220.
28 Samuel Bishop, "Genius," The Poetical Works of the Rev. Samuel Bishop,
Thomas Clare ed., vol.1 (London, 1796) 222.
255
29 William Hayley, "An Essay on Epic Poetry." Hayley's Poems and Plays,
vol. 3 (London, 1785) 73 .
30 Michael C. Ferber has argued that although Locke's rejection of innate
ideas was popular with late seventeenth-and-early-eighteenth-century
radicals and dissenters, by the mid-eighteenth century the radical
tradition began to doubt the philosophy of unbridled individual freedom
and commercialism. According to Fcrber, the Quaker tradition, which
emphasised the "inner light" provided an antidote to Locke's
equalitarianism. By returning to seventeenth-century Christian thought
it could be argued that "man's potential innate autonomy requires for its
fulfilment not the 'right' to enter into contracts with other isolated selves
but the radical mutual interpenetration of others in a total community."
Michael Ferber, The Social Vision of William Blake (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985) 25.
31 Blake summarises this modern world-view in his annotations to
Thornton's The Lord's Prayer, Newly Translated: "Thus we see that the
Real God is the Goddess Nature & that God Creates nothing but what
can be Touchd & Weighed & Taxed & Measured" (E:670; K:789).
32 Satan does not only represent aspects of modern individualism; he is
also associated with the traditional virtues of which Blake was critical,
including justice, Milton's central virtue. The "four iron pillars of Satans
Throne" are 'Temperance, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude." Blake
describes these virtues as "the four pillars of tyranny" (M, 29[31]: 48-49,
E:128; K:517).
33 This line in Jerusalem also recalls Milton's description of chaos in
Paradise Lost-. "Without dimension, where length, bredth, and highth, /
And time and place are lost" (PL.2.893-94).
34 Locke, Essay, bk.4, ch. 6, 10 585.
35 William Wordsworth, "The Prelude," (1805) Wordsworth: Poetical Works,
rev. ed. ed. Thomas Hutchinson and Ernest de Selincourt (1969; Oxford:
256
Oxford University Press, 1987). All quotations are taken from this
edition.
36 Harold Bloom, writing of There is No Natural Religion, points out that
Blake's reaction to Cartesian doubt was to endow the natural world with
as much truth and meaning as possible: "As Descartes had resolved to
doubt whatever could be doubted, so Blake in reaction resolved to find
an image of truth in everything it was possible to believe." Blake's
Apocalypse, 24.
37 Following David Erdman I have included deleted material in italics and
square brackets.
38 Morton D. Paley has argued that Blake's theory of
creation-as-emanation in The Four Zoas forces him to see the body as
fallen despite his avowed valorisation of the body elsewhere. The figure
of weaving, or the garment, is therefore introduced to overcome this
difficulty by placing an intermediary between the spiritual and natural
levels of being: "In introducing the figure of the garment, Blake makes it
possible for us to view the body as a buffer zone between the drives and
appetites which constitute man as mere spectre and Beulah, the
potential earthly paradise within." Morton D. Paley, "The Figure of the
Garment in The Four Zoas, Milton and Jerusalem," Curran and
Wittreich, Sublime Allegory 126.
39 S. Foster Damon, William Blake 113.
40 James Rieger, "The Hem of Their Garments': The Bard's Song in
Milton," Curran and Wittreich, Sublime Allegory, 270.
41 S. Foster Damon defined Blake as a mystic but used the Evelyn
Underhill definition of mysticism as the belief that heaven is "an actual
state within us." S. Foster Damon, William Blake 2. Even employing
this definition Blake is not quite a mystic, for heaven not only lies within
but between human beings in human interaction.
42 Mark Schorer, William Blake: The Politics of Vision (New York: Henry
Holt, 1946) 47.
257
43 William Wordsworth, Preface to The Excursion, (11.49-50), Poetical
Works 590.
44 Wordsworth 589.
45 Ronald L. Grimes, 'Time and Space in Blake's Major Prophecies,"
Curran and Wittreich, Sublime Allegory 61. Harold Bloom also insists
that "Blake's heaven ... is a radical renewal of this world, an Earth
more alive to the awakened senses than the one that so fearfully turns
away." Blake's Apocalypse, 131. I consequently disagree with G.M.
Harper who claimed that "Blake agreed with the Neoplatonists in
considering time as essentially evil because of its connections with the
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it is the external empty container of Newtonian philosophy. Once time
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In his early work, De Idea Platonica, Milton satirises the Aristotelian
realism which refuses to understand the transcendent nature of the Platonic
"idea" or "form."1 The realist speaker asks "who that first man was according to
whose likeness cunning nature moulded all the forms of men . . . the pattern
used by God." The literal-minded speaker fails to understand the Platonic
relationship between universals and particulars. By asking who and where "that
first man" is the speaker is asking particular questions of universals and fails to
grasp the eternal and transcendent character of the idea. Significantly, the
exemplary "idea" used by Milton in De Idea Platonica is that of the eternal
form of "man," a "mighty giant, this archetype of man." The idea of the
archetypal man is actually a neo-Platonic conception. The Christian
neo-Platonists usually explained the Platonic forms as "ideas" of the divine
mind. Milton seems to support this interpretation with his repeated insistence
that knowledge of what is eternally true can only be achieved through the
soul's relationship to God. In his Platonic Seventh Prolusion Milton insists that
contemplation of the forms, spiritual devotion and perfect knowledge are
intertwined (CPW.1.292-306).
Unlike the literalist Aristotelian speaker of De Idea Platonica, Milton is
able to argue coherently about eternal forms or ideas because he has
established a transcendent God. Blake, like the speaker of De Idea Platonica,
is also concerned with the "mighty giant, or eternal man" (De_Idea.) and
similarly repudiates the concept of transcendence. It is not surprising,
therefore, that given Milton's defence of transcendence, Blake's response is to
re-humanise the archetypal man. Albion is not a "pattern used by god" nor is
he "lodged in the brain of Jove" (De Idea.) Blake's insistence that each
particular entity has its own form refuses the transcendence of form in the
Platonic sense. At the same time, his positing of an "eternal man" provides an
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intersubjective ground for each particular form - a point of forgiveness and
renewal - which is, again, not transcendent in the Platonic or Miltonic sense.
Blake's "eternal man" exists at the level of imagination and creation.
Milton's descent from eternity in Milton which precipitates the awakening of
Albion is primarily an aesthetic and communicative act. Milton refuses the
transcendence of reason by sculpting Urizen in clay and overcomes the divisive
and antagonistic behaviour of Satan by acknowledging his complicity with the
accuser:
Satan! my Spectre! I know my power thee to annihilate
And be a greater in thy place, & be thy Tabernacle
A covering for thee to do thy will, till one greater comes
And smites me as I smote thee & becomes my covering.
(M, 38[43]: 29-32, E:139; K:529)
The "grey monk" cycle of accusation and punishment is overcome by Milton's
refusal to be "a greater" in the place of Satan - a refusal to become a holy
tabernacle only to be succeeded by another accuser.
The Miltonic notion of the integrity of justice is challenged by Blake's
doctrine of forgiveness. The logical necessity and transcendence which
grounded the classical conception of the virtues subordinates human existence
to an external command or form. Milton, whose main aim was the
internalisation of the law, allowed for this element of exteriority because for
him the soul, by its transcendent nature, was a part of divine transcendence.
Blake's refusal of transcendence, however, grounds an ethics thoroughly
immanent to human being where the only transcendence allowed is the
imaginative aggregate of other human beings. For Milton, God must expel
Adam from paradise in accord with divine law which is anterior to will. The
moderns, reacting against the traditional logic of divine law, created a
voluntarist and willing God and a corresponding worldly ethics based on human
will rather than virtue. Blake rejects both the transcendence of divine law and
the atomisation of individual wills in the modern state of nature. Whereas for
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Milton grace could not be extended without the satisfaction of justice, Blake's
ethics of forgiveness is based upon the compelling and spontaneous recognition
of others prior to law or self-interest.
In traditional ethics the passions and the will were limited and ordered
by the virtues. Once the traditional concept of the virtues was abandoned
modern ethics confronted the problem of how ethical behaviour could be
legitimated. What could limit the desires of the self? For Hobbes, only the
state can control self-interest, the state being an outgrowth of longer-term
self-interest. Critics of Hobbes's arguments maintained that ethical behaviour
was not a function of self-interest and that the self could outstep its own
desires. Hazlitt, who articulated the most vehement opposition to Hobbesian
self-interest argued for disinterestedness but did so from the empiricist's
premise of the isolated individual. While arguing that the self could surpass its
own interests Hazlitt still maintained the ontological self-sufficiency of
individuals. Concern for the welfare of others is analogous to concern for our
own future affairs. While it is true that we cannot experience the feelings of
our own future concerns we can project ourselves "forward" to what we cannot
presently feel. By the same argument, just as I can project towards my own
future affairs so I can project into the affairs of others. While the present and
past can only be known by the "mechanical" effect of sensations,
I have not the same sort of exclusive, or mechanical self-interest in my
future being or welfare, because I have no distinct faculty giving me a
direct present interest in my future sensations, and none at all in those
of others. The imagination, by means of which alone I can anticipate
future objects, or be interested in them, must carry me out of myself
into the feelings of others by one and the same process by which I am
thrown forward as it were into my future being, and interested in it.2
Hazlitt still presupposes modern individual self-presence in order to argue that
self-love entails "loving others."3 His imagination is still the individual
imagination, albeit one which can seek the good of others. For Hazlitt we can
only experience our own feelings or interests directly; interest for others has to
be derived from this basis. Consequently both Hobbes and Hazlitt argue for
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the "mechanical" and individual nature of experience, although Hazlitt extends
the perimeters of this experience. Blake denies the modern individualist
premises on both sides of this debate. It is not necessary to prove or argue
that the self can or cannot act above and beyond its interest, for the "self' is an
aberration of the fallen world of traditional ethics and modern ideology.
Appropriately conceived, selves are not selves at all but are by their very
nature mutually constitutive aspects of an eternal imagination. Selves do not
need to step out of their own interests; they are already formed and created by
the existence of others. The grounds of existence for Blake - the imagination,
Jerusalem the building of human souls, and the body of Christ of which all
believers form a part - are primarily intersubjective. Such "intersubjectivity" is
not a "connection" of individuals but the ground from which individuals are
formed.
In his invocations to Paradise Lost Milton had expressed the impotence
of individual genius without the influx of divine aid. Milton's ethics, in general,
centred on the recognition of human finitude - a fact lamentably overlooked by
his Satan. Blake refutes the finitude of human being, constantly stressing the
infinite and all-encompassing character of the imagination. At the same time,
like Milton, Blake also challenges the modern drive to autonomy and
self-grounding. The individual is finite but human being in general is infinite.
Milton's reason could be autonomous and self-grounding once it received the
influx of divine light. Blake's images of redemption, on the other hand, do not
involve inward vision (as in Samson Agonistes) but interaction and recognition:
the retrieval of the female emanation, the embodiment and embrace of
reason/Urizen, the construction of a building of souls (Jerusalem) and the
renewal of the eternal human form (Albion). This move outwards beyond the
self is not, however, a move to alienation or exteriority but a return to
imagination's proper dwelling. Such a return is never final precisely because
the imagination is appropriately not a static and self-enclosed entity but a
dynamic, renovating and inclusive act of a plurality of beings. In contrast to
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Milton's transcendent and eternal God of truth and justice Blake sets the
ever-renewing imagination: not the solitary imagination, but the renovative
powers in the continually recreated art of the eternal man: "All things acted on
Earth are seen in the bright Sculptures of / Los's Halls & every Age renews its
powers from these Works" (J, 16: 61-62, E:161; K:638).
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